We,Heirs of Enlightenment: Critical Theory,Democracy and Social Science

Abstract

My goal here is to come to terms with the Enlightenment as the horizon of critical social science. First, I consider in more detail the understanding of the Enlightenment in Critical Theory, particularly in its conception of the sociality of reason. Second, I develop an account of freedom in terms of human powers, along the lines of recent capability conceptions that link freedom to the development of human powers, including the power to interpret and create norms. Finally, I show the ways in which the social sciences can be moral sciences in the Enlightenment sense. This account provides us with a coherent Enlightenment standard by which to judge institutions as promoting development, understood in terms of the capabilities necessary for freedom. The relevant social science in this area might include the robust generalization that there has never been a famine in a democratic society.     

Using a metaperspective to clarify the structural-narrative debate in family therapy

The debate in family therapy between structural and narrative therapists often seems irreconcilable. Drawing from work in theoretical sociology that identifies the basic structure of existing social theory, a metaperspective is introduced to clarify a discussion between leading figures in the debate. Disparate views of family interactions are examined in terms of more fundamental disagreements about the center of attention in therapy. Narrative and structural modes of presentation are examined as separate traditions that could not be further apart conceptually. Efforts to identify common ground are discussed in terms of more significant differences that are minimized by drawing out similarities. This analysis provides a framework for standing outside entrenched arguments to see more clearly the unique contributions of each approach.     

Preference for peers in infancy

Previous findings suggest that infants prefer other infants from among individuals of various ages. There are two explanations for this: one is that like adults, infants prefer babyish characteristics; the other is that infants prefer individuals who are similar to themselves. We examined whether infants respond differently to same-age infants from among older or younger infants. This might allow the possibility of methodologically separating the two explanations for peer preference in infancy. The results revealed that 9-month-olds showed peer preference when they saw movies of infants. Further experiments showed that 6- and 9-month-olds preferred static images of same-age infants. The lack of preference of 6-month-olds for movies of same-age infants could be related to their ability to process information. Thus, the cue for peer preference may be physical similarity to oneself, rather than the strength of babyish characteristics reflecting a particular developmental stage.     

Preschoolers' use of surface similarity in object comparisons: taking context into account

Previous research has emphasized the role of within-match similarity in children's comparisons. The current study investigated another potentially important contributing factor, namely the distinctiveness of the matching items relative to other items in the scene. Using a well-known relational mapping task, we found that 3- and 4-year-olds made more correct matches between identical objects when those objects were maximally distinctive from the foils. In a cross-mapping experiment, where same relative size was pitted against object similarity, 3-year-olds made more incorrect object matches when the objects were both similar to each other and distinctive from the foils. Furthermore, 3- and 4-year-olds performed the same, regardless of within-match similarity, so long as the ratios of within-match and nonmatch similarity were roughly equal. These findings suggest that children's comparisons are guided by a ratio consisting of many pairwise similarity relations, including (but not limited to) the degree of within-match similarity.     

Two Theories of Just War

As it is traditionally conceived, Just War Theory is not well suited for dealing with nation vs non-nation wars. It thus makes sense to create a second Just War Theory to deal with these wars. This article explores the differences and similarities between the two theories.

Modeling college women's perceptions of elite leadership positions with Social Cognitive Career Theory

The utility of Social Cognitive Career Theory (SCCT; Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994) for predicting college women's interests and goals for positions of elite leadership was examined with 156 undergraduate women at a public university. They completed measures of elite leadership self-efficacy expectations, outcome expectations, interests, and goals. Results supported SCCT as a theoretical framework for understanding internal factors that may contribute to women's elite leadership interests and goals. Self-efficacy and outcome expectations for elite leadership positions related positively to interests and goals for such positions, and self-efficacy and outcome expectations each contributed unique variance to the prediction of elite leadership interests. Outcome expectations partially mediated the relation between elite leadership self-efficacy and interests, interests partially mediated the relation between elite leadership outcome expectations and goals, and the combination of elite leadership interests and outcome expectations completely mediated the relation between self-efficacy for elite leadership positions and elite leadership goals.     

Did she mean to do it? Acquiring a folk theory of intentionality

The ability to both identify and explain others’ intentional acts is fundamental for successful social interaction. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigated 3- to 9-year-olds’ (n = 148) understanding of the folk concept of intentionality, using three types of intentionality measures. The relationship between this type of reasoning and false belief and interpretive mind understanding was also examined. Judgment of the appropriateness of an explanation was based on adult responses (n = 20). Overall, the results indicated that the ability to both identify and appropriately explain a range of intentional acts does not fully emerge until 7 years of age or later. The pattern of explanations revealed the gradual development of a folk concept of intentionality. Preschool- and early school-age children focused on the protagonists’ desires and actions, whereas 8- and 9-year-olds and adults were more likely to reference the protagonists’ awareness and skills.     

Similarity predicts liking in 3-year-old children

Two studies examined the influence of similarity on 3-year-old children’s initial liking of their peers. Children were presented with pairs of childlike puppets who were either similar or dissimilar to them on a specified dimension and then were asked to choose one of the puppets to play with as a measure of liking. Children selected the puppet whose food preferences or physical appearance matched their own. Unpacking the physical appearance finding revealed that the stable similarity of hair color may influence liking more strongly than the transient similarity of shirt color. A second study showed that children also prefer to play with a peer who shares their toy preferences, yet importantly, show no bias toward a peer who is similar on an arbitrary dimension. The findings provide insight into the earliest development of peer relations in young children.     

孙中山的伦理思想述要——纪念孙中山诞辰140周年

孙中山的伦理思想是在近代中国人民反帝反封建的斗争中形成的,其形成标志着中国近代民族资产阶级伦理思想的成熟。他的基于“民生史观”的道德起源和本质论;张扬“自由、平等、博爱”的道德观;“为主义而奋斗”的人生观;包含着许多合理积极宝贵内容,值得认真地继承与弘扬。     

Locke's theory of classification

In §155 of his New Theory of Vision Berkeley explains that a hypothetical ‘unbodied spirit’ ‘cannot comprehend the manner wherein geometers describe a right line or circle’.1 ¹All references to Berkeley are from, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.), The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1948) The following abbreviations are used: An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision, section x = New Theory x; Philosophical Commentaries, entry x = Commentaries x; Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge, section x = Principles x. All other references to Berkeley's works are of the form The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, volume x, page y = Works, x, y. The reason for this, Berkeley continues, is that ‘the rule and compass with their use being things of which it is impossible he should have any notion.’ This reference to geometrical tools has led virtually all commentators to conclude that at least one reason why the unbodied spirit cannot have knowledge of plane geometry is because it cannot manipulate a ruler or a compass. In this article I will show that such an interpretation is flawed. I will instead argue that Berkeley's understanding of Euclidian geometry was based on Isaac Barrow's account of the foundations of geometry. On this view geometrical objects are conceived in terms of the idealized motion that generates the objects of geometry. Consequently, that what the unbodied spirit cannot do in this context is to form an idea of motion rather than being unable to handle geometrical tools.