Solidarity and Social Justice: Effect of Individual Differences in Justice Sensitivity on Solidarity Behaviour

We investigate the effect of individual differences in justice sensitivity (JS) on giving behaviour in a solidarity game, its potential moderators and the underlying psychological mechanisms. In a solidarity game, subjects are asked to make decisions about transferring money to other players in a case in which they win a random draw and the other players lose. The results of four studies showed the following: (1) JS explains a unique portion of variance in the solidarity behaviour, above and beyond other basic personality dimensions (e.g. HEXACO model); (2) its effect does not depend on contextual factors, such as the degree of moral entitlement not to share and the possibility to attribute the recipients' disadvantage to their own responsibility; and (3) individual differences in the emotions anticipated in response to different outcomes of a random draw and the cognitive interpretation of the allocation situation partially mediate the effect of JS on solidarity behaviour. We also provided the first evidence that JS predicts individual differences in the propensity to take away others' earnings (antisocial behaviour). The results are discussed with respect to the research on personality as a predictor of prosocial and antisocial behaviour. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The link between ego-resiliency and changes in Big Five traits after decision making: The case of Extraversion

After performing such solitary decision making tasks as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Game of Dice Task (GDT), we expected that changes will occur in Extraversion trait measured by a short Hungarian Big Five Inventory (BFI). We also hypothesized that ego-resiliency (Block, 2002)—a dimension measuring the ability to adapt to situational demands—will be linked to the magnitude of Extraversion change. After a pre-task measurement of the Big Five traits and ego-resiliency, participants (N = 93) completed the IGT and the GDT tasks. After each task, they filled out the BFI again. Pre- and post-task Big Five trait values showed significant differences. Participants reported lower post task scores on the Extraversion dimension and the magnitude of Extraversion change between pre- and post-task measurements correlated with ego-resiliency. The results highlight some short term effects of contextual factors influencing self-characterizations in BFI dimensions. Especially, individuals with high ego-resiliency give characteristically more introverted self-characterization after solitary tasks. The present results show an example of how the interplay between contextual factors and ego-resiliency can modify self-characterization within a very short period of time.     

Friend or foe: the effect of implicit trustworthiness judgments in social decision-making

The human face appears to play a key role in signaling social intentions and usually people form reliable and strong impressions on the basis of someone's facial appearance. Therefore, facial signals could have a substantial influence on how people evaluate and behave towards another person in a social interaction, such as an interactive risky decision-making game. Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence that demonstrates that social behavior plays a crucial role in human decision-making. Although previous research has demonstrated that explicit social information about one's partner can influence decision-making behavior, such as knowledge about the partner's moral status, much less is known about how implicit facial social cues affect strategic decision-making. One particular social cue that may be especially important in assessing how to interact with a partner is facial trustworthiness, a rapid, implicit assessment of the likelihood that the partner will reciprocate a generous gesture. In this experiment, we tested the hypothesis that implicit processing of trustworthiness is related to the degree to which participants cooperate with previously unknown partners. Participants played a Trust Game with 79 hypothetical partners who were previously rated on subjective trustworthiness. In each game, participants made a decision about how much to trust their partner, as measured by how much money they invested with that partner, with no guarantee of return. As predicted, people invested more money in partners who were subjectively rated as more trustworthy, despite no objective relationship between these factors. Moreover, the relationship between the amount of money offered seemed to be stronger for trustworthy faces as compared to untrustworthy faces. Overall, these data indicate that the perceived trustworthiness is a strong and important social cue that influences decision-making.     

Rationality and bounded information in repeated games, with application to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Actions in a repeated game can in principle depend on all previous outcomes. Given this vast policy space, human players may often be forced to use heuristics that base actions on incomplete information, such as the outcomes of only the most recent trials. Here it is proven that such bounded rationality is often fully rational, in that the optimal policy based on some limited information about the game's history will be universally optimal (i.e., within the full policy space), provided that one's opponents are restricted to using this same information. It is then shown how this result allows explicit calculation of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) for any repeated or stochastic game. The technique is applied to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for the case of 1-back memory. Two classes of SPEs are derived, which exhibit varying degrees of (individually rational) cooperation as a result of repeated interaction.     

Step it up! Using the good behavior game to increase physical activity with elementary school students at recess

We evaluated the effects of a modified version of the Good Behavior Game (GBG) on the number of steps taken by students during school recess. We divided a class into two teams, and awarded the team with the highest step counts at the end of each game raffle tickets for a school‐wide lottery. The GBG was compared to recess periods without the game using an alternating‐treatments design. Students took more steps while playing the GBG than they did during recess periods without the game.     

公平行为的认知神经机制

大量研究采用最后通牒博弈发现人们愿意牺牲自身利益来维护公平,普遍具有不公平厌恶倾向。本文基于行为博弈任务对个体处于不同角色时的公平行为,从神经学层面做出新的解释,并对现存理论模型做了梳理。脑成像的研究发现,公平行为的相关脑区主要有负责情绪加工的脑岛和与认知控制相关的背外侧前额叶,内侧眶额皮层。前脑岛激活越大,个体拒绝不公平方案的可能性越大,而腹外侧前额叶可以调节前脑岛的活动,使个体采取更理性的方式,接受不公平分配方案。另外,睾酮素和催产素作为神经调节的激素,可以对公平行为起到调节作用,睾酮素通过抑制内侧眶额皮层的激活,增加对不公平方案的拒绝率,相反,催产素可以降低个体对于不公平方案的拒绝率,并增加个体的公平行为。     

Effects of the Good Behavior Game on student and teacher behavior in an alternative school

The Good Behavior Game (GBG) is a classroom behavior management procedure that has been shown to be effective in reducing disruptive behavior across many settings and populations (Flower, McKenna, Bunuan, Muething, & Vega, 2014). We investigated the effects of the GBG on student and teacher behavior in two classrooms containing fourth‐ to eighth‐grade students in an alternative school for students with emotional and behavioral disorders. Results indicated the GBG reduced disruption and increased the teacher's use of praise relative to reprimands. Social validity measures, collected from both teachers and students, indicated strong approval of the GBG.     

Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information

The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we do not need to assume that rationality is commonly known (as is done in [Aumann (1995)]) or commonly hypothesized by the players (as done in [Samet (1996)]). The proposed model is compared with the account of hypothetical knowledge presented by Samet in [Samet (1996)] and with other possible strategies for extending information structures with conditional propositions. This research was funded by the National Science Foundation: “Game-Theoretic Foundation for Multi-Agent Systems”, IIS 9734923. Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

绩效、能力、职位对组织分配公平观的影响

旨在探索基于组织分配公平的认知评价和决策行为的影响因素,为此提出了不公平阈限的概念,即在追求公平和谋求自我利益的动机权衡中,个体为了追求公平而愿意放弃的最高限度的个人利益。采用最后通牒博弈和独裁者博弈的二阶段实验范式,样本量为60。结果发现,工作绩效、工作能力均对个体的不公平阈限有显著的影响;对于公平判断和基于公平的回应行为,工作绩效起着首要作用,工作能力的影响次之,再次是对方的提议数额的影响。第一阶段对方提议的分配方案对被试越有利,则第二阶段被试的回应行为越有利于对方。排除能力差别的作用之后,职位差别并未引起不公平阈限的显著差异。根据研究结果,总结出分配公平的三项原则：绩效原则、能力原则和互惠原则     

School and individual factors on game addiction: A multilevel analysis

This study investigated the protective or risk factors of game addiction at individual and school-level using multilevel modelling. Data from Korea Children and Youth Panel Survey was used for the analyses. The findings revealed that individual-level variables, including gender, delinquency, family intimacy, stress, self-esteem and self-control, were significant predictors of game addiction. Furthermore, protective school climate contributed to decreasing the level of game addiction and risky school climates positively predicted game addiction. The effect of individual-level variables on game addiction was different depending on the type or level of school-level variables. Based on the findings, implications and suggestions for future studies were discussed.