A Theory of Hypermodal Logics: Mode Shifting in Modal Logic

A hypermodality is a connective whose meaning depends on where in the formula it occurs. The paper motivates the notion and shows that hypermodal logics are much more expressive than traditional modal logics. In fact we show that logics with very simple K hypermodalities are not complete for any neighbourhood frames.     

Disjunctive Quantum Logic in Dynamic Perspective

In Coecke (2002) we proposed the intuitionistic or disjunctive representation of quantum logic, i.e., a representation of the property lattice of physical systems as a complete Heyting algebra of logical propositions on these properties, where this complete Heyting algebra goes equipped with an additional operation, the operational resolution, which identifies the properties within the logic of propositions. This representation has an important application towards dynamic quantum logic, namely in describing the temporal indeterministic propagation of actual properties of physical systems. This paper can as such by conceived as an addendum to Quantum Logic in Intuitionistic Perspective that discusses spin-off and thus provides an additional motivation. We derive a quantaloidal semantics for dynamic disjunctive quantum logic and illustrate it for the particular case of a perfect (quantum) measurement.     

On Łukasiewicz's Four-Valued Modal Logic

ukasiewicz's four-valued modal logic is surveyed and analyzed, together with ukasiewicz's motivations to develop it. A faithful interpretation of it in classical (non-modal) two-valued logic is presented, and some consequences are drawn concerning its classification and its algebraic behaviour. Some counter-intuitive aspects of this logic are discussed in the light of the presented results, ukasiewicz's own texts, and related literature.     

《易传》天论的哲学意义--兼论中国哲学有没有哲学概念

"天人关系"是中国哲学的基本问题,这一基本问题在<易传>中表现得比较典型.<易传>之"天"概念蕴涵自然、自然规律、义理、天帝、阳气等数重内涵,逻辑内涵混杂,外延不确定.中国哲学之"天"从未获得"纯粹的哲学形式",天不是一个纯粹哲学概念,只是一个前哲学概念.实际上,气、道、理等中国哲学主干概念具有同样的哲学性质.学术界有必要共同讨论一个问题中国有哲学概念如何可能?     

Irrationality and egoism in Hegel’s account of right

ABSTRACT

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.     

Information and the complementarity game

Complementarity games are explorative games between two players. The deterministic rules of the game are known to both players. The first player freely chooses among a finite number of states of the game but tells nobody of this decision. The second player accesses the game only by primitive, symbolic input‐output interfaces. The task of the second player is to find out the unknown state by input‐output experiments. The logic resulting from this scenario resembles‐ quantum logic in many aspects. It is the empirical logic of choice for virtual realities.