Compared to Dematerialized Money,Cash Increases Impatience in Intertemporal Choice

When it comes to trading time for money (or vice versa), people tend to be impatient and myopic. Often dramatically so. For illustration, half of people would rather collect $15 now than $30 in 3 months. This willingness to forego 50% of the reward to skip a 3‐month wait corresponds to an annual discount rate of 277%. This article investigates how money's physical form biases intertemporal choice. We ask, what happens to (im)patience (i.e., discount rates) when time is traded against cash rather than against an equivalent sum of dematerialized money? We find that intertemporal decisions pitting time against cash (rather than against dematerialized money) increase impatience. The underlying mechanism relates to the pain of parting from money. Letting go of cash (dematerialized money) we can have now is psychologically more (less) painful, which in turn reduces (increases) our willingness to wait for larger‐later payoffs. Importantly, heightening prevention focus (i.e., concerns for safety and security) moderates this bias. The article concludes by discussing the implications of the research, particularly for the psychology of saving behavior.     

Integrating the global neuronal workspace into the framework of predictive processing: Towards a working hypothesis

Hohwy (2013) proposed an account of conscious access that integrates the global neuronal workspace (GNW) into the framework of predictive processing, a view that I term the predictive global neuronal workspace (PGNW). Whilst promising, the PGNW is theoretically underdeveloped and empirically underexplored. The aim of this article is to outline the empirical predictions that distinguish the PGNW from other workspace models. I do so by (i) placing the PGNW in close contact with experimental work and cashing out a set of predictions that distinguish it from the standard formulation of the GNW, (ii) exploring the evidence for the first of these predictions in the context of bistable perception and the conscious processing of auditory regularities, and (iii), contrasting the PGNW with Chanes and Barrett (2016) limbic workspace. Combined, these arguments show that the PGNW is both testable and supported by current evidence.     

Measuring driving workload of heavy vehicles at roundabouts

Correctly designed roundabouts proved to have positive safety and functional performances. However, they are also affected by peculiar disadvantages. In particular, they are difficult to manoeuvre, especially for heavy vehicle drivers. Despite these concerns, there are currently no driving workload metrics devoted to roundabouts.A novel methodological approach is proposed for trying to quantify workload impinging on heavy vehicle drivers when manoeuvring through complex at-grade intersections. Proper acquisition of input data constitutes the starting point for future research about ascertainment of workload for these particular road scenarios. The described procedure enables recording steering wheel angles performed by a driver when manoeuvring an articulated lorry through a complex at-grade intersection. A field trial was carried out for verifying the practical feasibility of proposed method in capturing driver’s steering behaviour. Dynamic data acquired via global navigation satellite system instrumentation were related to actual driver’s steering wheel behaviour captured by camera frames. As a complement to the experiment, selected steering behaviour metrics were calculated. Steering Entropy attributed a high difficulty level to the manoeuvres performed through the roundabout, whereas High Frequency Component and Steering Reversal Rate showed intensity and occurrences of driver’s corrections needed for controlling position of the semitrailer at the ring. It appears that even a single roundabout may represent an arduous task for drivers. The study concludes with recommendations for further research about workload imposed by roundabouts to heavy vehicle drivers, with special attention to successions of closely spaced roundabouts.     

How do affected interests support global democracy?

In this paper, I critique one way of arguing for global democracy on grounds of affected interests and defend another. A famous argument for global democracy, which I call the Demos-Based Argument, attempts to justify global democracy based on the claim that affected interests vindicate individual claims to democratic participation or representation. I analyze and evaluate the Demos-Based Argument and consider different ways of interpreting and justifying its crucial premise: the Principle of Affected Interests. The result is that the argument fails. One lesson of the discussion of the Demos-Based Argument is that the most promising, though eventually unsuccessful, justification of the Principle of Affected Interests is utilitarian. Given the failure of the Demos-Based Argument, the question suggests itself if there is another way to argue for global democracy on utilitarian grounds. I will outline a promising alternative argument for global democracy, which I call the Direct Argument. Like the Demos-Based Argument, the Direct Argument is based on affected interests and ultimately on utilitarianism, but unlike the former, the Direct Argument avoids the detour over stating a criterion for individual claims to democratic participation and representation.     

A role for the anterior insular cortex in the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness

According to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, consciousness results from the global broadcast of information throughout the brain. The global neuronal workspace is mainly constituted by a fronto-parietal network. The anterior insular cortex is part of this global neuronal workspace, but the function of this region has not yet been defined within the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. In this review, I hypothesize that the anterior insular cortex implements a cross-modal priority map, the function of which is to determine priorities for the processing of information and subsequent entrance in the global neuronal workspace.     

High regularities in eye-movement patterns reveal the dynamics of the visual working memory allocation mechanism

With only two to five slots of visual working memory (VWM), humans are able to quickly solve complex visual problems to near optimal solutions. To explain the paradox between tightly constrained VWM and impressively complex human visual problem-solving ability, we propose several principles for dynamic VWM allocation. In particular, we propose that complex visual information is represented in a temporal manner using only a few slots of VWM that include global and local visual chunks. We built a model of human traveling salesman problem solving based on these principles of VWM allocation and tested the model with eye-movement data. Exactly as the model predicted, human eye movements during traveling salesman problem solving have precise quantitative regularities with regard to both the general statistical pattern of attentional fixations and how they vary across individuals with different VWM capacities. Even though VWM capacity is very limited, eye movements dynamically allocate VWM resources to both local and global information, enabling attention to fine details without loss of the big picture.     

The direction of hemispheric asymmetries for object categorization at different levels of abstraction depends on the task

In this study hemispheric asymmetries for categorizing objects at the basic versus subordinate level of abstraction were investigated. As predictions derived from different theoretical approaches are contradictory and experimental evidence is inconclusive in this regard, we conducted two categorization experiments, where we contrasted two experimental paradigms. In the first experiment, subjects had to verify whether a word and a laterally presented picture matched or not. In the second experiment, subjects had to identify laterally presented pictures of animals either at the basic or subordinate level by pressing a corresponding response key. Whereas the first experiment revealed an advantage of the left hemisphere (LH) for categorizing objects at the basic level and of the right hemisphere (RH) for categorizing at the subordinate level, just the opposite brain asymmetry was found in the second experiment. As the stimuli were identical in both experiments, hemispheric asymmetries seem to be strongly task dependent.