Whose promises are worth more? How social status affects trust in promises

Promises are among the most widely used tools for increasing trust in social hierarchies; yet the effect of social status on trust in promises is unknown. Here we used a modified version of the Trust Game, in which participants, acting as Investors, were paired with Trustees of varying social status who were given the opportunity to promise (or not) to return at least half of the multiplied amount (i.e., 4 × the amount invested). No return feedback was provided. Participants invested more in partners who promised than those who did not or whose promise information was concealed. Importantly, in both lab-manipulated (Exps. 1–3: math-induced) and pre-existing (Exp. 4: university-based) hierarchies, participants invested more in promises given by high status than low status partners. Post-experiment measures suggest that this may be due to greater expectations of honesty for high status than low status others. Potential explanations and implications are discussed.     

Epistemic Possibility and the Necessity of Origin

The necessity of origin suggests that a person’s identity is determined by the particular pair of gametes from which the person originated. An implication is that speculative scenarios concerning how we might otherwise have been had our gametic origins been different are dismissed as being metaphysically impossible. Given, however, that many of these speculations are intelligible and commonplace in the discourses of competent speakers, it is overhasty to dismiss them as mistakes. This paper offers a way of understanding these speculations that does not commit them to incoherence but aims to make the best sense of what they are expressing. Using the philosophical framework of two-dimensional semantics, it proposes that the speculative scenarios are best analysed as epistemic possibilities, rather than as metaphysical possibilities. It then explores some implications of this analysis for the ethical challenges associated with the non-identity problem.     

Semantic Similarity of Alternatives Fostered by Conversational Negation

Conversational negation often behaves differently from negation as a logical operator: when rejecting a state of affairs, it does not present all members of the complement set as equally plausible alternatives, but it rather suggests some of them as more plausible than others (e.g., “This is not a dog, it is a wolf/*screwdriver”). Entities that are semantically similar to a negated entity tend to be judged as better alternatives (Kruszewski et al., 2016). In fact, Kruszewski et al. (2016) show that the cosine similarity scores between the distributional semantics representations of a negated noun and its potential alternatives are highly correlated with the negated noun-alternatives human plausibility ratings. In a series of cloze tasks, we show that negation likewise restricts the production of plausible alternatives to similar entities. Furthermore, completions to negative sentences appear to be even more restricted than completions to an affirmative conjunctive context, hinting at a peculiarity of negation.     

Conditionals and inferential connections: toward a new semantics*

Abstract

In previous published research (“Conditionals and Inferential Connections: A Hypothetical Inferential Theory,” Cognitive Psychology, 2018), we investigated experimentally what role the presence and strength of an inferential connection between a conditional’s antecedent and consequent plays in how people process that conditional. Our analysis showed the strength of that connection to be strongly predictive of whether participants evaluated the conditional as true, false, or neither true nor false. In this article, we re-analyse the data from our previous research, now focussing on the semantics of conditionals rather than on how they are processed. Specifically, we use those data to compare the main extant semantics with each other and with inferentialism, a semantics according to which the truth of a conditional requires the presence of an inferential connection between the conditional’s component parts.     

Too Much Playing Games – A Response to Kretchmar

ABSTRACT

Scott Kretchmar recently put forth a new definition of what it is to play a game. Unfortunately, it must be rejected. In this paper, I will show that this new definition is far too broad by discussing an activity that is not an instance of playing a game but is wrongfully ruled as one on this new definition.     

Pinning down polysemy: A formalisation for a Brazilian Portuguese preposition

This paper presents a formal definition for a number of distinct cases where the preposition “em” (in) can be applied in Brazilian Portuguese. The aim of this work is to establish a mathematical model using qualitative spatial reasoning formalisms within the idea of precisification from supervaluation semantics. Our long term goal is to implement this model into artificial intelligent systems to allow for seamless communication with humans in a common speech.     

No frills: Simple regularities in language can go a long way in the development of word knowledge

Recent years have seen a flourishing of Natural Language Processing models that can mimic many aspects of human language fluency. These models harness a simple, decades-old idea: It is possible to learn a lot about word meanings just from exposure to language, because words similar in meaning are used in language in similar ways. The successes of these models raise the intriguing possibility that exposure to word use in language also shapes the word knowledge that children amass during development. However, this possibility is strongly challenged by the fact that models use language input and learning mechanisms that may be unavailable to children. Across three studies, we found that unrealistically complex input and learning mechanisms are unnecessary. Instead, simple regularities of word use in children's language input that they have the capacity to learn can foster knowledge about word meanings. Thus, exposure to language may play a simple but powerful role in children's growing word knowledge. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://youtu.be/dT83dmMffnM .

Research Highlights

• Natural Language Processing (NLP) models can learn that words are similar in meaning from higher-order statistical regularities of word use.
• Unlike NLP models, infants and children may primarily learn only simple co-occurrences between words.
• We show that infants' and children's language input is rich in simple co-occurrence that can support learning similarities in meaning between words.
• We find that simple co-occurrences can explain infants' and children's knowledge that words are similar in meaning.