The influence of emotion on face processing

According to the broaden-and-build theory, positive emotions broaden one's thought-action repertoire, which may manifest as a widened attentional scope in cognitive processing. The present study directly tests this hypothesis by examining the influences of induced emotions (positive, neutral and negative) on holistic processing of face (Experiment 1) and face discrimination (Experiment 2). In both experiments, emotions induced with images from the International Affective Picture System significantly interacted with face processing. That is, positive emotions engendered greater holistic face encoding in a composite-face task in Experiment 1 and more accurate face discrimination in Experiment 2, relative to the neutral condition. In contrast, negative emotions impaired holistic face encoding in the composite-face task and reduced face discrimination accuracy. Taken together, these results provide further support for the attentional broadening effect of positive affect by demonstrating that induced positive emotions facilitate holistic/configural processing.     

Shame,guilt, and facial emotion processing: initial evidence for a positive relationship between guilt-proneness and facial emotion recognition ability

Shame and guilt are closely related self-conscious emotions of negative affect that give rise to divergent self-regulatory and motivational behaviours. While guilt-proneness has demonstrated positive relationships with self-report measures of empathy and adaptive interpersonal functioning, shame-proneness tends to be unrelated or inversely related to empathy and is associated with interpersonal difficulties. At present, no research has examined relationships between shame and guilt-proneness with facial emotion recognition ability. Participants (N?=?363) completed measures of shame and guilt-proneness along with a facial emotion recognition task which assessed the ability to identify displays of anger, sadness, happiness, fear, disgust, and shame. Guilt-proneness was consistently positively associated with facial emotion recognition ability. In contrast, shame-proneness was unrelated to capacity for facial emotion recognition. Findings provide support for theory arguing that guilt and empathy operate synergistically and may also help explain the inverse relationship between guilt-proneness and propensity for aggressive behaviour.     

Visuospatial and mathematical dysfunction in major depressive disorder and/or panic disorder: A study of parietal functioning

The parietal cortex is critical for several different cognitive functions, including visuospatial processing and mathematical abilities. There is strong evidence indicating parietal dysfunction in depression. However, it is less clear whether anxiety is associated with parietal dysfunction and whether comorbid depression and anxiety are associated with greater impairment. The present study compared participants with major depression (MDD), panic disorder (PD), comorbid MDD/PD and controls on neuropsychological measures of visuospatial processing, Judgement of Line Orientation (JLO), and mathematical abilities, Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT) Arithmetic. Only comorbid MDD/PD was associated with decreased performance on JLO, whereas all psychopathological groups exhibited comparably decreased performance on WRAT Arithmetic. Furthermore, the results were not accounted for by other comorbid disorders, medication use or psychopathology severity. The present study suggests comorbid depression and anxious arousal are associated with impairment in visuospatial processing and provides novel evidence indicating mathematical deficits across depression and/or anxiety. Implications for understanding parietal dysfunction in internalising psychopathology are discussed.     

Information processing biases concurrently and prospectively predict depressive symptoms in adolescents: Evidence from a self-referent encoding task

Negative information processing biases have been hypothesised to serve as precursors for the development of depression. The current study examined negative self-referent information processing and depressive symptoms in a community sample of adolescents (N = 291, M_age at baseline = 12.34 ± 0.61, 53% female, 47.4% African-American, 49.5% Caucasian and 3.1% Biracial). Participants completed a computerised self-referent encoding task (SRET) and a measure of depressive symptoms at baseline and completed an additional measure of depressive symptoms nine months later. Several negative information processing biases on the SRET were associated with concurrent depressive symptoms and predicted increases in depressive symptoms at follow-up. Findings partially support the hypothesis that negative information processing biases are associated with depressive symptoms in a nonclinical sample of adolescents, and provide preliminary evidence that these biases prospectively predict increases in depressive symptoms.     

Social anxiety and information processing biases: An integrated theoretical perspective

Models of anxiety disorders posit that information processing biases towards threat may result from an imbalance between top-down attentional control processes and bottom-up attentional processes, such that anxiety could reduce the influence of the former and increase the influence of the latter. However, researchers have recently pointed to limitations of the top-down/bottom-up terminology and outlined the additional contribution of memory processes to attention guidance. The goal of this paper is to provide bridges between recent findings from cognitive psychology and anxiety disorders research. We first provide an integrative overview of the processes influencing the content of working memory, including the availability of attentional control, and the strengths of task goals, stimulus salience, selection history and long-term memory. We then illustrate the interest of this formulation to the study of information processing biases in anxiety disorders, with a specific focus on social anxiety.     

Accommodating Presuppositions Is Inappropriate in Implausible Contexts

According to one view of linguistic information (Karttunen, 1974; Stalnaker, 1974), a speaker can convey contextually new information in one of two ways: (a) by asserting the content as new information; or (b) by presupposing the content as given information which would then have to be accommodated. This distinction predicts that it is conversationally more appropriate to assert implausible information rather than presuppose it (e.g., von Fintel, 2008; Heim, 1992; Stalnaker, 2002). A second view rejects the assumption that presuppositions are accommodated; instead, presuppositions are assimilated into asserted content and both are correspondingly open to challenge (e.g., Gazdar, 1979; van der Sandt, 1992). Under this view, we should not expect to find a difference in conversational appropriateness between asserting implausible information and presupposing it. To distinguish between these two views of linguistic information, we performed two self‐paced reading experiments with an on‐line stops‐making‐sense judgment. The results of the two experiments—using the presupposition triggers the and too—show that accommodation is inappropriate (makes less sense) relative to non‐presuppositional controls when the presupposed information is implausible but not when it is plausible. These results provide support for the first view of linguistic information: the contrast in implausible contexts can only be explained if there is a presupposition‐assertion distinction and accommodation is a mechanism dedicated to reasoning about presuppositions.     

Feature Statistics Modulate the Activation of Meaning During Spoken Word Processing

Understanding spoken words involves a rapid mapping from speech to conceptual representations. One distributed feature‐based conceptual account assumes that the statistical characteristics of concepts’ features—the number of concepts they occur in (distinctiveness/sharedness) and likelihood of co‐occurrence (correlational strength)—determine conceptual activation. To test these claims, we investigated the role of distinctiveness/sharedness and correlational strength in speech‐to‐meaning mapping, using a lexical decision task and computational simulations. Responses were faster for concepts with higher sharedness, suggesting that shared features are facilitatory in tasks like lexical decision that require access to them. Correlational strength facilitated responses for slower participants, suggesting a time‐sensitive co‐occurrence‐driven settling mechanism. The computational simulation showed similar effects, with early effects of shared features and later effects of correlational strength. These results support a general‐to‐specific account of conceptual processing, whereby early activation of shared features is followed by the gradual emergence of a specific target representation.     

Making Sense of Dynamic Systems: How Our Understanding of Stocks and Flows Depends on a Global Perspective

Stocks and flows (SF) are building blocks of dynamic systems: Stocks change through inflows and outflows, such as our bank balance changing with withdrawals and deposits, or atmospheric CO₂ with absorptions and emissions. However, people make systematic errors when trying to infer the behavior of dynamic systems, termed SF failure, whose cognitive explanations are yet unknown. We argue that SF failure appears when people focus on specific system elements (local processing), rather than on the system structure and gestalt (global processing). Using a standard SF task (n = 148), SF failure decreased by (a) a global as opposed to local task format; (b) individual global as opposed to local processing styles; and (c) global as opposed to local perceptual priming. These results converge toward local processing as an explanation for SF failure. We discuss theoretical and practical implications on the connections between the scope of attention and understanding of dynamic systems.     

Eye‐tracking Social Preferences

We hypothesize that if people are motivated by a particular social preference, then choosing in accordance with this preference will lead to an identifiable pattern of eye movements. We track eye movements while subjects make choices in simple three‐person distribution experiments. We characterize each choice in terms of three different types of social preferences: efficiency, maxi‐min, and envy. For the characterization, we use either the choice data or the eye movement data. The evidence indicates that distributional choices are broadly consistent with the choice rule implied by eye movements. In other words, what subjects appear to be interested in when you look at their choices corresponds to what they appear to be interested in when you look at their eye movements. This correspondence lends credibility to the behavioral relevance of social preferences models. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotion recognition in children with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders

There is a limited amount of research that examines social-emotional functioning in children with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), and the majority of it relies on parent and teacher reports of social impairments. Because these provide broad measures of social function, they fail to elucidate the underlying specific skills with which this group of children has difficulty. The current study examines emotion-recognition abilities in children with FASD, as it plays a central role in social interaction. Participants were 22 children with diagnosed FASD (ages 8–14), and age- and gender-matched typically developing controls. Tasks included measures of emotion recognition from three nonlinguistic modalities: facial expressions, emotional tone of voice, and body positioning and movement. Participant’s parents completed measures of adaptive and behavioral function that were related to children’s performance on aspects of emotion recognition. Overall, the results show that children with FASD have more difficulties with emotion recognition than typically developing age-matched peers, but these difficulties may not be clinically significant (e.g., smaller effect size) or may be specific to the age of the individual exhibiting the emotion (i.e., child vs. adult). These results are discussed in the context of previous studies.