Science and Human Behavior: a tutorial in behavior analysis

B. F. Skinner's Science and Human Behavior (1953) became the main source of my understanding of behavior during my first semester as a college professor in 1955 at Kansas University. It has continued to exert a major influence throughout my career as the basis for a completely deterministic science of behavior, as a handbook to be consulted as a first step in dealing with any issue in behavior analysis, and as a tutorial in behavioral interpretive analysis--in the use of a small number of behavioral concepts and principles to understand behavior of all degrees of complexity. I describe four general interpretive orientations or maxims that are of broad significance for behavior analysis, and also two underappreciated major theoretical contributions.     

Real Objects Can Impede Conditional Reasoning but Augmented Objects Do Not

In this study, Knauff and Johnson‐Laird's (2002) visual impedance hypothesis (i.e., mental representations with irrelevant visual detail can impede reasoning) is applied to the domain of external representations and diagrammatic reasoning. We show that the use of real objects and augmented real (AR) objects can control human interpretation and reasoning about conditionals. As participants made inferences (e.g., an invalid one from "if P then Q" to "P"), they also moved objects corresponding to premises. Participants who moved real objects made more invalid inferences than those who moved AR objects and those who did not manipulate objects (there was no significant difference between the last two groups). Our results showed that real objects impeded conditional reasoning, but AR objects did not. These findings are explained by the fact that real objects may over‐specify a single state that exists, while AR objects suggest multiple possibilities.     

疫病与外交：清末民初华洋互动视域下的瘟疫防治

瘟疫贯穿人类历史发展始终。近代以降,由于列强势力深入中国各地,围绕瘟疫防治而产生的华洋互动日趋频繁。一方面,外侨主导的防疫事业引发了中国社会各阶层收回防疫主权的外交诉求;另一方面,列强以防疫之名行侵略之实的行为使得华洋之间围绕国权展开了艰难博弈。在此过程之中,近代中国政府通过完善其行政能力,更有力地介入到防疫领域的管理中,推动了防疫事业的制度化发展,并以外交的方式维护公共卫生领域的国权,从而在应对公共卫生事件中逐步走向成熟。

     

Terrorist Suspect Religious Identity and Public Support for Harsh Interrogation and Detention Practices

Does the U.S. public's support for the use of harsh interrogation and detention practices against terrorism suspects depend upon the religious identity of the alleged perpetrators? Some scholarly research indicates greater public acceptance for abridging the rights of Muslims after 9/11. This is consistent with literature suggesting that heightened perception of threat decreases popular tolerance for racial, ethnic, and religious outgroups. This study executes a survey experiment and finds respondents to be more permissive of the use of extraordinary detention practices, such as indefinite detention and denying suspects access to legal counsel and civilian criminal courts, against terror suspects identified as Muslims. Furthermore, the study reveals that respondents are significantly less likely to treat domestic, right‐wing terrorist suspects with extraordinary detention, suggesting ingroup leniency.     

罗尔斯“分配的正义观”与诺齐克“持有的正义观”对照研究

分配正当性的根据是什么 ?人的基本权利与平等的要件如何分配才是符合正义的 ?罗尔斯和诺齐克从两个向度上对此作了深入研究。罗尔斯从平等的权利出发 ,主张用“公平正义的两个原则”来取代功利主义 ,认为除非有充足理由证明应当不平等 ,否则就应当平等。并要求依据“公平的正义原则”分配公共资源和自由体系 ;诺齐克从人的不可剥夺的权利出发 ,认为除非有充足理由证明应当平等 ,否则就应当不平等 ,通过“资格”理论确立“持有”的正当性。在功利主义、财产权、国家的作用、自由平等、分配模式和社会稳定的意义等方面 ,罗尔斯与诺齐克的观点也各有契合与对立。     

Victims' Stories: A Call to Care

In her book Victims' Stories and the Advancement of Human Rights, Diana Meyers offers a careful analysis of victims' stories as a narrative genre, and she argues that stories in this genre function as a call to care: they both depict a moral void and issue a moral demand, thereby fostering the development of a culture of human rights. This article, while finding Meyers's articulation of this idea compelling, questions Meyers's account of how victims' stories do their moral work. Whereas Meyers argues that victims' stories are complete narratives, characterized by a distinctive form of closure, it suggests that the moral power of victims' stories may lie in part in their open‐endedness or lack of closure. In telling their stories, victims engage their audiences in a new moral relationship and implicitly give them a role to play in bringing about the moral (and narrative) closure they seek.     

The Institute on Human Values in Medicine: Its Role and Influence in the Conception and Evolution of Bioethics

For ten years, 1971–1981, the Institute onHuman Values in Medicine (IHVM) played a keyrole in the development of Bioethics as afield. We have written this history andanalysis to bring to new generations ofBioethicists information about the developmentof their field within both the humanitiesdisciplines and the health professions. Thepioneers in medical humanities and ethics cametogether with medical professionals in thedecade of the 1960s. By the 1980s Bioethics wasa fully recognized discipline. We show the rolethat IHVM programs played in defining thefield, training faculty and helping schools todevelop programs. We review the beginnings ofthe IHVM in the crucible of social andtechnological change that led to theestablishment of the IHVM's parentorganization, the Society for Health and HumanValues. We then turn to the IHVM programsthrough which Faculty members receivedfellowships to explore new crossovers betweenthe humanities and the health professions. Wehave not only described the Fellows Program asit existed in 1973–1980, but have completed asurvey of the fellows a quarter of a centuryafter they held their fellowships. We describeother IHVM programs designed to facilitate theinitiation and development of new humanitiesprograms, to explore conceptual issues betweenmedicine and five humanities fields, to conductissue driven or educational method conferencesand to advance humanities programs intograduate education through the Directors ofMedical Education.     

Examining arguments against quantitative research: “Case studies” illustrating the challenge of finding a sound philosophical basis for a human sciences approach to psychology

This article offers a close examination of critiques of quantitative research by Michell, 2011, Marecek, 2011, and Morawski (2011). One goal is to show that these three critics actually share with most mainstream quantitative researchers commitments to the Cartesian framework, even though this is not obvious because Cartesianism can appear in different guises. As a result of these commitments, the three theorists advance criticisms of mainstream quantitative research that fail to identify its key failings, put forward flawed views about how we should conduct research, and offer misguided criticisms of an approach I advocate called explicitly interpretive quantitative research. Another goal is to use the examination of the three critiques as a vehicle for clarifying the participatory perspective, a philosophical viewpoint that departs from the Cartesian framework. With regard to research methodology, the participatory perspective provides the basis for explicitly interpretive quantitative research, leads to ideas about changes we should make in how we conduct qualitative research, and treats quantitative and qualitative research as fundamentally similar because both should be pursued as interpretive modes of inquiry. I suggest that my analyses of the three critiques of quantitative research – or “case studies,” as I call these analyses – also may prove useful to researchers and theorists who want to develop a human sciences approach to other issues besides research methodology by helping them (1) recognize when lines of thinking that seem to depart from the mainstream actually represent variants of Cartesianism, and (2) consider what the participatory perspective might have to offer if they were to use it as the philosophical basis for their efforts.     

The functional theory of human values: From intentional overlook to first acknowledgement—A reply to Schwartz (2014)

Schwartz has been aware of the Functional Theory of Values for over a decade. For the first time, Schwartz (2014) acknowledges the Gouveia theory and provides considerations based on the Gouveia, Milfont, and Guerra (2014) study. In this reply we present a historical overview of the development of the theory, noting unwarranted barriers to the publication of our work. We then address his comments, focusing on the theoretical innovations of the theory and remarking that recent refinements of Schwartz’s model were already evident in the Gouveia theory. Hypotheses tested in Gouveia et al. (2014) are also re-tested and supported with European Social Survey data using the Schwartz PVQ-21. We conclude by summarizing current projects that offer further opportunities to continue the theoretical debate.     

Should Inherent Human Dignity Be Considered Intrinsically Heuristic?

What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes (2011), human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect.