Eye movements of monkey observers viewing vocalizing conspecifics

Primates, including humans, communicate using facial expressions, vocalizations and often a combination of the two modalities. For humans, such bimodal integration is best exemplified by speech-reading - humans readily use facial cues to enhance speech comprehension, particularly in noisy environments. Studies of the eye movement patterns of human speech-readers have revealed, unexpectedly, that they predominantly fixate on the eye region of the face as opposed to the mouth. Here, we tested the evolutionary basis for such a behavioral strategy by examining the eye movements of rhesus monkeys observers as they viewed vocalizing conspecifics. Under a variety of listening conditions, we found that rhesus monkeys predominantly focused on the eye region versus the mouth and that fixations on the mouth were tightly correlated with the onset of mouth movements. These eye movement patterns of rhesus monkeys are strikingly similar to those reported for humans observing the visual components of speech. The data therefore suggest that the sensorimotor strategies underlying bimodal speech perception may have a homologous counterpart in a closely related primate ancestor.     

Using a metaperspective to clarify the structural-narrative debate in family therapy

The debate in family therapy between structural and narrative therapists often seems irreconcilable. Drawing from work in theoretical sociology that identifies the basic structure of existing social theory, a metaperspective is introduced to clarify a discussion between leading figures in the debate. Disparate views of family interactions are examined in terms of more fundamental disagreements about the center of attention in therapy. Narrative and structural modes of presentation are examined as separate traditions that could not be further apart conceptually. Efforts to identify common ground are discussed in terms of more significant differences that are minimized by drawing out similarities. This analysis provides a framework for standing outside entrenched arguments to see more clearly the unique contributions of each approach.     

Two Theories of Just War

As it is traditionally conceived, Just War Theory is not well suited for dealing with nation vs non-nation wars. It thus makes sense to create a second Just War Theory to deal with these wars. This article explores the differences and similarities between the two theories.

Modeling college women's perceptions of elite leadership positions with Social Cognitive Career Theory

The utility of Social Cognitive Career Theory (SCCT; Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994) for predicting college women's interests and goals for positions of elite leadership was examined with 156 undergraduate women at a public university. They completed measures of elite leadership self-efficacy expectations, outcome expectations, interests, and goals. Results supported SCCT as a theoretical framework for understanding internal factors that may contribute to women's elite leadership interests and goals. Self-efficacy and outcome expectations for elite leadership positions related positively to interests and goals for such positions, and self-efficacy and outcome expectations each contributed unique variance to the prediction of elite leadership interests. Outcome expectations partially mediated the relation between elite leadership self-efficacy and interests, interests partially mediated the relation between elite leadership outcome expectations and goals, and the combination of elite leadership interests and outcome expectations completely mediated the relation between self-efficacy for elite leadership positions and elite leadership goals.     

Did she mean to do it? Acquiring a folk theory of intentionality

The ability to both identify and explain others’ intentional acts is fundamental for successful social interaction. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigated 3- to 9-year-olds’ (n = 148) understanding of the folk concept of intentionality, using three types of intentionality measures. The relationship between this type of reasoning and false belief and interpretive mind understanding was also examined. Judgment of the appropriateness of an explanation was based on adult responses (n = 20). Overall, the results indicated that the ability to both identify and appropriately explain a range of intentional acts does not fully emerge until 7 years of age or later. The pattern of explanations revealed the gradual development of a folk concept of intentionality. Preschool- and early school-age children focused on the protagonists’ desires and actions, whereas 8- and 9-year-olds and adults were more likely to reference the protagonists’ awareness and skills.     

Religion is natural, atheism is not: On why everybody is both right and wrong

After discussing evidence of irreligion and the rise of the so called “New Atheism”, the authors refute the claim that this poses a problem for the cognitive science of religion and its hypothesis that religion is natural. The “naturalness hypothesis” is not deterministic but probabilistic and thus leaves room for atheism. This, the authors maintain, is true of both the by-product and adaptationist stances within the cognitive science of religion. In this context the authors also discuss the memetic or “unnaturalness” hypothesis, i.e. that religion is a “virus of the mind”. The authors criticize accounts of atheism offered by cognitive scientists of religion as being based on unfounded assumptions about the psychology of atheists, and object to the notion that the natural aspects of religion by corollary make atheism unnatural. By considering human cognition in a semiotic framework and emphasizing its natural ability to take part in semiotic systems of signs, atheism emerges as a natural, cognitive strategy. The authors argue that to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness) hypotheses of religion must be merged. Finally, a preliminary analysis of the “New Atheism” is offered in terms of semiotic and cognitive dynamics.     

孙中山的伦理思想述要——纪念孙中山诞辰140周年

孙中山的伦理思想是在近代中国人民反帝反封建的斗争中形成的,其形成标志着中国近代民族资产阶级伦理思想的成熟。他的基于“民生史观”的道德起源和本质论;张扬“自由、平等、博爱”的道德观;“为主义而奋斗”的人生观;包含着许多合理积极宝贵内容,值得认真地继承与弘扬。     

Locke's theory of classification

In §155 of his New Theory of Vision Berkeley explains that a hypothetical ‘unbodied spirit’ ‘cannot comprehend the manner wherein geometers describe a right line or circle’.1 ¹All references to Berkeley are from, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.), The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1948) The following abbreviations are used: An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision, section x = New Theory x; Philosophical Commentaries, entry x = Commentaries x; Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge, section x = Principles x. All other references to Berkeley's works are of the form The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, volume x, page y = Works, x, y. The reason for this, Berkeley continues, is that ‘the rule and compass with their use being things of which it is impossible he should have any notion.’ This reference to geometrical tools has led virtually all commentators to conclude that at least one reason why the unbodied spirit cannot have knowledge of plane geometry is because it cannot manipulate a ruler or a compass. In this article I will show that such an interpretation is flawed. I will instead argue that Berkeley's understanding of Euclidian geometry was based on Isaac Barrow's account of the foundations of geometry. On this view geometrical objects are conceived in terms of the idealized motion that generates the objects of geometry. Consequently, that what the unbodied spirit cannot do in this context is to form an idea of motion rather than being unable to handle geometrical tools.     

Lost in Translation? The Need for ‘Upstream Engagement’ with Nanotechnology on Trial

Nowadays, the criticism of the so-called ‘deficit model’ and the need for ‘upstream engagement’ in science and technology are becoming part of the master narratives of public policies in many countries, especially concerning nanotechnology. This may be considered as a major success for STS scholars, whose research results have largely contributed to this change, especially those concerning the GMO controversies. Some STS scholars thus move from a position of distant and critical observers to the role of experts in social engineering or advisers of policy-makers. However, in their enthusiasm concerning the expected benefits of upstream engagement, institutions, TA practitioners and social scientists seem to ignore some important limitations as well as the implicit framing assumptions of the concept. Based on an experience made by a group of social scientists in the Grenoble area—one of the major ‘nanodistricts’ in Europe—our paper shows that the ‘upstream engagement’ concept is still embedded in a linear model of innovation and is not very useful to anyone pursuing the co-production of innovations. It is especially true when socio-technical networks are already aligned by powerful actors and a worldwide agenda as in the case of nanotechnology. In order to give an opportunity for public engagement to have a larger impact on decision-making, we propose an alternative approach, which combines Actor–Network Theory (ANT), as an analytical tool, with the reflexive and ongoing implementation of public participation. Public engagement is probably one of the critical loci where STS scholars must reflect on the articulation between the knowledge they produce and public policies in action.     

The proximate memory mechanism underlying the survival-processing effect: Richness of encoding or interactive imagery?

Nairne and collaborators showed that assessing the relevance of words in the context of an imagined survival scenario boosts memory for these words. Although this survival-processing advantage has attracted a considerable amount of research, little is known about the proximate memory mechanism mediating this effect. Recently, Kroneisen and Erdfelder (2011) argued that it is not survival processing itself that facilitates recall but rather the richness and distinctiveness of encoding that is triggered by the survival-processing task. Alternatively, however, it is also conceivable that survival processing fosters interactive imagery, a process known to improve associative learning. To test these explanations we compared relevance-rating and interactive imagery tasks for survival and control scenarios. Results show that the survival advantage replicates in the relevance-rating condition but vanishes in the interactive imagery condition. This refutes the interactive imagery explanation and corroborates the richness-of-encoding hypothesis of the survival-processing effect.