Bergson and the holographic theory of mind

Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson’s ecological model of perception. It is applied to the problems of consciousness, direct realism, qualia and illusions. The model implies an entirely different basis for memory and cognition, and a brief overview is given for the basis of direct memory, compositionality and systematicity.     

Creativity and the artwork: the perspectives of a painter and a philosopher

Creativity in Robert Henri's view is a gratuitous act, shot through with mystery; what is left after such an act is the artwork itself as concrete evidence that such a heightened state of consciousness has been achieved. This paper will examine Henri's understanding of the nature of creativity from his perspective as a twentieth century New York painter, in conjunction with Eliot Deutsch's theoretical insights as a philosopher deeply interested in the nature of the experience of an artwork. In his Essays on the nature of art, Deutsch presents the view that the experience of an artwork involves the assimilation of the work's aesthetic force, the recognition of its meaning, the discernment of its formal dimensions, and ‘calls for a special appropriation that yields an integrated wholeness’. This paper presents commonalities between Henri's and Deutsch individual perspectives and discusses some value‐centred educational implications that could be drawn from these commonalities.     

Nietzsche and l’élan technique: Technics,life, and the production of time

Abstract In this paper we examine Nietzsche’s relation to the life sciences of his time and to Darwinism in particular, arguing that his account of the will to power in terms of technics eschews three metaphysical prejudices, hylemorphism, utilitarianism, and teleological thinking. Telescoping some of Nietzsche’s pronouncements on the will to power with a Bergsonian lens, our reading of the will to power, as an operation productive of time, the future or life, offers an alternative to Heidegger’s. Rather than being reducible to a technics of domination or mastery, the will to power, we argue, is best interpreted as a technics of material forces that recasts all things past and future, near and far, moment by moment.     

列斐伏尔日常生活批判概念的前后转变

作为西方马克思主义的创始人之一,列斐伏尔的核心贡献在于他首次提出了日常生活批判这个概念,但前后期有明显区别。本文概括了这种前后观点的转变。总体来说,他早期对日常生活主要采取了一种相对比较哲学化的与乐观化的立场：认为被异化的日常生活世界既包括着被压迫的因素,也包括着解放的因素;日常生活是各种社会活动与社会制度结构的最深层次连接处,是一切文化现象的共同基础,也是导致总体性革命的策源地。而他后期则对日常生活理解得更加微观(即社会学化),也相对悲观了一些：认为在发达资本主义社会,现代日常生活被全面地组织到纳入到生产与消费的总体环节中去。现代社会成了一个“消费被引导的官僚社会”,而不是一个可供人们自由选择的休闲社会、丰裕社会。     

Sense data and logical relations: Karin Costelloe-Stephen and Russell’s critique of Bergson

ABSTRACT

Though scholarship has explored Karin Costelloe-Stephen’s contributions to the history of psychoanalysis, as well as her relations to the Bloomsbury Group, her philosophical work has been almost completely ignored. This paper will examine her debate with Bertrand Russell over his criticism of Bergson. Costelloe-Stephen had employed the terminology of early analytic philosophy in presenting a number of arguments in defence of Bergson’s views. Costelloe-Stephen would object, among other things, to Russell’s use of an experiment which, as she points out, was first conducted by Carl Stumpf. Russell appeals to Stumpf's experiment in his attempt to prove that sense data are terms in logical relations, a thesis presupposed by the project of logical analysis outlined in Our Knowledge of the External World. A reformulated version of Costelloe-Stephen's argument put forth by this paper shows that Russell's argument fails to provide adequate proof for his thesis. Further modifications of the argument can also address a reconstruction (based on contemporary reports) of Russell's reply to Costelloe-Stephen. In his reply, Russell would use, already in 1914, the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in contrasting his and Moore’s approach to a continental one, exemplified by Bergson and Costelloe-Stephen.