Extradimensional transfer in the easy-to-hard effect

In three experiments analyzing determinants of the easy-to-hard effect, pigeons acquired a hard discrimination after training on other problems. Intradimensional pretraining resulted in immediate transfer to the hard discrimination. Extradimensional pretraining consistently did not produce immediate transfer but did facilitate learning rate. In Experiment 1, the compounding of cues from an easy extradimentsional discrimination with those from the hard discrimination resulted in the former overshadowing the latter. When different types of extradimensional discriminations were introduced in Experiments 2 and 3, the degree of transfer was not proportional to the similarity in incidental background cues across problems. The findings indicate that in the easy-to-hard effect: (a) intra- and extradimensional mechanisms jointly contribute to the development of stimulus control, (b) intradimensional transfer is more consistent with the gradient-interaction model than the selective attention model, and (c) extradimensional transfer is better accounted for by the construct of general attentiveness rather than by the neutralization of background cues.     

Perceptions of the magnitude and diversity of social support

Three studies were conducted to test the hypotheses that subjects would overestimate the proportion of their peers who shared their opinion on an issue and that they would perceive their own opinion group as consisting of people with a wider and more diverse range of values and outlooks than those holding different opinions. The first study was conducted following a period of intense debate about sixism on a college campus. Subjects estimated student opinion on issues related to sexism and indicated how diverse or similar they perceived supporters and nonsupporters of the women's movement to be. In a second study subjects estimated the proportion of students who evaluated President Carter's performance as good, fair, or poor and then indicated how diverse or similar the three groups of students were who held these various opinions. A third study closely replicated the second, using the issue of divestiture of college-owned stock in South Africa. In all three studies, subjects were divided into groups on the basis of their own attitudes. Results consistently supported the hypotheses.     

Common sense and Berkeley's perception by suggestion

Abstract

Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ‘Propositional Account’. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non‐propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a ‘non‐conciliatory’ attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge is no longer plausible once we recognize that Berkeley endorses the non‐propositional sense of mediate perception. I close by urging that the non‐propositional interpretation of Berkeley's account of mediate perception affords a greater appreciation of Berkeley's attempt to bring a philosophical account of sense perception in line with some key principles of common sense. While Berkeley's account of perception and physical objects permits physical objects to be immediately perceived by some of the senses, they are, most often, mediately perceived. But for Berkeley this is not a challenge to common sense since common sense requires only that we perceive objects by our senses and that they are, more or less, as we perceive them. Mediate perception by suggestion is, for Berkeley, as genuine a form of perception as immediate perception, and both are compatible with Berkeley's understanding of the demands of common sense.     

A Wild West of the Mind

§258 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is often seen as the core of his private language argument. While its role is certainly overinflated and it is a mistake to think that there is anything that could be called the private language argument, §258 is an important part of the private language sections of the Philosophical Investigations. As with so much of Wittgenstein's work, there are widely diverse interpretations of why exactly the private diarist's attempted ostensive definition fails. I argue for a version of the no-stage-setting interpretation of the failure of private ostension. On this interpretation, the reason why the diarist cannot establish a meaning for ‘S’ is that she lacks the conceptual-linguistic stage-setting needed to disambiguate the concentration of her attention (the private analogue of an ostensive definition). Thus, the problem with any subsequent use of ‘S’ is not that there is no criterion of correctness for remembering the meaning of ‘S’ correctly, or for re-identifying S correctly in the future. Rather, it is because of the initial failure to define ‘S’ that there is nothing that could count as a criterion of correctness for the future use of ‘S’; there is nothing to remember or re-identify. My argument for the no-stage-setting interpretation consists in showing how well it fits into the rest of the Philosophical Investigations and in defending it against objections from Robert J. Fogelin, Anthony Kenny, and most recently John V. Canfield. Kenny's and Canfield's objections are found to suffer from problems regarding memory scepticism.     

God,Truth and Mathematics in Nineteenth-century England

In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke created a special epistemological category for mathematical and religious knowing. This category of knowledge was quickly brushed to the side in the French Enlightenment, but the English preserved it well into the nineteenth century. This article considers the ways that the neo-Lockian joining of mathematics and theology fundamentally affected both mathematical and theological thinking in the first half of the English nineteenth century. It argues that these developments set the stage for the post-Darwinian conflicts between science—including mathematics—and religion.     

Sher’s defense of blame

In his In Praise of Blame, George Sher aims to provide an analysis and defense of blame. In fact, he aims to provide an analysis that will itself yield a defense by allowing him to argue that morality and blame “stand or fall together.” He thus opposes anyone who recommends jettisoning blame while preserving (the rest of) morality. In this comment, I examine Sher’s defense of blame. Though I am much in sympathy with Sher’s strategy of defending blame by providing an analysis that shows its connection to our commitment to morality, I question his execution of this strategy. Sher hopes to defend our blaming practices by showing our dispositions to them to be a merely contingent consequence of a belief–desire pair that is itself justified by whatever justifies our commitment to morality. I doubt our blaming practices can be defended in this way. In explaining my doubts, I provide a short comparison of Sher’s approach with that of P. F. Strawson in “Freedom of Resentment.” I suggest that we might do better by exploring the connection between our commitment to morality and our blaming practices themselves.

The Lutheran Confessional Writings for the 21st Century: A Question of Translation

The 21^st century shift of the church's "center of gravity" from North America and Europe to Asia, Africa, and South America, provides a context in which translating the Lutheran confessional writings— and the theology to which they point—will play a vitally important role in the life of "...the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church."     

Sensualistischer Phänomenalismus und Denkökonomie. Zur Wissenschaftskonzeption Ernst Machs

Sensationalistic Phenomenalism and Economy of Thought. On Ernst Mach's Concept of Science. Ernst Mach, natural scientist and major precursor of the Vienna Circle, never wants to be a philosopher. Nevertheless his writings are full of valuable hints for a modern theory of human knowledge – with respect to economical, historical and evolutionary aspects. His kind of phenomenalism is sensationalistic, monistic and instrumentalistic. This article deals with some contributions of his approach to actual debates in the general philosophy of science. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Reflections of the Aging Caesar: Drama as Cultural Perspective

This article affirms the view that literature transmits multiple reflections on human life that shape social mores. Examining stereotypes of age in literature as socially constructed artifacts reveals the prevailing attitudes toward aging during that time. This study focuses on the aging Julius Caesar in William Shakespeare's The Tragedy of Julius Caesar and in George Bernard Shaw's Caesar and Cleopatra. Writing 300 years apart, these two great playwrights inscribe both positive and negative models of aging, reflecting views in their eras that persist today. This article identifies these models, then explores them from a Lacanian standpoint, showing that each dramatist focuses on Caesar's ego development through the opinions of other characters. Offering a primarily negative view of aging, Shakespeare emphasizes the fragmented mirror images that other characters hold up to Caesar. Shaw self-consciously counters Shakespeare by foregrounding Caesar as subject, who beholds his aging self in the mirror of others' opinions while enacting a positive model of aging. Tracing this long tradition of aging stereotypes found in the two plays can be useful as scholars continue to reconstruct society's attitudes toward aging.