Universalism and Junk

Those who accept the necessity of mereological universalism face what has come to be known as the ‘junk argument’ due to Bohn [2009 Bohn, Einar D. 2009a. An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition, Analysis 69/1: 27–31.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], which proceeds from (i) the incompatibility of junk with universalism and (ii) the possibility of junk, to conclude that mereological universalism isn't metaphysically necessary. Most attention has focused on (ii); however, recent authors have cast doubt on (i). This paper undertakes a defence of premise (i) against three main objections. The first is a new objection to the effect that Bohn's defence of that premise presupposes far too much. I show that one can defend premise (i) from a much weaker set of assumptions. The second objection, due to Contessa [2012 Contessa, Gabriel 2012. The Junk Argument: Safe Disposal Guidelines for Mereological Universalists, Analysis 72/3: 455–7.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], is that those who accept unrestricted composition should only accept the existence of binary sums (which are compatible with junk) rather than infinitary fusions. I argue that this conception of unrestricted composition is problematic: it is in conflict with an intuitive remainder principle. The final objection is due to Spencer [2012 Spencer, Joshua. 2012. All Things Must Pass Away, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 7, ed. Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 67–92.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]]. His view is that there is no absolutely unrestricted plural universal quantifier; so any statement of the unrestricted fusion axiom will simply not rule out the existence of junky worlds. I argue that the failure of unrestricted quantification will not be enough by itself to establish the existence of junk. Furthermore, it is not clear whether this view counts as a form of mereological universalism. As a result, I suggest that if one wants to reject the junk argument, premise (ii) is the only viable option.     

Metacognitions,intolerance of uncertainty and worry: An investigation in adolescents

BackgroundCognitive models of Generalized Anxiety Disorder have mainly been tested in adult samples to date. Studies investigating whether the concepts are also applicable to worry in adolescents are largely lacking. The goal of the present study was to test the relationship between worry and key cognitive variables (positive and negative metacognitions; intolerance of uncertainty) in adolescents.MethodSecondary school students (N = 521) completed self-report measures of worry frequency, metacognitions, intolerance of uncertainty, and depression.ResultsResults showed a significant association between metacognitions, intolerance of uncertainty and worry, even after controlling for depression. In regression analyses, a substantial proportion of the variance of worry could be accounted for by the cognitive variables of interest.ConclusionsThe findings support the relevance of metacognitions and intolerance of uncertainty for understanding cognitive mechanisms underlying worry in adolescents. It appears useful to combine them into a more comprehensive integrated model.     

Intelligence and emotional disorders: Is the worrying and ruminating mind a more intelligent mind?

Previous research has shown that anxiety and depression symptoms are negatively associated with measures of intelligence. However, this research has often not taken state distress and test anxiety into account, and recent findings indicate possible positive relationships between generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), worry, and intelligence. The present study examined the relationships between GAD, depression, and social anxiety symptoms, as well as their underlying cognitive processes of worry, rumination, and post-event processing, with verbal and non-verbal intelligence in an undergraduate sample (N = 126). While the results indicate that verbal intelligence has positive relationships with GAD and depression symptoms when test anxiety and state negative affect were taken into account, these relationships became non-significant when overlapping variance was controlled for. However, verbal intelligence was a unique positive predictor of worry and rumination severity. Non-verbal intelligence was a unique negative predictor of post-event processing. The possible connections between intelligence and the cognitive processes that underlie emotional disorders are discussed.     

IRT展开模型及对非累积反应机制的检测

被试回答人格测验题目时并不是特质水平越高其得分率越高,这称为非累积反应机制。广义等级展开模型GGUM就是针对这一机制提出来的。使用EPQ和五因素人格问卷发现GGUM比累积IRT模型有更好的模型拟合度和测量精度。研究结果表明GGUM有其合理性,且有助于反应心理过程机制的深入探讨。     

Look before you leap: the role of negative urgency in appraisals of ambiguous and unambiguous scenarios in individuals high in generalized anxiety disorder symptoms

Negative interpretation bias, the propensity to make threatening interpretations of ambiguous information, is associated with symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Apart from its relationship with intolerance of uncertainty (IU), little is known about what explains the presence of this cognitive bias in GAD. One factor may be negative urgency (NU), the tendency to take rash action when distressed, which is related to GAD symptoms and to cognitive biases in nonclinical populations. The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between NU and interpretation bias in individuals high in GAD symptoms (N = 111). IU, trait anxiety, and other forms of impulsivity were examined concurrently as competing correlates of interpretation bias. Greater NU and IU were found to be unique correlates of greater threatening interpretations of ambiguous scenarios. Greater NU was also a unique correlate of greater threatening interpretations of negative and positive scenarios. No other forms of impulsivity were uniquely related to interpretation bias. The findings suggest that greater NU may have a role in the tendency for individuals high in GAD symptoms to make threatening interpretations in response to ambiguous scenarios, overtly threatening situations, and situations without indication of threat or danger. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Social interpretation bias and generalized social phobia: the influence of developmental experiences

Patients with generalized social phobia (N = 42) and non-phobic community controls (N = 42) engaged in a social interaction with an experimental assistant whose behavior was used to create either a positive or an ambiguous social environment. Participants then rated their own performance and their partner's behavior. As a group, social phobic patients displayed negatively biased self-judgments, but failed to display biased social interpretations. Among the social phobia group, a social developmental history marked by parental hostility was associated with negative interpretations of partner behavior and a history of parental overprotection was associated with less sensitivity to partner behavior. The results supported cognitive models of social phobia, which implicate negative learning experiences in the development of information processing biases.     

The neuronal basis of bimanual coordination: recent neurophysiological evidence and functional models

Recent physiological studies of the neuronal processes underlying bimanual movements provide new tests for earlier functional models of bimanual coordination. The recently acquired data address three conceptual areas: the generalized motor program (GMP), intermanual crosstalk and dynamic systems models. To varying degrees, each of these concepts has aspects that can be reconciled with experimental evidence. The idea of a GMP is supported by the demonstration of abstract neuronal motor codes, e.g. bimanual-specific activity in motor cortex. The crosstalk model is consistent with the facts that hand-specific coding also exists and that interactions occur between the motor commands for each arm. Uncrossed efferent projections may underlie crosstalk on an executional level. Dynamic interhemispheric interactions through the corpus callosum may provide a high-level link at the parametric programming level, allowing flexible coupling and de-coupling. Flexible neuronal interactions could also underlie adaptive large-scale systems dynamics that can be formalized within the dynamic systems theory approach.

The correspondence of identified neuronal processes with functions of abstract models encourages the development of realistic computational models that can predict bimanual behavior on the basis of neuronal activity.     

Standard Quantification Theory in the Analysis of English

Standard first-order logic plus quantifiers of all finite orders (SFOL) faces four well-known difficulties when used to characterize the behavior of certain English quantifier phrases. All four difficulties seem to stem from the typed structure of SFOL models. The typed structure of SFOL models is in turn a product of an asymmetry between the meaning of names and the meaning of predicates, the element-set asymmetry. In this paper we examine a class of models in which this asymmetry of meaning is removed. The models of this class permit definitions of the quantifiers which allow a desirable flexibility in fixing the domain of quantification. Certain SFOL type restrictions are thereby avoided. The resulting models of English validate all of the standard first-order logical truths and are free of the four deficiencies of SFOL models.     

Necessary versus Probable Cause

One finds in the systems of natural languages some explicit means of elaborating not only upon the directness of the causal relationship believed to exist between two events X and Y (i.e. some means of specifying just how inevitably event X gives or gave rise to event Y), but also some manner of indicating just who or what is understood to be the primary instigator of the caused event. The goal of the present paper is to explore these notions in detail and arrive at a formal, logic-based means of capturing them.     

On quantifying different types of categorical data

In quantifying categorical data, constraints play an important role in characterizing the outcome. In the Guttman-type quantification of contingency tables and multiple-choice data (incidence data), the trivial solution due to the marginal constraints is typically removed before quantification; this removal, however, has the effect of distorting the shape of the total space. Awareness of this is important for the interpretation of the quantified outcome. The present study provides some relevant formulas for those cases that are affected by the trivial solution and those cases that are not. The characterization of the total space used by the Guttman-type quantification and pertinent discussion are presented.This study was supported by a grant from The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada to S. Nishisato.