Validity and Necessity

In this paper I argue against the commonly received view that Kripke’s formal Possible World Semantics (PWS) reflects the adoption of a metaphysical interpretation of the modal operators. I consider in detail Kripke’s three main innovations vis-à-vis Carnap’s PWS: a new view of the worlds, variable domains of quantification, and the adoption of a notion of universal validity. I argue that all these changes are driven by the natural technical development of the model theory and its related notion of validity: they are dictated by merely formal considerations, not interpretive concerns. I conclude that Kripke’s model theoretic semantics does not induce a metaphysical reading of necessity, and is formally adequate independently of the specific interpretation of the modal operators.     

On the Referential Indeterminacy of Logical and Mathematical Concepts

Hartry Field has recently examined the question whether our logical and mathematical concepts are referentially indeterminate. In his view, (1) certain logical notions, such as second-order quantification, are indeterminate, but (2) important mathematical notions, such as the notion of finiteness, are not (they are determinate). In this paper, I assess Fields analysis, and argue that claims (1) and (2) turn out to be inconsistent. After all, given that the notion of finiteness can only be adequately characterized in pure second-order logic, if Field is right in claiming that second-order quantification is indeterminate (see (1)), it follows that finiteness is also indeterminate (contrary to (2)). After arguing that Field is committed to these claims, I provide a diagnosis of why this inconsistency emerged, and I suggest an alternative, consistent picture of the relationship between logical and mathematical indeterminacy.     

Some Results on Modal Axiomatization and Definability for Topological Spaces

We consider two topological interpretations of the modal diamond—as the closure operator (C-semantics) and as the derived set operator (d-semantics). We call the logics arising from these interpretations C-logics and d-logics, respectively. We axiomatize a number of subclasses of the class of nodec spaces with respect to both semantics, and characterize exactly which of these classes are modally definable. It is demonstrated that the d-semantics is more expressive than the C-semantics. In particular, we show that the d-logics of the six classes of spaces considered in the paper are pairwise distinct, while the C-logics of some of them coincide. Mathematics Subject Classifications (2000): 03B45, 54G99. Presented by Michael Zakharyaschev     

On the Predicate Logic of Linear Kripke Frames and some of its Extensions

We propose a new, rather simple and short proof of Kripke-completeness for the predicate variant of Dummett's logic. Also a family of Kripke-incomplete extensions of this logic that are complete w.r.t. Kripke frames with equality (or equivalently, w.r.t. Kripke sheaves [8]), is described.     

Misinterpretations of Garden-Path Sentences: Implications for Models of Sentence Processing and Reanalysis

Theories of sentence comprehension have addressed both initial parsing processes and mechanisms responsible for reanalysis. Three experiments are summarized that were designed to investigate the reanalysis and interpretation of relatively difficult garden-path sentences (e.g., While Anna dressed the baby spit up on the bed). After reading such sentences, participants correctly believed that the baby spit up on the bed; however, they often confidently, yet incorrectly, believed that Anna dressed the baby. These results demonstrate that garden-path reanalysis is not an all-or-nothing process and that thematic roles initially assigned for the subordinate clause verb are not consistently revised. The implications of the partial reanalysis phenomenon for Fodor and Inoue's (1998) model of reanalysis and sentence processing are discussed. In addition, we discuss the possibility that language processing often creates good enough structures rather than ideal structures.     

言语的情绪韵律和情绪语义对听觉去信息掩蔽的作用

言语的情绪信息(情绪性韵律和情绪性语义)具有去听觉掩蔽的作用, 但其去掩蔽的具体机制还不清楚。本研究通过2个实验, 采用主观空间分离范式, 通过操纵掩蔽声类型的方式, 分别探究言语的情绪韵律和情绪语义去信息掩蔽的机制。结果发现, 情绪韵律在知觉信息掩蔽或者在知觉、认知双重信息掩蔽下, 均具有去掩蔽的作用。情绪语义在知觉信息掩蔽下不具有去掩蔽的作用, 但在知觉、认知双重信息掩蔽下具有去掩蔽的作用。这些结果表明, 言语的情绪韵律和情绪语义有着不同的去掩蔽机制。情绪韵律能够优先吸引听者更多的注意, 可以克服掩蔽声音在知觉上造成的干扰, 但对掩蔽声音在内容上的干扰作用很小。言语的情绪语义能够优先获取听者更多的认知加工资源, 具有去认知信息掩蔽的作用, 但不具有去知觉信息掩蔽的作用。     

Deregulated semantic cognition contributes to object‐use deficits in Alzheimer's disease: A comparison with semantic aphasia and semantic dementia

Executive control is impaired from the early stages of Alzheimer's Disease (AD) and this produces deregulated semantic cognition (Corbett, Jefferies, Burns, & Lambon Ralph, 2012 ; Perry, Watson, & Hodges, 2000 ). While control deficits should affect semantic retrieval across all modalities, previous studies have typically focused on verbal semantic tasks. Even when non‐verbal semantic tasks have been used, these have typically employed simple picture‐matching tasks, which may be influenced by abnormalities in covert naming. Therefore, in the present study, we examined 10 patients with AD on a battery of object‐use tasks, in order to advance our understanding of the origins of non‐verbal semantic deficits in this population. The AD patients’ deficits were contrasted with previously published performance on the same tasks within two additional groups of patients, displaying either semantic degradation (semantic dementia) or deregulation of semantic retrieval (semantic aphasia; Corbett, Jefferies, Ehsan, & Lambon Ralph, 2009 ). While overall accuracy was comparable to the scores in both other groups, the AD patients’ object‐use impairment most closely resembled that observed in SA; they exhibited poorer performance on comprehension tasks that placed strong demands on executive control. A similar pattern was observed in the expressive domain: the AD and SA groups were relatively good at straightforward object use compared to executively demanding, mechanical puzzles. Error types also differed: while all patients omitted essential actions, the SA and AD groups’ demonstrations also featured unrelated intrusions. An association between AD patients’ object use and their scores on standard executive measures suggested that control deficits contributed to their non‐verbal semantic deficits. Moreover, in a task specifically designed to manipulate executive demand, patients with AD (and SA) exhibited difficulty in thinking flexibly about the non‐canonical uses of everyday objects, especially when distracted by semantically related objects. This study provides converging evidence for the notion that a failure of regulatory control contributes to multimodal semantic impairment in AD and uniquely demonstrates this pattern for the highly non‐verbal domain of object use.     

From reasonable preferences,via argumentation,to logic

This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.