The judicial dialogue

A variety of theoretical positions are emerging to explain the judicial process from such perspectives as hermeneutics, semiotics, critical theory and argumentation/rhetoric. They ask such questions as these: What is the source of judicial authority? How do judges arrive at their decisions? By what logic are decisions to be tested? In this essay I argue that a focus on decisions and their justifications alone masks the broader process in which judges, along with all the other relevant groups, engage in a continuing and evolving dialogue to structure their normative universe through the complementary processes of dialectic and rhetoric. Contemporary concepts of argumentation can serve to analyze this process critically.     

Künstliche Intelligenz und Philosophie

Artificial Intelligence can be considered as the so far last attempt to decode the anthropological comparison between human beings and machines. Thereby it also represents in a prominent way what can be called systemic thought. Searle's conclusive argument against strong AI (that is the idea of computers having intention in a literal way) refers to his precise distinction between syntax and semantics. This difference obviously opposing some of Searle's other essential ideas will only convince if it also explains the genetic-pragmatic aspect. A theory explaining the life of mind and the possibility of understanding needs to combine representation and intention with the subjective causation of signs. At the same time they have to be contextualized within a model of teleologically interpreted life recognized with the help of self-experience and self-reflection. This suggests that AI is a simulation which wrongly believes to be a real duplication. Actually it is a semiotic reduction (syntax and semantic surface of signs only) and a psychological compensation (Turing test) connected with a genetic or abductive fallacy. The biological decontextualization, in fact the elimination of teleology and intention, the deconstruction of subjectivity, the loss of the genetic-pragmatic dimension and the abductive fallacy induce the strong AI to confuse its surface-illusion of simulated understanding with the real process itself.     

A PEIRCEAN RESPONSE TO THE EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE

The evolutionary debunking argument advanced by Sharon Street, Michael Ruse, and Richard Joyce employs the logic of Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins to contend that humans cannot have knowledge of moral truths, since the evolutionary process that has produced our basic moral intuitions lacks causal connections to those (putative) truths. Yet this argument is self‐defeating, because its aim is the categorical, normative claim that we should suspend our moral beliefs in light of the discoveries about their non‐truth‐tracking origins, when it is precisely this claim that relies upon the normativity under attack. This article cites Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) to argue that such self‐defeat can be avoided by expanding upon the basic structure of the argument put forth by Griffiths and Wilkins, provided that one embraces a version of realism that corresponds with Peirce's doctrine of final causation. So construed, final causation reconciles real generals (including real moral values) with natural selection and undergirds further speculation of moral facts within values per se.     

Psychosynthesis of the brain and mind: Comments on a new intellectual framework in psychiatry and psychotherapy

Abstract

Eric R. Kandel, the Nobel Prize winner of 2000 in physiology and medicine, emphasises five scientific principles of which psychiatrists must be aware and which are presented and critically analysed in this article. Kandel states that professional requirements for future psychiatrists will impose a greater knowledge of the structure and functioning of the brain, and that the rationale for the unique domain that psychiatry occupies within academic medicine is the analysis and understanding of the interaction between the social and biological determinants of behaviour. The work of a psychotherapist is based both on scientific knowledge and, to a large extent, on an empathic understanding of the patient's history as well as his or her verbal and non-verbal expressions – as a consequence, the orientation of hermeneutic philosophy and semiotics should also be included in the intellectual framework. The aim of this paper is to update the channels of communication between modern neurobiology, psychoanalysis, semiotics and philosophy to the best advantage for their multidisciplinary, holistic cooperation.     

Coda and counterpoint

This essay responds to several of the issues raised by the various review essays on the author's book, Semiotics of Religion: Signs of the Sacred in History, while simultaneously offering some observations on the nature, current state, and future prospects of the semiotics of religion; on the explanatory ambitions and methodological limitations of this field; and on the location of semiotics in the human sciences and in historical and cultural studies, as distinguished from universalizing or Cartesian approaches.     

Dreams in Child Psychoanalysis

More than six decades after Freud's death, psychoanalysts are certainly not more unified in their view of the concept of the unconscious—its structure and its way of working—than in ‘the good old days’. Challenges are facing psychoanalysis from many perspectives, urging psychoanalysts to continuously reconsider their theoretical grounds. This paper pursues three lines of argumentation concerning the Unconscious. The first line concerns the relation to neuroscience and this paper suggests the concept of background feelings (Damasio) as a contribution to another understanding of deficits in the psychoanalytic relationship. The second line concerns the relation to cognitive semiotics, and here, the paper stresses the concept of basic image sehemata as a possible link between the subject's pre-reflective awareness of the other and the internal world of phantasy. The third line pursues a concept of the analytic interpretation which is close to the Freudian idea that psychoanalysis is the communication between two Unconscious, and, consequently, that the psycho-analytic interpretation is not per se a conscious act.     

CRITICAL AFTERWORD

This Afterword looks back over both parts of the discussion of “God and the World of Signs”—“Semiotics and the Emergence of Life” in the previous issue of Zygon and “Semiotics and Theology” in this issue. Three central questions in this extended debate are identified: What is the nature of biological organisms and biological evolution? What is the relationship between the natural world and the Triune God of the Christian theological tradition? What should be the goals of Science/Religion Studies? I summarize the answers that Christopher Southgate and Andrew Robinson have given in their program and the challenges raised by their critics. Their strengths and weaknesses are assessed. In the conclusion I ask readers to imagine that this particular research program were to be taken as a model program in science‐and‐religion research (with some tweaking) and then consider the features of the program that could function as standards for scholars working in other areas of the dialogue.