Examples of real world engineering ethics problems

Nine examples are presented illustrating the kinds of problems encountered in actual practice by conscientious engineers. These cases are drawn fom the records of the IEEE Ethics Committee, and from the experience of the ethics help-line initiated recently by the Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Science. They range from situations in which companies try to cheat one another to those in which human health and safety are jeopardized. In one case, an engineer learned that even a quiet resignation can prove very costly in a personal sense. Some ways in which professional societies might make ethical practice of engineering somewhat easier are mentioned. An carlier, shorter version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Ethics in Engineering and Computer Science, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, March 21–24, 1999, and can be accessed on line at http://onlineethics.org/cases/unger.html. In all cases described in this paper, the names of individuals and organizations have been suppressed or fictionalized. Professor Unger was Chairman of the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) Ethics Committee (1997–1998).     

Forensic psychology in Iceland: a survey of members of the Icelandic Psychological Society

Forensic psychology is a rapidly growing specialism within psychology. A survey was carried out among the 152 members of the Icelandic Psychological Society (Sálfradingafélagi Islands) about their involvement and role in court work. Out of 101 psychologists who responded to the survey, 39 reported having been involved in court work, of whom 34 had testified in court. The great majority of court work of the psychologists involved assessments relating to child-care and custody proceedings, but there was evidence that Icelandic psychologists are increasingly becoming involved in criminal cases concerning criminal responsibility and the reliability of testimony. They are working much more independently of medical colleagues than before.     

Too much – not enough. The representation of the body and the meaning of symptoms in patients with eating disorders

Eating disorders cover different clinical syndromes, all of which are characterized by an immense focus on food, body and weight, an endless attempt to combat the body and by a fluctuation between ‘too much and not enough’ on different levels (e.g., behaviourally, mentally, physically).

The aim of this article is to contribute to the psychoanalytic understanding of eating disorders, to highlight the vital importance of the symptoms as a psychological survival strategy and to illustrate similarities between eating disordered patients as well as the very different pathways that can lead to an eating disorder. Two clinical cases are presented, one very shortly and one in more detail.     

‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP

Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ by the presence of a counterfactual controller. This article argues that this response to Frankfurt does not undercut his attack on PAP, since there are Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle—‘brain-malfunction’ cases—that evade the dispositionalist analysis.     

Murdering an Accident Victim: A New Objection to the Bare-Difference Argument

Many philosophers, psychologists, and medical practitioners believe that killing is no worse than letting die on the basis of James Rachels's Bare-Difference Argument. I show that his argument is unsound. In particular, a premise of the argument is that his examples are as similar as is consistent with one being a case of killing and the other being a case of letting die. However, the subject who lets die has both the ability to kill and the ability to let die while the subject who kills lacks the ability to let die. Modifying the latter example so that the killer has both abilities yields a pair of cases with morally different acts. The hypothesis that killing is worse than letting die is the best explanation of this difference.     

Burnout and psychiatric “cases”: Early evidences of an association

This exploratory study extends the phase model of burnout in a critical direction by assessing whether individuals assigned to eight progressive phases will present escalating mental health symptoms. Despite the small convenience population (N = 161), the present affirmative results encourage early replications for three basic reasons. Thus the associations with mental health reported here are consistent with numerous other tests of the concurrent validity of the phase model. Moreover, substantial proportions of the variance are explained here by data supporting the view that the progressive phases are associated with accelerating proportions of “cases,” here defined as respondents to the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) who report four or more non-psychotic psychiatric symptoms. The GHQ form used here is modified for U.S. contexts. In addition, this basic conclusion is reinforced in three ways: by factor analysis of GHQ items; by rejecting several variables alternative to the phases as GHQ variants; and by using canonical discriminant functions to compare phase assignments with the actual group memberships of “normals” and “cases” assigned by the GHQ.     

Sexual abuse as a theme in group-analytic therapy

The group-analytic approach, which emphasises the individual in a network of group relationships, is described with reference to the subject of sexual abuse in childhood. Three different National Health Service psychotherapy groups run by the author provide contrasting examples of how the theme, originating in an individual participant, was manifested in the dynamics of the group-as-a-whole. The therapeutic significance to the individual and the group is explored.     

Teaching ethics to scientists and engineers: Moral agents and moral problems

In this paper I outline an “agent-centered” approach to learning ethics. The approach is “agent-centered” in that its central aim is to prepare students toact wisely and responsibly when faced with moral problems. The methods characteristic of this approach are suitable for integrating material on professional and research ethics into technical courses, as well as for free-standing ethics courses. The analogy I draw between ethical problems and design problems clarifies the character of ethical problems as they are experienced by those who must respond to them. It exposes the mistake, common in ethics teaching, of misrepresenting moral problems as multiple-choice problems, especially in the form of ‘dilemmas’, that is, a forced choice between two unacceptable alternatives. Furthermore, I clarify the importance for responsible practice of recognizing any ambiguity in the problem situation. To foster in students the skills they need, teaching examples should preserve the open-ended, multiply-constrained, and ambiguous character of problem situations as experienced by the agent. I give guidelines for constructing open-ended scenarios that present moral problems much as an agent would experience them — guidelines which strongly influenced the construction of ‘cases’ in the latest edition of “On Being a Scientist” — and I discuss how to present historical cases and cases from the instructor’s own experience to best foster agent-centered learning. This paper is a modification of material originally included in the handbook which accompanied the AAAS Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993.     

The Map and the Territory: Complexity in Biology

In business administration or in economics it is absolutely relevant not to consider indexes like profit growth rate or gross domestic product as exhaustive indexes for economic wealth. Likewise, in biology it is important not to confuse the representation of life with life itself. The most important concepts in biology are information, memory, structure, plasticity, and robustness. Information is the difference that makes the difference. Memories are information registered in an organism. Plasticity is the capacity of a living organism to change its own structure/sets of behaviors for having a competitive advantage. Robustness is the ability of a living organism to resist environmental changes without changing its own structure/sets of behavior, and fragility is when a living organism undergoes changes in its own structure without being able to resist non-adaptive changes.