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21.
Eileen John 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(3):285-297
The question of how well we need to be known, to be loved, is considered. A ‘second-person’ model is argued for, on which love requires that the beloved's demands to be known be respected. This puts pressure on the idea that lovers need to make a beloved's interests their own, taking that to require comprehension of the beloved's interests: a lover would have to appreciate the normative intelligibility and motivating force of an interest. The possibility of love with failure of comprehension is defended, using illustrations from Marilynne Robinson's novel Gilead. 相似文献
22.
Michael A. Becker 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):523-545
ABSTRACTWhile Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase ‘second nature’ in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures ‘natural consciousness’, ‘natural notion’, and ‘inorganic nature’, in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the ‘official’ version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an ‘unofficial’ version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a ‘second nature’. 相似文献
23.
Theo Van Willigenburg 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2005,8(1-2):45-62
Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like ‘having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children’. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning in general. Christine Korsgaard relates the rational binding force of practical reasons to the various identities or self-conceptions under which we value ourselves. The problem is that it is not clear why such self-conceptions would necessitate us rationally, given the fact that most of our identities are simply given. Perhaps, Harry Frankfurt is right in arguing that we are not only necessitated by reason, but also, and predominantly by what we love. I argue, however, that “the necessities of love” (in Frankfurt’s phrase) are not to be separated from, but should be seen as belonging to the necessities of reason. Our loves, concerns and related identities provide for a specific and important structure to practical reflection. They function on the background of reasoning, having a specific default role: they would lose their character as concerns, if there was a need for them to be cited on the foreground of deliberation or if there was a need to justify them. This does not mean that our deep concerns cannot be scrutinised. They can only be scrutinised in an indirect way, however, which explains their role in grounding the normativity of agent-relative reasons. It appears that this account can provide for a viable interpretation of Korsgaard’s argument about the foundational role of practical identities. 相似文献
24.
Jan Bransen 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(1):3-25
This paper challenges the idea that there is a natural opposition between self-interest and morality. It does by developing an account of self-love according to which we can have self-regarding reasons that (1) differ substantially from the standard conception of self-interest and that (2) share enough crucial features with moral reasons to count as morally respectable.The argument involves three steps. The first step concentrates on the idea of a moral point of view as a means to distinguish between reasons that could be morally respectable and those we have reason to distrust as not morally respectable. The second step discusses Harry Frankfurt's work on love, in order to develop an attitude of selfless love as a source of morally respectable reasons. The third step introduces the idea of an alternative of oneself to show that selfless self-love is a coherent conception of an attitude that provides one with self-regarding and self-grounded reasons that are also morally respectable. 相似文献
25.
Carl Ginet 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(3):229-253
This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield
a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one
is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it. 相似文献
26.
Caryn D. Riswold 《Dialog》2003,42(2):136-145
Four novels elicit theological reflection in the college classroom. The Poisonwood Bible by Barbara Kingsolver describes justification by grace and the difficulty of living liberated from guilt. The Harry Potter novels by J.K. Rowling prompt tensions between destiny and free choice in determining personal identity. At Home in Mitford by Jan Karon challenges conscientious Christian community to open itself in risk to outsiders. The Red Tent by Anita Diamant retrieves silent women's voices in the Book of Genesis, raising tensions between fiction and biblical authority. 相似文献
27.
本文介绍和分析了法兰克福学派内部在如何看待科技的生态功能问题上的两种迥然不同的观点,指出了它们各自论点中存在的误识和留给人们的启迪,论证了科技进步与合理解决环境污染,生态平衡等全球性问题之间密不可分的关系。 相似文献
28.
Gary Foster 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):153-168
Harry Frankfurt characterizes love as “a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for
it.” As such, he views romantic love as an inauthentic paradigm for love since such love desires reciprocation, sexual gratification
and so on. I argue that Frankfurt’s conception of love is (a) too general—he does not distinguish between the type of love
one has for one’s partner, one’s country, a moral ideal, etc., (b) it overemphasizes the role of bestowal at the expense of
the part played by appraisal and (c) it is insufficiently social. Certain forms of love, romantic love and friendship for
instance, are defined largely in terms of reciprocation. For Frankfurt, reciprocation is somewhat of an accidental feature
of love. This deficiency in Frankfurt’s conception of love can be traced to a problem in his conception of selfhood which
I argue is insufficiently social in nature.
相似文献
Gary FosterEmail: |
29.
Jon Fennell 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》1999,18(6):405-434
The central questions raised by Allan Bloom's The Closing of theAmerican Mind are often overlooked. Among the most important ofBloom's themes is the impact of nihilism upon education. Bloom condemnsnihilism. Interestingly, we find among his critics two alternativejudgments. Richard Schacht, citing Nietzsche, asserts that nihilism,while fruitless in and of itself, is a necessary prerequisite tosomething higher. Harry Neumann, affirming the accuracy of nihilism,declares that both Bloom and Nietzsche reject nihilism out of ignoranceborn of weakness. All three philosophers understand that the purpose ofeducation emerges from one's position on nihilism. If nihilism is true,then it is senseless and cowardly to teach one's students that there aregrounds for moral judgments. On the other hand, if one believes thatthere is an objective higher and lower in moral matters, then one cannotat the same time consistently endorse nihilism or the atheism upon whichit rests. There is reason to believe that a consistent nihilism isimpossible and hence that the concept is bankrupt. But then something istrue, and there are grounds for moral judgment. Education must respondaccordingly. But even Bloom with his emphasis on the Great Books fallsshort of what is required. An education which aims to defeat nihilismmust, at the very least, hold out the promise that through thecultivation of reason one may indeed arrive at the truth. 相似文献
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