Asymmetric cost and benefit perceptions in willingness-to-donate decisions

Charitable giving entails the act of foregoing personal resources in order to improve the conditions of other people. In the present paper, we systematically examine two dimensions integral to donation decisions that have thus far received relatively little attention but can explain charitable behavior rather well: the perceptions of cost for the donor and benefit for the recipients. In line with current theories in judgment and decision making, we hypothesize that people weigh these dimensions subjectively and perceive them asymmetrically, consistent with prospect theory. Costs for the donor are typically perceived as losses, whereas benefits for recipients are perceived as gains. In four studies, we presented several scenarios to participants in which both donation amounts (costs) and number of lives helped (benefits) were manipulated while keeping the ratio of costs and benefits constant. Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that willingness to help decreased as donation amounts and number of lives helped increased. Additionally, Studies 3 and 4 provide evidence for a solution to reduce the asymmetry and increase donation amounts as the number of lives at risk increases.     

The decision to check in multialternative choices and limited sensitivity to default

Given the rapid proliferation of smartphone applications and data aggregation websites, in many situations people can use decision aids to guide their choices. For example, they may consider whether to use a navigation device to check the fastest route or whether to use a price comparison website to find the cheapest deal. In what circumstances will subjects use a costly comparison decision aid (which I refer to as “checking”) to choose for them? In six studies, I investigate the impact of the number of available alternatives and checking's attractiveness on the decision to check. While at first increasing the attractiveness of checking led to higher checking rates, a further increase in the number of available alternatives (and thus checking's attractiveness) did not increase the checking rate. Surprisingly, even when checking had a 40% higher expected value compared with not checking, the observed checking rate was below 45%, contrary to risk and ambiguity aversion predictions. Furthermore, labeling the checking alternative as the default had no impact on its choice rate. I find large individual differences in decisions to check. Surprisingly, subjects' initial decisions had high predictive power over their subsequent checking rates, even after 100 trials with full feedback. I propose two simple learning models that capture well the aggregated results.     

Financial prospect relativity: context effects in financial decision‐making under risk

We report three studies in which methodologies from psychophysics are adapted to investigate context effects on individual financial decision‐making under risk. The aim was to determine how the range and the rank of the options offered as saving amounts and levels of investment risk influence people's decisions about these variables. In the range manipulation, participants were presented with either a full range of choice options or a limited subset, while in the rank manipulation they were presented with a skewed set of feasible options. The results showed that choices are affected by the position of each option in the range and the rank of presented options, which suggests that judgments and choices are relative. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Don't hate me because I'm beautiful: Anti-attractiveness bias in organizational evaluation and decision making

Within organizational judgment and decision making contexts, biases based on an evaluated person's attractiveness are among the most salient and frequently investigated. An enormous amount of research indicates favoritism for attractive people compared to unattractive ones. The current research demonstrates that the nature of this bias depends on whether one is evaluating a member of the same sex or the opposite sex. Experiment 1 (n = 2639) investigated selection of scholarship applicants and demonstrated that a pro-attractiveness bias held only for selection of opposite-sex scholarship applicants; no such bias was observed for highly attractive same-sex applicants. Experiment 2 (n = 622) investigated evaluations of prospective job candidates and demonstrated again that pro-attractiveness bias was observed only for opposite-sex candidates; participants discriminated against highly attractive same-sex candidates. Moreover, this bias was not observed among highly attractive participants; it held only for moderately attractive participants, those for whom highly attractive same-sex individuals can pose especially potent social threats. Findings suggest that attractiveness biases in organizational decision making are rooted partly in the social threats and opportunities afforded by attractive people.     

Authorship Decision Making: An Empirical Investigation

This empirical study concerns the authorship credit decision-making processes and outcomes that occur among coauthors in cases of multiauthored publications. The 2002 American Psychological Association (APA) Ethics Code offers standards for determining authorship order; however, little is known about how these decisions are made in actual practice. Results from a survey of 109 randomly selected authors indicated that most authors were satisfied with the decision-making process and outcome with few disagreements. Participants reported cases of both undeserved authorship being given and omission of deserving contributors' names as coauthors. Some factors associated with authorship decisions included “sense of loyalty or obligation,” “publish or perish pressures,” and “power differentials.” Authors who used APA standards were significantly more satisfied with both the process and outcome of authorship credit decisions.     

El efecto del marco en diferentes contextes

Resumen

A pesar de la vasta investigación que ha generado el efecto del marco desde su definición en 1981 por Tversky y Kahnemann, pensamos que en ocasiones se han confundido los tipos de marcos estudiados. En este trabajo se revisa este efecto y se justifica empíricamente, con los datos de un meta-análisis previo, la distinción entre el marco de riesgo, el marco de atributo y el marco de objetivo. Los autores profundizan en cada uno de los tipos de marcos propuestos, y analizan las limitaciones conceptuales con el fin de aclarar la investigación en este campo.     

The Effects of the Structured Interview on Reducing Biases Against Pregnant Job Applicants

Some research has been conducted on the discrimination faced by pregnant women in the workplace. Few studies, however, have specifically investigated how this bias is manifested in employment or hiring decisions. The current study was designed to examine possible bias during structured interviews. Participants watched a videotaped scenario in which candidates were interviewed for a job. The 2 × 2 × 2 experimental conditions were varied to represent a structured or an unstructured interview, a pregnant or nonpregnant interviewee, and the open position of either a high school teacher or sales representative. Results indicate an overall bias against pregnant women and suggested that the structured interview reduces this bias.     

The distortion of criteria after decision-making

The results of two experiments indicate that decision-makers separately distort their interpretations of decision criteria and evaluations of information in a manner that justifies their decisions. In Study 1, participants reported a yes/no decision either before or after they rated the applicable decision criterion and problem information. Participants distorted their criterion and information ratings more when they reported their decisions before, rather than after, they rated the decision criterion and problem information. Study 2 demonstrated that distortion of decision criterion ratings occurred after a decision had been made whereas distortion of information evaluations occurred during the process of reaching a decision. These results are consistent with a two-stage model of decision-making in which the distortion of decision criteria is distinct from the distortion of decision information.     

Risk perception and risky choice: Situational, informational and dispositional effects

We investigated how situational (gain–loss), informational (opportunity–threat framing) and dispositional (achievement motive and avoidance motive) variables affected opportunity–threat perception and risky choice in managerial decision-making contexts. In Study 1, the risk preference of the participants showed a reflection effect due to situational differences (gain or loss) and a partial framing effect caused by presenting the same choice information in terms of either opportunities or threats. However, both effects were in the opposite direction of predictions from prospect theory. Gains and positive framing enhanced risk-seeking preference whereas losses and negative framing augmented risk-averse preference. Risk-seeking choices were mediated by opportunity perception whereas risk-averse choices were mediated by threat perception. In Study 2, the participants high in achievement motive perceived greater opportunities in a negative situation, and the participants high in avoidance motive perceived greater threats in a positive situation, suggesting that ambition (achievement motive) operates more significantly in the face of adversities whereas cautiousness (avoidance motive) functions more significantly in prosperity.