The Moral Philosophy of Raimond Gaitaand Some Questions of Methodin the Philosophy of Religion

Raimond Gaita's moral philosophy is distinguished by, among other things, its attention to the role of embodied, enacted witness in disclosing certain moral values, and its understanding of the emotions as forms of thought. In this paper, I consider how Gaita's insights on these matters may be applied to certain questions in the philosophy of religion, paying particular attention to the nature of religious experience and 'the problem of evil'. I suggest that Gaita's discussion of how we come to recognise moral values or 'meanings' can be extended to the question of how we might recognise religious meanings. On this view, religious experience may take the form of an appreciation of the meaning borne by a material context (rather than, for example, some supra-sensory encounter with a supernatural agent), and our sense of the goodness or otherwise of the world may be answerable to the authoritative example of particular lives.     

A systematic examination of different parameters of presession exposure to tangible stimuli that maintain problem behavior

We examined the effects of three different presession conditions on tangibly maintained problem behavior for 2 students with autism, using individual-participant multielement designs. First, an analogue functional analysis demonstrated that problem behavior was maintained by access to tangible items. Next, topographies of item rejection were identified. Finally, students were exposed to (a) brief access, (b) no access, and (c) satiation to the tangible items prior to tangible sessions. The results demonstrated high levels of problem behavior following the brief-access and no-access presession conditions and low levels of problem behavior following the satiation condition. The findings are discussed in the context of how satiation might best be defined for these sorts of evaluations.     

AN EVALUATION OF RESURGENCE DURING TREATMENT WITH FUNCTIONAL COMMUNICATION TRAINING

Extinction‐induced resurgence is the recurrence of previously reinforced behavior when another behavior is placed on extinction (Lieving, Hagopian, Long, & O'Connor, 2004). This phenomenon may account for some instances of treatment relapse when problem behavior recovers during extinction‐based treatments. The current study sought to determine whether resurgence of problem behavior would reliably occur with 5 participants who received treatment with FCT. Results showed that problem behavior reemerged for all but 1 participant when the communicative response was exposed to extinction or thin schedules of reinforcement. These findings suggest that resurgence may account for some instances of response recovery during treatment, and that the described procedure may be useful for the further study of resurgence and eventual prevention of this phenomenon.     

THE EFFECTS OF TEACHING PRECURRENT BEHAVIORS ON CHILDREN'S SOLUTION OF MULTIPLICATION AND DIVISION WORD PROBLEMS

We examined the effects of teaching overt precurrent behaviors on the current operant of solving multiplication and division word problems. Two students were taught four precurrent behaviors (identification of label, operation, larger numbers, and smaller numbers) in a different order, in the context of a multiple baseline design. After meeting criterion on three of the four precurrent skills, the students demonstrated the current operant of correct problem solutions. These skills generalized to novel problems. Correct current operant responses (solutions that matched answers revealed by coloring over the space with a special marker) maintained the precurrent behaviors in the absence of any other programmed reinforcement.     

USE OF LATENCY TO PROBLEM BEHAVIOR TO EVALUATE DEMANDS FOR INCLUSION IN FUNCTIONAL ANALYSES

Few direct‐assessment procedures are designed to identify potential negative reinforcers (e.g., including demands in the escape condition of functional analyses). Two participants were systematically exposed to a series of demands nominated by caregivers as potential negative reinforcers. Sessions ended following the first instance of problem behavior, and a hierarchy of demand aversiveness was created based on the latency to the first problem behavior. Subsequent functional analyses confirmed the predictive value of the hierarchy, with shorter latency demands consistently producing more differentiated functional analysis outcomes.     

A semantics-based approach to the "no negative evidence" problem

Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument-structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., * Don't giggle me ) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax-semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy-two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (* The funny man's joke giggled Bart ) and lower (* The funny man giggled Bart ) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more-direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less-direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great.     

Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative

The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons. I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response. I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’ phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.

What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?

Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.

The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality

We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.

影响9点问题解决的关键行为

在已有研究的基础上,作者提出划出第三条线是解决9点问题关键行为的假设,并设计了三个实验来验证假设.结果表明:任意两条线的提示训练使9点问题的解决率接近或达到100%,因而,提示两条线不能被看成是解决9点问题的关键行为;而提示划出第三条线的训练使9点问题的解决率明显高于提示其它任何一条线训练的效果,可以被认为是解决9点问题的关键行为;能够引导被试划出第三条线的训练使9点问题的解决率明显提高.