THE SUPERNATURAL AS LANGUAGE GAME

Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew?     

Universal Grammar as a Theory of Notation

What is common to all languages is notation, so Universal Grammar can be understood as a system of notational types. Given that infants acquire language, it can be assumed to arise from some a priori mental structure. Viewing language as having the two layers of calculus and protocol, we can set aside the communicative habits of speakers. Accordingly, an analysis of notation results in the three types of Identifier, Modifier and Connective. Modifiers are further interpreted as Quantifiers and Qualifiers. The resulting four notational types constitute the categories of Universal Grammar. Its ontology is argued to consist in the underlying cognitive schema of Essence, Quantity, Quality and Relation. The four categories of Universal Grammar are structured as polysemous fields and are each constituted as a radial network centred on some root concept which, however, need not be lexicalized. The branches spread out along troponymic vectors and together map out all possible lexemes. The notational typology of Universal Grammar is applied in a linguistic analysis of the ‘parts of speech’ using the English language. The analysis constitutes a ‘proof of concept’ in (1) showing how the schema of Universal Grammar is capable of classifying the so-called ‘parts of speech’, (2) presenting a coherent analysis of the verb, and (3) showing how the underlying cognitive schema allows for a sub-classification of the auxiliaries.     

Skinner's verbal behavior, Chomsky's review, and mentalism.

Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957) is a comprehensive treatise that deals with most aspects of verbal behavior. However, its treatment of the learning of grammatical behavior has been challenged repeatedly (e.g., Chomsky, 1959). The present paper will attempt to show that the learning of grammar and syntax can be dealt with adequately within a behavior-analytic framework. There is no need to adopt mentalist (or cognitivist) positions or to add mentalist elements to behaviorist theories.     

TRAINING FUNCTIONAL EXPRESSIVE LANGUAGE: THE ACQUISITION AND GENERALIZATION OF FIVE-ELEMENT SYNTACTIC RESPONSES1

A single-subject multiple-baseline design using within- and across-subject replication was employed to study the acquisition of expanded “agent-action-object” sentences and the spontaneous generation of this form in the natural environment. Three young language-delayed subjects were trained to describe various agent-action-object relationships with a five-element syntactical form. The language training strategy was a synthesis of the developmental-psycholinguistic and behavioral models. Dynamic interactions between familiar persons and objects were the stimulus events that the children mapped. A five-element syntactical form, previously absent from the children's language repertoires, was trained during individual sessions. Concurrent with baseline, training, and followup, each subject's language was monitored in another setting, the classroom during free play. After onset of training, the core elements of the complex syntactic form were spontaneously emitted by the child in its natural environment. The free-play data reflect individual differences in the emergence and frequency of each child's spontaneous use of the agent-action-object form. The acquisition and maintenance of the specific lexicon and syntax trained were tested by posttraining probes and responses to videotape presentations. These probes revealed generalization and maintenance of both the lexical and syntactical forms acquired in treatment. The main purpose of any language-training procedure should be to provide language that is functional for the child in the natural environment. This study, which documented the spontaneous usage of the core agent-action-object syntactical form in the natural environment, effectively trained a functional syntactical rule.     

THE ACQUISITION OF PREPOSITIONAL MOTOR RESPONSES IN HANDICAPPED CHILDREN1

The acquisition of prepositional motor responses in three handicapped preschool children was analyzed for three pairs of prepositions. Generalization of prepositional knowledge at each stage of acquisition was assessed by a series of probe trials. In addition, an analysis of the control of prepositional responses when objects of the preposition (OP) and direct objects (DO) were relevant cues was conducted. The effect of this object-cue procedure, as well as a specially devised prompting technique on acquisition, was also determined. Results indicated substantial control by OPs whenever this cue was relevant, but this did not affect acquisition of prepositional concepts when these cues were eliminated. Analysis of the probe data and the prompting technique suggested various ways in which instructional programs for teaching prepositional knowledge to handicapped children could be constructed in a simple and efficient manner.     

Language, moral order and political praxis

The paper argues that the debate between objectivist criticism and postmodern critique represents a fracturing of the modes of mundane social and linguistic practice. The two together miss the open-textured character of language-in-use and the reflexive properties of situated human practice. Both difference and agreement are grounded in the multiplicity of criteria that are a feature of the logical grammar of language, and therefore of everyday praxis, including that of critique. To escape the duality of foundationalism on the one hand, and radical relativism on the other, attention to the praxiological details of human action and reasoning is needed. The paper draws on Wittgensteinian philosophy and ethnomethodological studies of reasoning to make its case.     

TEACHING GENERALIZED RECEPTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE BEHIND-FRONT DISCRIMINATIONS TO TWO RETARDED CHILDREN1

Typically, a generalized discrimination for two linguistic forms (e.g., “behind the (noun)” and “in front of the (noun)”) has been developed in a sequence of three treatment conditions, with generative usage developed for each form consecutively in the first two conditions and a generalized discrimination developed for those forms in the third condition. Moreover, generalized discriminations have typically been measured by a set of unreinforced probes, rather than by first-trial performances across a series of new tasks, as in some studies that have taught generative usage of a single form of language. In this study, successive sets of instructions were presented to two children. Each set contained four tasks, the four possible combinations of two new nouns with the linguistic forms “Put the (noun) behind the (noun)” and “Put the (noun) in front of the (noun)”. For each set, receptive usage of nouns was taught, and then the four instructions were presented, once each, to test for generative usage of the prepositional forms. First-trial performances were never prompted. After a baseline of five sets of tasks, correct first-trial performances earned praise and tokens. Also, in each set with three or fewer such performances, the specific receptive discriminations were taught to a criterion before presentation of the next set. Successive sets were presented until all first-trial performances were correct in five consecutive sets, whereupon this generalized discrimination was reversed and subsequently reinstated. Similar procedures were then used to teach the same children a generalized productive-discrimination for the forms “behind the (noun)” and “in front of the (noun)”. This study demonstrated the development of generalized receptive and productive behind-front discriminations without the prior development of generative usage in each linguistic form and with measurement of the generalized discrimination across first-trial performances. The method may offer a less time-consuming procedure for the development and measurement of generalized discriminations in receptive and productive language.     

Learning non-local dependencies

This paper addresses the nature of the temporary storage buffer used in implicit or statistical learning. Kuhn and Dienes [Kuhn, G., and Dienes, Z. (2005). Implicit learning of nonlocal musical rules: implicitly learning more than chunks. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 31(6) 1417-1432] showed that people could implicitly learn a musical rule that was solely based on non-local dependencies. These results seriously challenge models of implicit learning that assume knowledge merely takes the form of linking adjacent elements (chunking). We compare two models that use a buffer to allow learning of long distance dependencies, the Simple Recurrent Network (SRN) and the memory buffer model. We argue that these models - as models of the mind - should not be evaluated simply by fitting them to human data but by determining the characteristic behaviour of each model. Simulations showed for the first time that the SRN could rapidly learn non-local dependencies. However, the characteristic performance of the memory buffer model rather than SRN more closely matched how people came to like different musical structures. We conclude that the SRN is more powerful than previous demonstrations have shown, but it's flexible learned buffer does not explain people's implicit learning (at least, the affective learning of musical structures) as well as fixed memory buffer models do.