Is Nature Enough? Yes

Abstract. Religious naturalism encompasses thinkers from Baruch Spinoza, George Santayana, John Dewey, Henry Nelson Wieman, and Ralph Burhoe to recent writers. I offer a generic definition of religious naturalism and then outline my own version, the “minimalist vision of transcendence.” Many standard issues in the science‐and‐religion dialogue are seen to fade in significance for religious naturalism. I make suggestions for our understanding of science, including the importance of transcognitive abilities, the need for a revised notion of rationality as an alternative to extreme versions of postmodernism, the value of rational dissensus, and the education of appreciation. Finally, I suggest ways to interpret the religious traditions of the world by religious naturalism.     

Stimulus control over sex-typed play in cross-gender identified boys.

Discriminative stimulus control over masculine and feminine sex-typed play behaviors was investigated in five boys, aged 5–8 yr, with “childhood crossgender identification.” Reliable observational measures of play were obtained with two sets of toys: (a) “dress-up toys” (girls' apparel vs boys' apparel), and (b) “affect toys” (maternal-nurturance play vs masculine-aggression play). With an ABA reversal intrasubject design, certain stimulus conditions (e.g., presence of father, mother, male, or female stranger) were found to be discriminative for reliable changes in sex-typed play. Sex-typed play was found to vary as a function of the social stimulus situation and as a function of the type of play response required. All children played predominantly feminine while alone in the playroom. While no single environmental stimulus was consistently discriminative for masculine play across children, at least one stimulus condition was found for each subject under which he played predominantly masculine.     

Some processes in children's comprehension of linguistically and visually depicted relationships

A type of paired-associate task was given to 64 kindergarteners and 64 fifth-graders. In four conditions both linguistic and pictorial stimuli were presented simultaneously. In one condition, both a linguistic and pictorial relationship between two objects was depicted; in a second, only the linguistic aspect of the stimuli depicted a relationship; in the third condition, only the picture was relational; and in the fourth, neither the sentences nor the pictures portrayed a relationship between the objects. The results indicate that a relationship in both modes facilitated recall more than the presentation of a relationship in only one mode. A relationship in either mode enhanced recall more than no relationship at all. There were general significant age and IQ effects. The results are interpreted as favoring a duo-system model, with both representation and comprehension occurring within the context of relatively independent systems.     

INTERPRETING PUTNAM'S DIALECTICAL METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: Hilary Putnam's philosophical views have undergone extensive interpretation over many years. One such interpretive work is George Myerson's book Rhetoric, Reason and Society. Myerson's interest in dialogic rationalism leads him to examine the views of many theorists of rationality, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. As a prominent philosopher of rationality, Putnam is at the very center of this examination. Notwithstanding this fact, I contend that Myerson misinterprets the dialectical character of Putnam's philosophy in general and of Putnam's views on rationality in particular. This misinterpretation, I argue, is revealing of an illusion of thought to which Myerson is subject, an illusion that makes it seem that it is possible to theorize intelligibly about rationality from a metaphysical standpoint. This same illusion, I claim, also makes it seem that Myerson's positive views on rationality are intelligible. Employing a close textual analysis of Myerson's book, I argue that neither scenario is the case.     

Building Communities, Bridging Gaps: Alexander George's Contributions to Research Methods

This article assesses Alexander L. George's seminal contributions in six areas of political psychology and qualitative case study methods. These include George's work on psychological inputs in political processes, the intersection of history and political science, methods of within-case analysis such as process tracing, the use of structured, focused case comparisons (SFCC), the development of typological theories, and the connections among theory, empirical research, teaching, and policy. The article concludes with an analysis of four ongoing dimensions of George's research agenda: the need to integrate theories on purposive, cognitive, social, and motivational dynamics of decision making; the importance of methodological safeguards against our own cognitive biases as researchers; ways of integrating qualitative, quantitative, formal, and experimental research methods; and ways of modeling and testing theories on causal complexity.     

The Foundation of an Interpretative Sociology: A Critical Review of the Attempts of George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz

George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz proposed foundations for an interpretative sociology from opposite standpoints. Mead accepted the objective meaning structure a priori. His problem became therefore the explanation of the individuality and creativity of human actors in his social behavioristic approach. In contrast, Schutz started from the subjective consciousness of an isolated actor as a result of a phenomenological reduction. He was concerned with the problem of explaining the possibility of this isolated actor’s perceiving other actors in their existence, their concreteness, and the motives for their behavior. I treat these two approaches and their associated problems as equally relevant. My evaluation is based on their success in solving their specific problems. The aim is to decide which of the two approaches provides the more adequate foundation for an interpretative sociology.

Constructivism and education: education as an interpretative transformational process

This paper provides an analysis of the ideas of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead with regards the relationship between experience, meaning, language and thinking. It discusses how experience, meaning, language and thinking are based on the creative and constructive actions of individuals. Unlike what is the case in so-called radical constructivism, it is argued that the actions of the individual should be understood in a transactional way. The paper shows the implication of a transactional constructivism for education, arguing that education is the medium in which the creative and constructive actions of individuals come together in a social environment.     

Terrorism,War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

True self-love and true self-sacrifice

A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins’ argument.