On Bayesian estimation in unrestricted factor analysis

It is shown that the common and unique variance estimates produced by Martin & McDonald's Bayesian estimation procedure for the unrestricted common factor model have a predictable sum which is always greater than the maximum likelihood estimate of the total variance. This fact is used to justify a suggested simple alternative method of specifying the Bayesian parameters required by the procedure.     

Index to Volume 119

This longitudinal study focused on the causal relationships between self-concept, locus of causality, and academic achievement. The subjects were 212 male and 213 female students at a prestigious secondary school in the central Philippines. Analysis of the panel data indicated that no single network of causal dominance may exist for males and females but did support Weiner's (1979) causal attribution theory in finding that locus of causality was causally predominant over self-concept.     

Burnout and psychiatric “cases”: Early evidences of an association

This exploratory study extends the phase model of burnout in a critical direction by assessing whether individuals assigned to eight progressive phases will present escalating mental health symptoms. Despite the small convenience population (N = 161), the present affirmative results encourage early replications for three basic reasons. Thus the associations with mental health reported here are consistent with numerous other tests of the concurrent validity of the phase model. Moreover, substantial proportions of the variance are explained here by data supporting the view that the progressive phases are associated with accelerating proportions of “cases,” here defined as respondents to the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) who report four or more non-psychotic psychiatric symptoms. The GHQ form used here is modified for U.S. contexts. In addition, this basic conclusion is reinforced in three ways: by factor analysis of GHQ items; by rejecting several variables alternative to the phases as GHQ variants; and by using canonical discriminant functions to compare phase assignments with the actual group memberships of “normals” and “cases” assigned by the GHQ.     

Teaching ethics to scientists and engineers: Moral agents and moral problems

In this paper I outline an “agent-centered” approach to learning ethics. The approach is “agent-centered” in that its central aim is to prepare students toact wisely and responsibly when faced with moral problems. The methods characteristic of this approach are suitable for integrating material on professional and research ethics into technical courses, as well as for free-standing ethics courses. The analogy I draw between ethical problems and design problems clarifies the character of ethical problems as they are experienced by those who must respond to them. It exposes the mistake, common in ethics teaching, of misrepresenting moral problems as multiple-choice problems, especially in the form of ‘dilemmas’, that is, a forced choice between two unacceptable alternatives. Furthermore, I clarify the importance for responsible practice of recognizing any ambiguity in the problem situation. To foster in students the skills they need, teaching examples should preserve the open-ended, multiply-constrained, and ambiguous character of problem situations as experienced by the agent. I give guidelines for constructing open-ended scenarios that present moral problems much as an agent would experience them — guidelines which strongly influenced the construction of ‘cases’ in the latest edition of “On Being a Scientist” — and I discuss how to present historical cases and cases from the instructor’s own experience to best foster agent-centered learning. This paper is a modification of material originally included in the handbook which accompanied the AAAS Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993.     

‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP

Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ by the presence of a counterfactual controller. This article argues that this response to Frankfurt does not undercut his attack on PAP, since there are Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle—‘brain-malfunction’ cases—that evade the dispositionalist analysis.     

Murdering an Accident Victim: A New Objection to the Bare-Difference Argument

Many philosophers, psychologists, and medical practitioners believe that killing is no worse than letting die on the basis of James Rachels's Bare-Difference Argument. I show that his argument is unsound. In particular, a premise of the argument is that his examples are as similar as is consistent with one being a case of killing and the other being a case of letting die. However, the subject who lets die has both the ability to kill and the ability to let die while the subject who kills lacks the ability to let die. Modifying the latter example so that the killer has both abilities yields a pair of cases with morally different acts. The hypothesis that killing is worse than letting die is the best explanation of this difference.     

Concept Cartesianism,Concept Pragmatism,and Frege Cases

This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content, of thoughts. I then consider Jerry Fodor’s argument that ‘modes of presentation’ are not identical with Fregean senses, and argue that explanatory considerations should leads us to reject his ‘syntactic’ treatment of Frege cases. Rejecting the Cartesian treatment of Frege cases, however, is not tantamount to accepting Peacocke’s claim that reasons and rationality are central to the individuation of concepts. For I argue that we can steer a middle course between Fodor’s Cartesianism and Peacocke’s Pragmatism, and adopt a form of Pragmatism that is constrained by Fregean considerations, but at the same time denies that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality.

Sexual abuse as a theme in group-analytic therapy

The group-analytic approach, which emphasises the individual in a network of group relationships, is described with reference to the subject of sexual abuse in childhood. Three different National Health Service psychotherapy groups run by the author provide contrasting examples of how the theme, originating in an individual participant, was manifested in the dynamics of the group-as-a-whole. The therapeutic significance to the individual and the group is explored.