Emotional Reactions and Moral Judgment: The Effects of Morally Challenging Interactions in Military Operations

This study explores the association between different types of morally challenging interactions during military deployment and response strategies (e.g., moral justification), as well as the mediating role of moral emotions. Interviews with Dutch servicemen who participated in military operations (e.g., in Afghanistan, Angola; N = 45) were content coded. We found a relationship between local-cultural and team-related interactions and moral justification; these effects were mediated by other-condemning emotions. Similarly, other-condemning emotions mediated the relationship between local-cultural interactions and relativism. This study points at the importance of other-condemning emotions in shaping military reactions to frequently occurring morally challenging interactions.     

The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal

The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism and irrealism in accounting for moral residue and other crucial phenomenological dimensions of our experience of moral dilemmas.     

The Experience of Ethical Dilemmas,Burnout, and Stress Among Practicing Counselors

The authors reported findings from a correlational investigation examining the relationship between counselors' (N = 140) experiences with ethical dilemmas and their reported levels of burnout and stress. Using structural equation modeling, the authors identified that a higher rate of encountering ethical dilemmas related to an increased level of counselor burnout and stress among the participants. However, higher rates of reflecting on the ethical dilemmas did not have a relationship with participants' burnout and stress. The authors present implications of these findings for counselors, along with future research directions.     

Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.     

A logic for deontic dilemmas

The possibility of deontic dilemmas poses a significant problem for deontic logic. Here I review some proposals to resolve this problem, and then offer a new account. This is a simple modification of standard deontic logic that enables the system to accommodate deontic dilemmas without inconsistency and without deontic explosion, while at the same time accounting for the range of genuinely valid inferences.     

The mismeasure of morals: antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral.     

Public good provision in inter‐team conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit‐sharing rule

A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free‐riding. Extending existing literature, we focus on asymmetric competitions between teams of unequal size, and competitions between more than two teams. Comparing two protocols for sharing the prize—egalitarian and proportional profit‐sharing rules—we find that (i) free‐riding diminishes and (ii) team members contribute more toward their team's effort when they belong to the larger team and when the profit‐sharing rule is proportional. (iii) Additionally, under the egalitarian profit‐sharing rule team members contribute more than predicted by the equilibrium solution. We discuss implications of our findings for eliciting contributions in competitive environments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which type of leader do I support in step‐level public good dilemmas? The roles of level of threshold and trust

The present research examined the moderating effect of the level of threshold on people's preferences for different leader types in step-level public good dilemmas. It was assumed that the primary focus of people in step-level public good dilemmas is to make sure that the group surpasses the threshold. Consequently, when the level of threshold is difficult to reach people are expected to provide more support for and cooperate with a leader that monitors and controls the contributions made toward the public good. However, if the threshold is easy to surpass people will focus more on whether the obtained public good or bonus will be distributed according to agreements, suggesting that people will provide more support to and cooperate with a leader that monitors and controls the distribution of the bonus. These predictions were confirmed across two experiments using a step-level public good paradigm with a dichotomous (Study 1) and a continuous (Study 2) contribution choice. Moreover, the results also revealed that perceptions of trust accounted, in part, for the effect of level of threshold on people's leadership preferences.     

Two approaches to the formalisation of defeasible deontic reasoning

This paper compares two ways of formalising defeasible deontic reasoning, both based on the view that the issues of conflicting obligations and moral dilemmas should be dealt with from the perspective of nonmonotonic reasoning. The first way is developing a special nonmonotonic logic for deontic statements. This method turns out to have some limitations, for which reason another approach is recommended, viz. combining an already existing nonmonotonic logic with a deontic logic. As an example of this method the language of Reiter's default logic is extended to include modal expressions, after which the argumentation framework in default logic of [20, 22] is used to give a plausible logical analysis of moral dilemmas and prima facie obligations.An earlier version of this article was written while the author was working at the Department of Computing, Imperial College London, supported by ESRC/MRC/SERC Joint Council Initiative Project G9212036. Work on the present version was supported by a research fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, and by Esprit WG 8319 Modelage. I thank one of the referees for his interesting comments. Also, many thanks are due to Marek Sergot for valuable discussions on the topic of this paper.     

Dilemmas that undermine supervisor confidence

Background

Conventional wisdom links supervisor self‐confidence with experience in supervisory practice.

Aims

This study explored the nature of confidence from an emic perspective.

Method

Twelve experienced Canadian supervisors were interviewed, and data was analysed using Structured Thematic Analysis.

Results

Aspects of the role and process produce tensions that create ambiguity that may diminish self‐confidence. Five main themes were distilled: (a) building supervisee confidence when experiencing self‐doubt as supervisor or clinician;(b) parallel process‐what disturbs therapy disturbs supervision; (c) expert vs. co‐explorer; (d) engaging in supervision while maintaining boundaries; and (e) catch 22 – inviting disclosures of difficulties and evaluation.

Conclusion

The study adds nuance to the scholarly work that informs supervisor self‐confidence.