Peer Assessment of Aviation Performance: Inconsistent for Good Reasons

Research into expertise is relatively common in cognitive science concerning expertise existing across many domains. However, much less research has examined how experts within the same domain assess the performance of their peer experts. We report the results of a modified think‐aloud study conducted with 18 pilots (6 first officers, 6 captains, and 6 flight examiners). Pairs of same‐ranked pilots were asked to rate the performance of a captain flying in a critical pre‐recorded simulator scenario. Findings reveal (a) considerable variance within performance categories, (b) differences in the process used as evidence in support of a performance rating, (c) different numbers and types of facts (cues) identified, and (d) differences in how specific performance events affect choice of performance category and gravity of performance assessment. Such variance is consistent with low inter‐rater reliability. Because raters exhibited good, albeit imprecise, reasons and facts, a fuzzy mathematical model of performance rating was developed. The model provides good agreement with observed variations.     

A contemporary interpretation of Marx’s thoughts on modernity

Unlike some western scholars who limit their interpretation of modernity and its source to conceptual, cultural, value, and psychological dimensions, Marx pointed out that modernity came mainly from modern production system. Starting from the historical context of his time, Marx explored various aspects of modernity and pointed out that modernity was inherent in the logic of capital, resided in the process of historical evolution, arose in social conflicts and segmentation, and presented itself in a global horizon. The logic of capital, the historical viewpoint, the theory of contradiction and a global perspective are fundamental in Marx’s analysis of the problems of modernity. Marx’s ideas of modernity are methodologically significant to the construction of modernity in contemporary Chinese society. __________ Translated from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 中国社会科学 (China Social Sciences), 2005 (4) by Xing Lijun     

Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement

In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as synthetic, and what his explanatory claim means. I argue that the principle of complete determination does not follow from the principle of excluded middle because the externally negated or ‘negative’ judgement ‘Not (S is P)’ does not entail the internally negated or ‘infinite’ judgement ‘S is not-P.’ Kant's puzzling explanatory claim means that empirical objects are determined by the content of the totality of experience. This entails that empirical objects are completely determinate if and only if the totality of experience has a completely determinate content. I argue that it is not a priori whether experience has such a completely determinate content and thus not analytic that objects obey the principle of complete determination.     

Varieties of Reflection in Kant's Logic

For Kant, ‘reflection’ (Überlegung, Reflexion) is a technical term with a range of senses. I focus here on the senses of reflection that come to light in Kant's account of logic, and then bring the results to bear on the distinction between ‘logical’ and ‘transcendental’ reflection that surfaces in the Amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. Although recent commentary has followed similar cues, I suggest that it labours under a blind spot, as it neglects Kant's distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic. The foundational text of existing interpretations is a passage in Logik Jäsche that appears to attribute to Kant the view that reflection is a mental operation involved in the generation of concepts from non-conceptual materials. I argue against the received view by attending to Kant's division between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ general logic, identifying senses of reflection proper to each, and showing that none accords well with the received view. Finally, to take account of Kant's notion of transcendental reflection I show that we need to be attentive to the concerns of applied logic and how they inform the domain-relative transcendental logic that Kant presents in the first Critique.     

Louis Couturat,modern logic,and the international auxiliary language

ABSTRACT

To some extent, the early twentieth century revival of universal languages was the work of logicians and mathematicians. Pioneers of modern logic such as Frege, Russell and Peano wanted to overcome the diversity and deficiencies of natural languages. Through the rigour of formal logic, they aimed at providing scientific thinking with a reliable medium free from the ambiguity and inconsistencies of ordinary language. This article shows some interconnections between modern logic and the search for a common tongue that would unite scientists and people of all nations. The French mathematician and philosopher Louis Couturat is a key figure in understanding the interplay between these two movements. Through his work in composing the Ido language as an alternative to Esperanto, Couturat gave a new life to the Leibnizian idea of a universal characteristics. In addition, his multifaceted work provides a valuable insight into some political implications of early analytic philosophy.     

Revisiting the rise and fall of false recall: Presentation rate effects depend on retention interval

Leading theories of false memory predict that veridical and false recall of lists of semantically associated words can be dissociated by varying the presentation speed during study. Specifically, as presentation rate increases from milliseconds to seconds, veridical recall is predicted to increase monotonically while false recall is predicted to show a rapid rise and then a slow decrease—a pattern shown by McDermott and Watson (2001) in a study using immediate recall tests. In three experiments we tested the generality of the effects of rapid presentation rates on veridical and false memory. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants exhibited high levels of false recall on a delayed recall test, even for very fast stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA)—contrary to predictions from leading theories of false memory. When we switched to an immediate recall test in Experiment 3 we replicated the pattern predicted by the theories and observed by McDermott and Watson. Follow-up analyses further showed that the relative output position of false recalls is not affected by presentation rate, contrary to predictions from fuzzy trace theory. Implications for theories of false memory, including activation monitoring theory and fuzzy trace theory, are discussed.     

Possibilities,models, and intuitionistic logic: Ian Rumfitt’s The boundary stones of thought

AIan Rumfitt's new book presents a distinctive and intriguing philosophy of logic, one that ultimately settles on classical logic as the uniquely correct one–or at least rebuts some prominent arguments against classical logic. The purpose of this note is to evaluate Rumfitt's perspective by focusing on some themes that have occupied me for some time: (i) the role and importance of model theory and, in particular, the place of counter-arguments in establishing invalidity, (ii) higher-order logic, and (iii) the logical pluralism/relativism articulated in my own recent *Varieties of logic*.