Jealousy at work: The role of rivals’ characteristics

The present study examined rival characteristics that may evoke jealousy in the workplace, differences between men and women in this regard, and the relationship between jealousy responses and intrasexual competitiveness and social comparison orientation. Participants were 426 male and female employees. By means of a questionnaire, participants were presented with a jealousy‐evoking scenario after which jealousy responses to 24 rival characteristics were assessed. Findings showed that a rival's social communal attributes evoked highest levels of jealousy, and that, compared to men, women reported more jealousy in response to a rival's physical attractiveness. Overall, as individuals had higher scores on intrasexual competitiveness and social comparison orientation, they also experienced more jealousy in response to their rival, regardless of his or her characteristics. These findings suggest that those characteristics that are highly valued in employees may backfire when employees perceive co‐workers as rivals.     

Group choice: competition, travel, and the ideal free distribution

If a group of foragers distributes among resource patches according to the ideal free distribution, the relative number of foragers in each patch should match the relative amount of resource obtained there, unless deviations arise from factors such as incomplete information or interforager interference. In analogy to individual choice, such effects may produce undermatching—group distribution falling short of resource distribution—or overmatching—group distribution overshooting resource distribution. In the present experiments, a flock of about 30 pigeons distributed between two patches with continuous inputs of green peas. Competition was varied by changing the size or extent of the patches. When the patches were areas or troughs, some undermatching occurred. When the patches were small bowls, strong undermatching occurred. When travel was required to switch patches, undermatching decreased slightly. A visual barrier that prevented pigeons from seeing one patch from the other had no effect. Overall rate of food delivery, varied over a wide range, had no effect. It appeared that the mechanism of flock distribution depended on comparisons between patches that were successive rather than simultaneous. Although most pigeons participated in the experiments, and different pigeons participated to different extents, individual pigeons tended to be consistent in the extent of participation from session to session, suggesting the possibility that participation might reflect competitive ability. Examination of the preferences and switching of individual pigeons revealed no consistency within or across individuals. It appeared that the flock's distribution was a truly emergent phenomenon, in the sense that results at the level of the flock in no way paralleled behavior at the level of the individual.     

Testing a direct mapping versus competition account of response dynamics in number comparison†

Tracking hand movements during number tasks has become a powerful method for disentangling competing models of numerical representation. In two experiments, participants used a computer mouse to choose whether presented numbers were greater than or less than 5. In Experiment 1, trajectories became more curved towards the incorrect response as targets approached the standard 5, indicating increasing response competition. However, trajectories showed a rightward bias modulated by numerical distance and target size, indicating a direct mapping between hand movement and an ordered, spatial number representation. In Experiment 2, I changed the direction of mouse movements bottom-to-top orientation to left-to-right. Trajectories again became more curved towards the incorrect response as targets approached 5, but this time, there was no modulation of trajectory bias by target size or distance. The results call into question a direct mapping account and instead lend support to a competition model of response dynamics in number comparison.     

A caveat on the Savage–Dickey density ratio: The case of computing Bayes factors for regression parameters

The Savage–Dickey density ratio is a simple method for computing the Bayes factor for an equality constraint on one or more parameters of a statistical model. In regression analysis, this includes the important scenario of testing whether one or more of the covariates have an effect on the dependent variable. However, the Savage–Dickey ratio only provides the correct Bayes factor if the prior distribution of the nuisance parameters under the nested model is identical to the conditional prior under the full model given the equality constraint. This condition is violated for multiple regression models with a Jeffreys–Zellner–Siow prior, which is often used as a default prior in psychology. Besides linear regression models, the limitation of the Savage–Dickey ratio is especially relevant when analytical solutions for the Bayes factor are not available. This is the case for generalized linear models, non-linear models, or cognitive process models with regression extensions. As a remedy, the correct Bayes factor can be computed using a generalized version of the Savage–Dickey density ratio.     

Self‐control depletion impairs goal maintenance: A meta‐analysis

Initial exertion of self‐control has been suggested to impair subsequent self‐regulatory performance. The specific cognitive processes that underlie this ego depletion effect have rarely been examined. Drawing on the dual‐process theory of executive control (Engle & Kane, 2004 ; Kane & Engle, 2003 ), the current meta‐analysis revealed that initial self‐control exertion impairs participants’ capacities of maintaining the task goal but its effect on capacities of resolving response competition is in need of further investigation. Our results are more consistent with recent theoretical views that consider ego depletion as a switch cost and a result arising from reduced motivation to engage in further self‐control.     

连续性公共物品困境中信息结构对决策行为的影响

选取240名大学二年级的学生,通过局域网信息反馈,进行了模拟投资的小组实验。结果发现,1、在连续性公共物品困境和自协调序列规则下,先前决策者的合作行为在决策的早期和中期起到了明显的榜样示范作用,并导致后续决策者的合作行为增加;2、这种示范作用在决策后期不起作用,被试出于搭便车或者担心自己利益受损的心理会表现出较高的竞争行为;3、先前决策者的竞争行为在整个决策过程中都起到明显的示范作用,使后续决策者的合作率保持在较低的水平;4、在没有任何信息反馈的情况下,被试倾向于在初期就做出投资决策,并表现出一定程度的合作行为。     

群际接触理论介评

群际接触理论是关于群际关系的一个重要理论,其核心是过失无知现象,该理论认为通过在最佳情境中进行接触能减少群体间的偏见。该文阐述了Allport的接触假说,从四个方面论述了其他研究者对Allport接触假说的质疑及其对理论的完善,最后对Pettigrew提出的理论模型进行了介绍。     

预期推理在长时记忆中的表征形式

该研究采用移动窗口技术,通过两个实验研究探讨在高低不同竞争条件下预期推理结果在长时记忆中的表征形式。实验结果表明,预期推理在长时记忆中的表征形式依赖于文本中预期推理的引发语境,在不同竞争强度的预期语境中,预期推理的结果在长时记忆会以不同的形式进行表征。在低竞争条件下,预期推理的结果以确定的形式表征;只有在高竞争条件下,预期推理的结果才会以假定的形式进行表征。     

Rugby versus Soccer in South Africa: Content familiarity contributes to cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores

In this study, cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores are hypothesized to depend on a test's cultural complexity (Cultural Complexity Hypothesis: CCH), here conceptualized as its content familiarity, rather than on its cognitive complexity (Spearman's Hypothesis: SH). The content familiarity of tests assessing short-term memory, attention, working memory, and figural and verbal fluid reasoning, was manipulated by constructing test versions with an item content derived from either Afrikaans or Tswana culture in South Africa. Both test versions were administered to children of both cultures. The sample consisted of 161 urban Afrikaans, 181 urban, and 159 rural Tswana children (M_age = 9.37 years). Children generally performed best on the test version that was designed for their own group, particularly on the cognitively and culturally complex working memory and figural fluid reasoning tests. This relation between content familiarity and cognitive test performance supports CCH and disconfirms SH.     

Public good provision in inter‐team conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit‐sharing rule

A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free‐riding. Extending existing literature, we focus on asymmetric competitions between teams of unequal size, and competitions between more than two teams. Comparing two protocols for sharing the prize—egalitarian and proportional profit‐sharing rules—we find that (i) free‐riding diminishes and (ii) team members contribute more toward their team's effort when they belong to the larger team and when the profit‐sharing rule is proportional. (iii) Additionally, under the egalitarian profit‐sharing rule team members contribute more than predicted by the equilibrium solution. We discuss implications of our findings for eliciting contributions in competitive environments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.