Did Jesus Discover Forgiveness?

This essay explores Hannah Arendt's claim that Jesus was the “discoverer” of forgiveness. It assesses Charles Griswold's view that person‐to‐person forgiveness is in evidence in Greek culture and practice before Jesus. The essay refines Griswold's view and suggests that person‐to‐person forgiveness is a cultural universal. The essay makes observations about the significance of the different words that denote person‐to‐person forgiveness; it also explores the implications of reading the New Testament writings on person‐to‐person forgiveness in the chronological order in which they were written. From a close reading of the early New Testament documents, the essay makes two suggestions about the Western tradition of forgiveness. First, it suggests that Paul the apostle is the first to identify person‐to‐person forgiveness as a moral virtue. Second, it suggests that in the Synoptic tradition, Jesus is the first to identify person‐to‐person forgiveness as a discrete category of behavior distinct, for example, from pardoning, excusing, waiving, or ignoring the wrongs of others.     

Overhabituation and dishabituation: Effects of extraversion and amount of training

The Eysenck (1967) hypothesis that introverts have higher levels of cortical activation than extraverts has received support in a number of psychophysiological studies, though there is not complete consistency. The present study extended the habituation paradigm used in some previous work to include an examination of differences between extraverts and introverts during and following long-term overhabituation. Electrodermal activity was recorded while 72 extraverts and 72 introverts were subjected to criterion auditory habituation to a 1000-Hz, 90-db tone, followed by 60, 100, or 140 trials of overhabituation. The overhabituation run was followed by a test stimulus of 7000 Hz and a final repetition of the standard stimulus. Results showed that introverts increased in response frequency with increasing overhabituation exposure, while extraverts showed an increase only from 100 to 140 trials. In addition, the hypothesis that differences in test response amplitude favoring introverts would be eliminated by extended overhabituation training was supported. Specifically, extraverts showed increased responses at 100 and 140 trials, while introverts remained approximately constant across the three conditions. Finally, results supported the Sokolov hypothesis that overhabituation training produces test responses of larger amplitude.     

SCIENTISM AND TECHNOLOGY AS RELIGIONS

Abstract. Jacques Ellul, by far the most significant author in the serious discussions on the interface between religion and technology, is apparently not known to the science‐and‐religion field. The reason is the imprecise use of the terminology. In scientific formulation the relationship can be summarized as technology /religion:: science/theology. The first pair are robust three‐dimensional templates of most human experience; the second pair are linear, abstract concerns of a minority of citizens. In the parallel community—now well developed throughout academia—of science, technology, and society, where the technology/religion matters have been discussed more than the science/religion pair, John Caiazza's point that “techno‐secularism is the real problem” has been front and center for some decades. Among the theologians most aware of this, Raimundo Panikkar, Langdon Gilkey, and Huston Smith, Smith is the one who has taken the case much further than Caiazza, recognizing the danger of the real theological challenge from the religion of scientism and actively working against it. I write from a unique background among those involved in this debate—that of being deeply embedded simultaneously both in the modern science and technology establishment and in the reform of the religious enterprise for fifty years. I make the case that matters are worse than even Smith posits. He shows that scientism as a fundamentalist modern secularism serves the exact function of the theology behind the practiced religion of America and the West, that is, technology. An unexpected ray of hope has appeared in the sudden emergence of whole‐person healing (also known as complementary and alternative medicine), which is used regularly by well over half the population. This reintroduction of the spiritual dimension into this key technology of health will certainly be a major turning point.     

Adam Smith: Self-Command,Practical Reason and Deontological Insights

In this paper, I argue that, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith conflates two different meanings of ‘self-command’, which is particularly puzzling because of the central role of this virtue in his theory. The first is the matrix of rational action, the one described in Part III of the TMS and learned in ‘the great school of self-command’. The second is the particular moral virtue of self-command. Distinguishing between these two meanings allows us, on the one hand, to solve some apparent paradoxes of the text; and, on the other, to identify various features of both the practical reason and deontological ethical traditions that are present in Smith's sentimentalism, enriching his phenomenological account of moral actions.     

Levels of experienced dimensionality in children and adults

This work presents a new conceptualization of the contrast between holistic and differentiated perception of multidimensional stimuli. Specifically, two hypotheses about the experiential status of dimensions within holistic perception are proposed and tested as explanations of young children's general perceptual mode and adults' integral mode. The major result is that three levels of dimensional status are realized: (1) the hypothesis of nonprimary axes characterizes adult “integral” perception of saturation and brightness relations, (2) the hypothesis of primary but not mandatory axes characterizes kindergarteners' “integral” perception of size and shade relations, and (3) the notion of mandatory axes characterizes adults' separable perception of size and shade relations. These results indicate a new interpretation of the integrality-separability distinction and the derivative developmental hypothesis. It is specifically hypothesized that the developmental history of most dimensional combinations includes these three levels.     

Dishabituation and spontaneous recovery of the electrodermal orienting response: Effects of extraversion,impulsivity, sociability,and caffeine

The relationship between extraversion and psychophysiological indices of arousal is not yet fully understood. The present study attempted to further clarify this relationship by using caffeine to systematically manipulate arousal. Subjects pretested on the Eysenck Personality Inventory were given caffeine or a placebo, then underwent habituation, dishabituation, and spontaneous recovery of the electrodermal OR. Separate analyses examined the main and interactive effects of extraversion, impulsivity, and sociability with caffeine. Several tonic and phasic measures showed group reversal effects, with introverts having higher tonic levels and larger phasic responses under placebo conditions and extraverts having larger phasic responses and higher tonic levels under caffeine. Although both tonic and phasic responses were differentially affected, the group reversal effects occurred at different points in time on tonic than they did on phasic measures relative to the theoretical buildup of inhibition. The findings for impulsivity were quite consistent with those for extraversion, and both sets of results were generally supportive of the Eysenck hypothesis.     

Science and Scientism in Huston Smith's Why Religion Matters

Huston Smith is justifiably critical of scientism, the belief that science is the only reliable path to truth. He holds that scientism and the materialism that accompanies it have led to a widespread denial of the transcendence expressed in traditional religious world-views. He argues that evolutionary theory should be seen as a product of scientism rather than of scientific evidence, citing authors who claim that the fossil record does not support the idea of continuous descent with modification from earlier life forms. I suggest that he has underestimated the cumulative weight of evidence from many independent fields of science supporting neo-Darwinism. I argue that methodological (but not philosophical) naturalism is a basic assumption of scientific inquiry. Proponents of intelligent design assume a fixed plan or blueprint, which is compatible with Smith's understanding of God's timeless vision. By contrast, almost all biologists and many theologians today envisage a dynamic and open-ended process rather than the realization of the unchanging forms in a preexisting plan.     

Can God or the Market Set People Free?

Both Protestant theologians and “preference” economists believe that freedom is necessary for moral action, but such theologians and economists have seemingly irreconcilable accounts of freedom and, thus also, morality. Instead of learning from each other, they typically ignore each other or claim that one field reigns supreme over the other. This essay digs into the theological and economic traditions of each side to find points of similarity between them. It engages Adam Smith and Ernst Troeltsch to develop a view of “ethical freedom” that pulls together the “libertarian freedom” emphasized by preference economics and the “egalitarian freedom” emphasized in much Protestant theology. The three‐part view of freedom draws the disciplines together and opens possibilities for a more robust theory of moral action.     

The puzzling rabbis

Religion is one of the cultural systems that attempts to deal with human puzzlement. This paper uses the metaphor of the puzzle to make sense of what has always been a disconcerting feature of rabbinic Judaism, namely, the rabbis’ (200–600 C.E.) blatantly ad hoc manner of interpreting Scripture. The rabbis seem to know in advance what a verse must mean and go to great lengths to find a legitimation of that reading in the verse in question. Typically this ad hoc quality of rabbinic interpretation is explained as a means whereby the rabbis provide ‘prooftexts’ for new practices without Scriptural warrants. But what from one perspective appears as an attempt to find prooftexts is from another perspective an attempt to solve a puzzle. Conceptually speaking, solving a puzzle and finding prooftexts are worlds apart. This paper treats the rabbis as an inter‐generational community of puzzle solvers involved in the quest to discover how the oral Torah is already contained in the written Torah. Like all matching puzzles, this one is necessarily ad hoc.

The intellectual seeks in various ways, the casuistry of which extends into infinity, to endow his life with a pervasive meaning, and thus to find unity within himself, with his fellow men, and with the cosmos (Weber 1925, 1978 p. 506).

Analysis into parts is not really so important in these societies as is the periodic construction or reconstruction of the whole. The whole is what is truly edifying, and its reconstruction is a purpose which puzzlement can subtly serve (Fernandez, 1986, p. 179).     

A Wild West of the Mind

§258 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is often seen as the core of his private language argument. While its role is certainly overinflated and it is a mistake to think that there is anything that could be called the private language argument, §258 is an important part of the private language sections of the Philosophical Investigations. As with so much of Wittgenstein's work, there are widely diverse interpretations of why exactly the private diarist's attempted ostensive definition fails. I argue for a version of the no-stage-setting interpretation of the failure of private ostension. On this interpretation, the reason why the diarist cannot establish a meaning for ‘S’ is that she lacks the conceptual-linguistic stage-setting needed to disambiguate the concentration of her attention (the private analogue of an ostensive definition). Thus, the problem with any subsequent use of ‘S’ is not that there is no criterion of correctness for remembering the meaning of ‘S’ correctly, or for re-identifying S correctly in the future. Rather, it is because of the initial failure to define ‘S’ that there is nothing that could count as a criterion of correctness for the future use of ‘S’; there is nothing to remember or re-identify. My argument for the no-stage-setting interpretation consists in showing how well it fits into the rest of the Philosophical Investigations and in defending it against objections from Robert J. Fogelin, Anthony Kenny, and most recently John V. Canfield. Kenny's and Canfield's objections are found to suffer from problems regarding memory scepticism.