Emotional Reaction to Fragile X Premutation Carrier Tests Among Infertile Women

Female fragile X premutation carriers are at ∼10-fold increased risk of premature ovarian failure (follicle stimulating hormone >40 mIU/mL, amenorrhea, age <40). A milder degree of premature ovarian aging (diminished ovarian reserve, where follicle stimulating hormone levels are typically 10–20 mIU/mL) results in infertility. Approximately 10% of fertility clinic patients have this diagnosis. A cohort of 20 women diagnosed with diminished ovarian reserve provided a blood specimen (confidential results), and completed structured questionnaires that assessed emotional reactions to potentially being a premutation carrier (pretest questionnaire, n = 20) and the posttest known carrier status (3 month follow-up questionnaire, n = 18 non-carriers). Responses were measured using 9-point scales, and analyzed with Fisher exact and Wilcoxon exact tests. While most participants did not view fragile X premutations as a serious medical condition, perceptions of seriousness were positively correlated with anger and regret about not knowing sooner of the potential association of these premutations with infertility. Overall, when women (pretest) imagined themselves as carriers, their self-esteem and Health Orientation Scale responses were unchanged with the exception of feeling more afraid (p = 0.004). Despite strongly wishing for negative test results, they were glad to know there might be a medical explanation for their infertility. Financial Support: This work was financially supported by a University of Virginia School of Medicine Research & Development Award.     

Can chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) discriminate appearance from reality?

A milestone in human development is coming to recognize that how something looks is not necessarily how it is. We tested appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with a task requiring them to choose between a small grape and a big grape. The apparent relative size of the grapes was reversed using magnifying and minimizing lenses so that the truly bigger grape appeared to be the smaller one. Our Lens test involved a basic component adapted from standard procedures for children, as well as several components designed to rule out alternative explanations. There were large individual differences in performance, with some chimpanzees’ responses suggesting they appreciated the appearance-reality distinction. In contrast, all chimpanzees failed a Reverse Contingency control test, indicating that those who passed the Lens test did not do so by learning a simple reverse contingency rule. Four-year-old children given an adapted version of the Lens test failed it while 4.5-year-olds passed. Our study constitutes the first direct investigation of appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees and the first cross-species comparison of this capacity.     

Action understanding as inverse planning

Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an “intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a “teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.     

Liking products by the head of a dog: Perceived orientation of attention induces valence acquisition

We show that the valence acquired by an object is sensitive to the perceived attention it receives and that this effect occurs in a quite implicit fashion. Participants were exposed to products (i.e., peppermint brands) associated with the head of dogs oriented toward them, looking straight ahead, or oriented away from them. Participants then completed an affective priming task, which allowed us to assess the valence acquired by the products in a task free of desirability concerns. Results show that the valence of the products increased linearly as the perceived orientation of attention of the targets moved toward them. This finding suggests that mimetic desire effects may be activated in a quite implicit fashion. The theoretical and social implications of this finding are discussed.     

Jackson-5 scales of revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (r-RST) and their application to dysfunctional real world outcomes

Revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (r-RST) is a neurobiological theory of personality which has many differences compared to the original version. This highlights the need for measurement scales to reflect the revised theory. Study 1 uses exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to develop and test new scales (the ‘Jackson-5’) which are shown to be internally reliable, have scale inter-relationships matching theory, and to have desirable construct validity properties. Study 2 compares r-RST with original RST in the prediction of delinquency and psychopathy in students. Results suggest the new scales capture the main properties of r-RST and indicate that r-RST provides a substantially different explanation of the personality basis of dysfunctional behavior compared to original RST.     

Studying the variability of handwriting patterns using the Kinematic Theory

The variability observed in handwriting patterns is analyzed from the perspective of integrating the resulting motor control knowledge in the design of more powerful handwriting recognizers in personal digital assistants (PDAs) and smartphones. Using the highest representational level of the Kinematic Theory of Rapid Human Movement, the Sigma-Lognormal model, this article reports basic theoretical and practical results that could be taken into account in the design of such systems. The main movement variability introduced by the neuromuscular system (NMS) and induced through the scheduling of motor tasks by the central nervous system (CNS) is divided into global and local fluctuations. From a fiducial action plan decoded by this model, a wide range of handwriting distortions are artificially generated by acting on the Sigma-Lognormal parameters. The resulting patterns are studied to understand scale changes and rotational deformations, the two basic features that a recognizer has to take into account. An experiment based on the writing of the same word by six writers is also reported. The results, obtained by an ANOVA analysis, corroborate the predictions and support the relevance of the Kinematic Theory for the analysis and synthesis of handwriting disruptions. These findings consolidate the results of previous studies on single strokes using the Sigma-Lognormal model. Overall, this report provides new insights into our understanding of motor control, as well as into practical cues for the development of huge databases of letters and words to train and test on-line handwriting classifiers and recognizers.     

Comprehension of the representational mind in infancy

A broad array of infant studies are reviewed that appear to be consistent with the idea that belief understanding specifically, and mental attribution generally, emerge much earlier than previously acknowledged. We first examine existing false-belief research, which, while confirming that children under 4 years perform poorly on standard tests, suggests nevertheless that they have more implicit understanding of beliefs than they can express. After surveying theories that both favor and reject early development of theory of mind (TOM), we address two recent bodies of visual fixation research that provide support for the possibility of knowledge and belief attribution in infancy. The first indicates that infants of 13–15 months are sensitive to others’ false beliefs (and therefore have a representational TOM), the second, that by 12 months or younger infants have two antecedently related psychological understandings: (a) that when agents look they “see” and (b) that seeing plays a presumptive role in producing knowledge. This raises the broader question of whether “mentalism” might be part of core knowledge, which takes us to the earliest manifestation of psychological attribution, the construal of agentive behavior as intentional. Contrary to previous assumptions, recent studies indicate that infants of 3–9 months do not accord intentionality exclusively to humans or to self-propelled objects but rather to any entity that: (1) chooses flexibly among means and ends, (2) responds non-randomly to social overtures, and (3) reacts rationally to changing circumstances (i.e., that is not a mere automaton but is selectively and adaptively responsive to the environment). Other evidence is then examined which suggests that infants begin to construe these and other behaviors in mentalist rather than teleological terms much earlier than expected. Finally, the implications of this empirical record for domain-specific and domain-general theories of TOM are considered.     

Similarity and rules United: similarity- and rule-based processing in a single neural network

A central controversy in cognitive science concerns the roles of rules versus similarity. To gain some leverage on this problem, we propose that rule- versus similarity-based processes can be characterized as extremes in a multidimensional space that is composed of at least two dimensions: the number of features (Pothos, 2005) and the physical presence of features. The transition of similarity- to rule-based processing is conceptualized as a transition in this space. To illustrate this, we show how a neural network model uses input features (and in this sense produces similarity-based responses) when it has a low learning rate or in the early phases of training, but it switches to using self-generated, more abstract features (and in this sense produces rule-based responses) when it has a higher learning rate or is in the later phases of training. Relations with categorization and the psychology of learning are pointed out.