Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action

Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational permissibility that Smith wants to capture. Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf.     

LIMITATIONS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF DRUG‐ENABLED MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES

Scientific interest in drug‐induced mystical experiences reemerged in the 1990s. This warrants reexamining the philosophical issues surrounding such studies: Do psychedelic drugs cause mystical experiences? Are drug‐induced experiences the same in nature as other mystical experiences? Does the fact that mystical experiences can be induced by drugs invalidate or validate mystical cognitive claims? Those questions will be examined here. An overview of the scientific examination of drug‐induced mystical experiences is included, as is a brief overview of the history of the use of psychedelic drugs in religion.     

邪恶的两张面孔:根本的邪恶和平庸的邪恶——汉娜·阿伦特对极权主义制度下的邪恶现象的批判

汉娜.阿伦特对极权主义制度下的邪恶现象有两种表述方式,即“根本的邪恶”和“平庸的邪恶”。前者的根本特征表现为破坏了人类发展和和进步的概念,致力于把人变成多余的人的事业,以及消灭了人的法律人格、道德人格以及作为个体的人;后者的特征体现为无思想和肤浅性。阿伦特为思考极权主义专制制度下邪恶现象产生的根源以及个人应该担负何种道德责任提供了一种全新的视角,从而为建立一种以思想为核心的个人责任伦理提供了理论上的可能。     

Hannah Arendt,evil and the eradication of thought

Evil deeds may be committed intentionally or out of madness, but it is those who follow orders that present us with the most complex moral, philosophical and psychological questions. In writing about the banality of evil, Hannah Arendt argues that “in granting pardon, it is the person and not the crime that is forgiven; in rootless evil there is no person left whom one could ever forgive.” Arendt postulates that “being a person” necessarily entails the acts of memory and thought. This paper explores Arendt’s ideas on memory and thought and how these processes can become subverted in the service of a higher order. Clinical material illustrates Whitmer’s idea of dissociation as an “impairment of subjectivity” as distinct from Freud’s view of dissociation as a form of repression. This shift in theoretical perspective sheds new light on our understanding of the totalitarian state of mind, i.e. of the mind of a “nobody”, and the conditions within which evil is committed.     

Towards a New Kind of Semantic Normativity

Abstract

Hannah Ginsborg has recently offered a new account of normativity, according to which normative attitudes are essential to the meaningful use of language. The kind of normativity she has in mind –– not semantic but ‘primitive’ — is supposed to help us to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and reductive dispositionalist theories of meaning. For, according to her, it enables us both to account for meaning in non-semantic terms, which non-reductionism cannot do, and to make room for the normativity of meaning, which reductive dispositionalism cannot do. I argue that the main problem with Ginsborg’s account is that it fails to say what makes it possible for expressions to be governed by conditions of correct application to begin with. I do believe, however, that normative attitudes are essential to meaning, but they have to be thought of as fully semantic. And I suggest that conditions of correct application can be present only when those attitudes are present.     

Charting the map metaphor in theories of religion

The idea that scholars of religion produce ‘maps’ that represent the ‘territories’ of religion(s) is common and influential. This paper first discusses the role of the metaphor, with special reference to the work of J.Z. Smith, and some of the problems raised by the map metaphor (above all, its implicit reliance on a naive correspondence view of truth). It then draws two important distinctions: between different levels of representation; and between the representing and guiding function of maps (truth and use). It ends by comparing issues in the philosophy of science and the theory of religion in order to highlight some promising directions for more defensible semantic and epistemological groundwork in theory of religion.     

Vernon Smith开创的实验经济学及其对心理学研究的启示

2002年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主Vernon Smith是实验经济学的创始人。他获奖的原因是“在实验经济分析尤其是选择性市场机制研究中引入了实验室实验”,开创了经济学研究的新领域。该文介绍了实验经济学的理论基础、其主要研究领域以及实验经济学的新方向——神经经济学的研究。该文着重介绍并分析了实验经济学中与心理学研究有关的部分,以期对心理学研究有所启示。     

Remarks on the Modal Logic of Henry Bradford Smith

H. B. Smith, Professor of Philosophy at the influential Pennsylvania School was (roughly) a contemporary of C. I. Lewis who was similarly interested in a proper account of implication. His research also led him into the study of modal logic but in a different direction than Lewis was led. His account of modal logic does not lend itself as readily as Lewis' to the received possible worlds semantics, so that the Smith approach was a casualty rather than a beneficiary of the renewed interest in modality. In this essay we present some of the main points of the Smith approach, in a new guise.     

Children's size judgments when size and distance vary: Is there a developmental trend to overconstancy?

A review of the experimental literature on size constancy in children shows that studies permitting unrestricted viewing in natural settings provide only limited support for the hypothesis, proposed by Wohlwill, of a developmental trend from under- to overconstancy. A study is reported in which subjects aged 8 to 18 years made magnitude estimations of height for targets whose height and distance from them varied. For distances up to 15 m, and heights from 5 to 50 cm, size constancy prevailed at all ages: The same number was assigned to a given height at every distance. If a developmental trend exists, it requires either younger subjects or greater distances to be revealed.