Consequences of schematism

In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?).     

古人论文学语言和意象

本文介绍古人对如何解决语言和意象不相一致这一问题的一些意见,并从中归纳出四种解决问题的方法：１．让形象说话,２．抓住事物主要特征,３．不即不离地描写,４．语言浅近     

Towards a Rough Mereology-Based Logic for Approximate Solution Synthesis. Part 1

We are concerned with formal models of reasoning under uncertainty. Many approaches to this problem are known in the literature e.g. Dempster-Shafer theory [29], [42], bayesian-based reasoning [21], [29], belief networks [29], many-valued logics and fuzzy logics [6], non-monotonic logics [29], neural network logics [14]. We propose rough mereology developed by the last two authors [22-25] as a foundation for approximate reasoning about complex objects. Our notion of a complex object includes, among others, proofs understood as schemes constructed in order to support within our knowledge assertions/hypotheses about reality described by our knowledge incompletely.     

Effects of viewing time,fixations, and viewing strategies on visual memory for briefly presented natural objects

We investigated the impact of viewing time and fixations on visual memory for briefly presented natural objects. Participants saw a display of eight natural objects arranged in a circle and used a partial report procedure to assign one object to the position it previously occupied during stimulus presentation. At the longest viewing time of 7,000 ms or 10 fixations, memory performance was significantly higher than at the shorter times. This increase was accompanied by a primacy effect, suggesting a contribution of another memory component—for example, visual long-term memory (VLTM). We found a very limited beneficial effect of fixations on objects; fixated objects were only remembered better at the shortest viewing times. Our results revealed an intriguing difference between the use of a blocked versus an interleaved experimental design. When trial length was predictable, in the blocked design, target fixation durations increased with longer viewing times. When trial length was unpredictable, fixation durations stayed the same for all viewing lengths. Memory performance was not affected by this design manipulation, thus also supporting the idea that the number and duration of fixations are not closely coupled to memory performance.     

Association between objects and body parts mediated by function

Recent accounts of conceptual knowledge suggest that the specific gestures/actions that should be performed in order to use an object for its intended function are an integral part of its mental representation. If this is true, then the information regarding which body part needs activating to interact with the object should also be part of such representation. Starting from the assumption that not only artefacts (i.e., tools), but also natural objects (i.e., fruits and vegetables) have a function, the present study investigates the existence of a link between a specific object and the effector involved in its use. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) paradigm was adopted to test for an association between natural objects and mouth, and between artefacts and hand (Experiment 1) or foot (Experiment 2). Results showed selective links between objects and effectors, based on which body part is needed to carry out the object's function.     

Frege,Boolos, and Logical Objects

In this paper, the authors discuss Frege's theory of logical objects (extensions, numbers, truth-values) and the recent attempts to rehabilitate it. We show that the eta relation George Boolos deployed on Frege's behalf is similar, if not identical, to the encoding mode of predication that underlies the theory of abstract objects. Whereas Boolos accepted unrestricted Comprehension for Properties and used the eta relation to assert the existence of logical objects under certain highly restricted conditions, the theory of abstract objects uses unrestricted Comprehension for Logical Objects and banishes encoding (eta) formulas from Comprehension for Properties. The relative mathematical and philosophical strengths of the two theories are discussed. Along the way, new results in the theory of abstract objects are described, involving: (a) the theory of extensions, (b) the theory of directions and shapes, and (c) the theory of truth values.     

Natural Numbers and Natural Cardinals as Abstract Objects: A Partial Reconstruction of Frege" s="" grundgesetze="" in="" object="" theory"="

In this paper, the author derives the Dedekind–Peano axioms for number theory from a consistent and general metaphysical theory of abstract objects. The derivation makes no appeal to primitive mathematical notions, implicit definitions, or a principle of infinity. The theorems proved constitute an important subset of the numbered propositions found in Frege"s Grundgesetze. The proofs of the theorems reconstruct Frege"s derivations, with the exception of the claim that every number has a successor, which is derived from a modal axiom that (philosophical) logicians implicitly accept. In the final section of the paper, there is a brief philosophical discussion of how the present theory relates to the work of other philosophers attempting to reconstruct Frege"s conception of numbers and logical objects.     

The role of three-dimensional depth cues in infants' perception of partly occluded objects

Newborn infants were familiarized to a three dimensional display consisting of a rod which moved behind a central occluder, so that only the top and bottom of the rod were visible. The infants' eyes were 38 cm from the rod and the occluder was 15 cm in front of the rod, a separation intended to ensure that the gap between the two was detected by the infants. On subsequent test trials the infants looked longer at a complete rod than at two rod pieces, suggesting that the hidden unity, or completeness of the rod had not been perceived. In a study by Johnson and Náñez (in press), using computer. generated stimuli, 4 month olds perceived the hidden unity of a similar display presented on a VDU in the complete absence of three. dimensional depth cues. Taken together, these findings suggest that, for these displays, perception of three. dimensional depth cues is not necessary for the detection of the unity of partially hidden objects. It is suggested that age changes in early infancy in the perception of occluded objects may result either from the emergence of abilities to perceive objects from kinematic information or from the emergence of sensitivity to that information itself.     

Forms, uses and functions of children's favourite objects

In this study, the notion of a favourite object is used as a heuristic concept for things that children are occupied with and absorbed by. According to earlier studies, favourite objects can be grouped into four categories: forerunners of transitional objects, primary and secondary transitional objects, and favourite toys. This initial classification was compared to results of cluster analyses of characteristics of favourite objects among 32 preschool and 30 primary school children, corroborating the initial classification and specifying the typology. The distribution of types of objects was different for the two groups of children, but was not dependent on age within groups or, for the preschool children, on mental development. These results indicate that changes of favourite objects with mental maturation are slow.
The softness of the material of primary and secondary transitional objects and the preference for objects that could be kept close to the body suggest that the comforting character of these favourite objects has its root in the child's self-soothing actions with the object.