Destination memory and cognitive theory of mind in normal ageing

Destination memory is the ability to remember the destination to which a piece of information has been addressed (e.g., “Did I tell you about the promotion?”). This ability is found to be impaired in normal ageing. Our work aimed to link this deterioration to the decline in theory of mind. Forty younger adults (M age = 23.13 years, SD = 4.00) and 36 older adults (M age = 69.53 years, SD = 8.93) performed a destination memory task. They also performed the False-belief test addressing cognitive theory of mind and the Reading the mind in the eyes test addressing affective theory of mind. Results showed significant deterioration in destination memory, cognitive theory of mind and affective theory of mind in the older adults. The older adults’ performance on destination memory was significantly correlated with and predicted by their performance on cognitive theory of mind. Difficulties in the ability to interpret and predict others’ mental states are related to destination memory decline in older adults.     

The Moral Foreign-Language Effect

Many have argued that moral judgment is driven by one of two types of processes. Rationalists argue that reasoned processes are the source of moral judgments, whereas sentimentalists argue that emotional processes are. We provide evidence that both positions are mistaken; there are multiple mental processes involved in moral judgment, and it is possible to manipulate which process is engaged when considering moral dilemmas by presenting them in a non-native language. The Foreign-Language Effect (FLE) is the activation of systematic reasoning processes by thinking in a foreign language. We demonstrate that the FLE extends to moral judgment. This indicates that different types of processes can lead to the formation of differing moral judgments. One implication of the FLE is that it raises the possibility that moral judgments can be made more systematic, and that the type of processing used to form them might be relevant to normative and applied ethics.     

宗教对信徒颜色认知的影响及作用机制:以中国台湾宗教信徒为例

采用自然分类法考察中国台湾佛教徒、道教徒、基督徒和非宗教信徒的基本颜色词分类,并做多维标度和聚类分析,以揭示宗教对信徒颜色认知的影响。结果发现,中国台湾三大宗教信徒对基本颜色词的分类既具有共性,又存在差异,宗教信徒与非宗教信徒的基本颜色词分类也存在着共性和差异,共性反映了汉语言和汉文化的影响,差异反映了宗教对颜色认知的影响。研究表明,颜色通过意象式传播方式影响信徒的颜色认知,支持颜色词与颜色认知的相互作用理论。     

Preventing the detrimental effect of posttraumatic stress in young children: The role of theory of mind in the aftermath of a natural disaster

We conducted a field study to test whether parents' negative reactions to a natural disaster affected children's reactions, together with the factors buffering this negative influence. Specifically, we examined whether parents' posttraumatic stress symptoms following an earthquake were associated with children's posttraumatic symptoms and their use of negative coping strategies. Theory of mind (ToM) was tested as the factor allowing children to reduce the detrimental effects of posttraumatic stress symptoms on negative coping. Hypotheses were tested in a sample of elementary school children and their parents in the aftermath of the earthquakes that struck Northern Italy in 2012. Results revealed that mothers' (but not fathers') posttraumatic stress symptoms were positively associated with children's posttraumatic stress symptoms, which acted as mediator on the use of negative coping strategies by children, but only among children with low ToM abilities. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of findings.     

Testing joint attention, imitation, and play as infancy precursors to language and theory of mind

Various theoretical accounts propose that an important developmental relation exists between joint attention, play, and imitation abilities, and later theory of mind ability. However, very little direct empirical evidence supports these claims for putative “precursor” theory of mind status. A small sample (N=13) of infants, for whom measures of play, joint attention, and imitation had been collected at 20 months of age, was followed-up longitudinally at 44 months and a battery of theory of mind measures was conducted. Language and IQ were measured at both timepoints. Imitation ability at 20 months was longitudinally associated with expressive, but not receptive, language ability at 44 months. In contrast, only the joint attention behaviours of gaze switches between an adult and an active toy and looking to an adult during an ambiguous goal detection task at 20 months were longitudinally associated with theory of mind ability at 44 months. It is argued that joint attention, play, and imitation, and language and theory of mind, might form part of a shared social–communicative representational system in infancy that becomes increasingly specialised and differentiated as development progresses.     

Constructivism and education: education as an interpretative transformational process

This paper provides an analysis of the ideas of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead with regards the relationship between experience, meaning, language and thinking. It discusses how experience, meaning, language and thinking are based on the creative and constructive actions of individuals. Unlike what is the case in so-called radical constructivism, it is argued that the actions of the individual should be understood in a transactional way. The paper shows the implication of a transactional constructivism for education, arguing that education is the medium in which the creative and constructive actions of individuals come together in a social environment.     

The role of control functions in mentalizing: dual-task studies of theory of mind and executive function

Conflicting evidence has arisen from correlational studies regarding the role of executive control functions in Theory of Mind. The current study used dual-task manipulations of executive functions (inhibition, updating and switching) to investigate the role of these control functions in mental state and non-mental state tasks. The 'Eyes' pictorial test of Theory of Mind showed specific dual-task costs when concurrently performed with an inhibitory secondary task. In contrast, interference effects on a verbal 'Stories' task were general, occurring on both mental state and non-mental state tasks, and across all types of executive function. These findings from healthy functioning adults should help to guide decisions about appropriate methods of assessing ToM in clinical populations, and interpreting deficits in performance in such tasks in the context of more general cognitive dysfunction.     

Simulation, projection and empathy

Simulationists have recently started to employ the term “empathy” when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler’s classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding—in particular the understanding of emotional expressions—that are not explicable in terms of simulation-plus-projection routines.     

The cognitive structure of surprise: looking for basic principles

We develop a conceptual and formal clarification of notion of surprise as a belief-based phenomenon by exploring a rich typology. Each kind of surprise is associated with a particular phase of cognitive processing and involves particular kinds of epistemic representations (representations and expectations under scrutiny, implicit beliefs, presuppositions). We define two main kinds of surprise: mismatch-based surprise and astonishment. In the central part of the paper we suggest how a formal model of surprise can be integrated with a formal model of belief change. We investigate the role of surprise in triggering the process of belief reconsideration. There are a number of models of surprise developed in the psychology of emotion. We provide several comparisons of our approach with those models.

Producing and Recognizing Analogical Relations

Analogical reasoning is an important component of intelligent behavior, and a key test of any approach to human language and cognition. Only a limited amount of empirical work has been conducted from a behavior analytic point of view, most of that within Relational Frame Theory (RFT), which views analogy as a matter of deriving relations among relations. The present series of four studies expands previous work by exploring the applicability of this model of analogy to topography-based rather than merely selection-based responses and by extending the work into additional relations, including nonsymmetrical ones. In each of the four studies participants pretrained in contextual control over nonarbitrary stimulus relations of sameness and opposition, or of sameness, smaller than, and larger than, learned arbitrary stimulus relations in the presence of these relational cues and derived analogies involving directly trained relations and derived relations of mutual and combinatorial entailment, measured using a variety of productive and selection-based measures. In Experiment 1 participants successfully recognized analogies among stimulus networks containing same and opposite relations; in Experiment 2 analogy was successfully used to extend derived relations to pairs of novel stimuli; in Experiment 3 the procedure used in Experiment 1 was extended to nonsymmetrical comparative relations; in Experiment 4 the procedure used in Experiment 2 was extended to nonsymmetrical comparative relations. Although not every participant showed the effects predicted, overall the procedures occasioned relational responses consistent with an RFT account that have not yet been demonstrated in a behavior-analytic laboratory setting, including productive responding on the basis of analogies.