Manipulating the reported age in earliest memories

ABSTRACT

Previous work suggests that the estimated age in adults’ earliest autobiographical memories depends on age information implied by the experimental context [e.g., Kingo, O. S., Bohn, A., & Krøjgaard, P. (2013). Warm-up questions on early childhood memories affect the reported age of earliest memories in late adolescence. Memory, 21(2), 280–284. doi:10.1080/09658211.2012.729598] and that the age in decontextualised snippets of memory is younger than in more complete accounts (i.e., event memories [Bruce, D., Wilcox-O’Hearn, L. A., Robinson, J. A., Phillips-Grant, K., Francis, L., & Smith, M. C. (2005). Fragment memories mark the end of childhood amnesia. Memory & Cognition, 33(4), 567–576. doi:10.3758/BF03195324]). We examined the malleability of the estimated age in undergraduates’ earliest memories and its relation with memory quality. In Study 1 (n?=?141), vignettes referring to events happening at age 2 rendered earlier reported ages than examples referring to age 6. Exploratory analyses suggested that event memories were more sensitive to the age manipulation than memories representing a single, isolated scene (i.e., snapshots). In Study 2 (n?=?162), asking self-relevant and public-event knowledge questions about participants’ preschool years prior to retrieval yielded comparable average estimated ages. Both types of semantic knowledge questions rendered earlier memories than a no-age control task. Overall, the reported age in snapshots was younger than in event memories. However, age-differences between memory types across conditions were not statistically significant. Together, the results add to the growing literature indicating that the average age in earliest memories is not as fixed as previously thought.     

Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).     

Flashbacks,intrusions, mind-wandering – Instances of an involuntary memory spectrum: A commentary on Takarangi,Strange, and Lindsay (2014)

In their paper, Takarangi, Strange, and Lindsay (2014) showed in two experiments that participants who had witnessed a shocking film frequently “mind-wandered without awareness” about the content of the film. More importantly, they equated this effect with the occurrence of traumatic intrusions. In this commentary, we argue that the authors adhered to conceptually ambiguous terms, and thereby unintentionally contribute to an already existing conceptual blur in the trauma-memory field. We postulate that clear definitions are urgently needed for phenomena such as intrusions, flashbacks, and mind-wandering, when using them in the context of trauma memory. Furthermore, our proposal is that these phenomena can fall under a spectrum of different involuntary memory instances. We propose that by adopting stricter definitions and viewing them as separate, but interrelated phenomena, different lines of trauma-memory research can be reconciled, which would considerably advance the field.     

The relationship between sociocultural factors and autobiographical memories from childhood: the role of formal schooling

ABSTRACT

Cross-cultural differences in autobiographical memory (AM) are associated with cultural variations. In models of the self and parental reminiscing style, but not many studies have analysed the relationship between AM and specific cultural practices such as formal schooling. Theoreticians like [Greenfield, P. M. (2009). Linking social change and developmental change: Shifting. pathways of human development. Developmental Psychology, 45, 401–418. doi:10.1037/a0014726; Ka?itçiba?i, C. (2005). Autonomy and relatedness in cultural context. Implications for self and family. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36, 403–422. doi:10.1177/0022022105275959] and [Keller, H. (2007). Children development across cultures. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates] have considered formal schooling as an engine towards the model of independence; however, the empirical evidence in this regard is inconclusive: while some studies found evidence of a relation between formal schooling and characteristics of AM, others did not. To solve this inconsistency, the present study compared orally narrated childhood memories of Mexican adults with three different levels of education (from rudimentary literacy to university). Results support a relationship between formal schooling and AM in the predicted direction: More educated participants reported longer, more specific and more self-oriented memories than those with less schooling experience did. Some gender differences were also observed, with males generally reporting more individually and less socially oriented memories than females, except for university level participants. We conclude that these results support Greenfield’s theory about formal schooling as a sociocultural factor that promotes the cultural pathway to independence, as well as complexity and context-boundedness of gender differences in AM.