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131.
Thierry Lucas 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2013,8(2):289
Parallelism is present everywhere in the early Moist texts: at the syntactic level, at the semantic level, between sentences, between sets of sentences, between argumentative structures. The present article gives many examples of the phenomenon: parallelism of insistence, insistence from top to bottom, insistence from bottom to top, parallelism with symmetry, parallelism involving negation, subcontraries and negation at deeper levels, parallelism of the argumentative structures. Logic is particularly applied to the study of parallelism involving negation. From the point of view of argumentation, it is shown that many of those constructions have an important role in supporting arguments such as: arguments of generalization, a fortiori arguments, arguments of exemplarity, consequentialist arguments, arguments by comparison. This study draws the attention to the importance of argumentation in the study of Moism and gives a new light on the argument by parallelism (mou 侔) in the “Xiaoqu”: It is a natural extension of what we call “parallelism involving negation,” already very common in the early Moist texts. 相似文献
132.
133.
This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer’s Propositional Deontic Logic (PD
e
L), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: “Never do that”, or
“Do this someday”. In this paper, we will investigate how to amend PD
e
L so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term
prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a duality between these two notions. As
a consequence, we have provided a new analysis of the long-term obligation by introducing a new atomic proposition I (indebtedness) to represent the condition that an agent has some unfulfilled obligation.
Presented by Jacek Malinowski 相似文献
134.
Applied Logic without Psychologism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Gregory Wheeler 《Studia Logica》2008,88(1):137-156
Logic is a celebrated representation language because of its formal generality. But there are two senses in which a logic
may be considered general, one that concerns a technical ability to discriminate between different types of individuals, and
another that concerns constitutive norms for reasoning as such. This essay embraces the former, permutation-invariance conception
of logic and rejects the latter, Fregean conception of logic. The question of how to apply logic under this pure invariantist
view is addressed, and a methodology is given. The pure invariantist view is contrasted with logical pluralism, and a methodology
for applied logic is demonstrated in remarks on a variety of issues concerning non-monotonic logic and non-monotonic inference,
including Charles Morgan’s impossibility results for non-monotonic logic, David Makinson’s normative constraints for non-monotonic
inference, and Igor Douven and Timothy Williamson’s proposed formal constraints on rational acceptance. 相似文献
135.
Formal nonmonotonic systems try to model the phenomenon that common sense reasoners are able to “jump” in their reasoning
from assumptions Δ to conclusions C without their being any deductive chain from Δ to C. Such jumps are done by various mechanisms which are strongly dependent on context and knowledge of how the actual world
functions. Our aim is to motivate these jump rules as inference rules designed to optimise survival in an environment with
scant resources of effort and time. We begin with a general discussion and quickly move to Section 3 where we introduce five
resource principles. We show that these principles lead to some well known nonmonotonic systems such as Nute’s defeasible
logic. We also give several examples of practical reasoning situations to illustrate our principles.
Edited by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
136.
Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and
some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist
theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology,
which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really
does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with
both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist
aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods.
This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve
epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational
concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology. 相似文献
137.
Tomoyuki Yamada 《Synthese》2008,165(2):295-315
In this paper, illocutionary acts of commanding will be differentiated from perlocutionary acts that affect preferences of
addressees in a new dynamic logic which combines the preference upgrade introduced in DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) by van Benthem and Liu with the deontic update introduced in ECL II (eliminative command logic II) by Yamada. The resulting logic will incorporate J. L. Austin’s distinction between illocutionary
acts as acts having mere conventional effects and perlocutionary acts as acts having real effects upon attitudes and actions
of agents, and help us understand why saying so can make it so in explicit performative utterances. We will also discuss how
acts of commanding give rise to so-called “deontic dilemmas” and how we can accommodate most deontic dilemmas without triggering
so-called “deontic explosion”. 相似文献
138.
T. Allan Hillman 《Synthese》2008,163(2):245-261
While considerable ink has been spilt over the rejection of idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the end of the
19th Century, relatively little attention has been directed at Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a work written in the early stages of Russell’s philosophical struggles with the metaphysics of Bradley, Bosanquet, and
others. Though a sustained investigation of that work would be one of considerable scope, here I reconstruct and develop a
two-pronged argument from the Philosophy of Leibniz that Russell fancied—as late as 1907—to be the downfall of the traditional category of substance. Here, I suggest, one can
begin to see Russell’s own reasons—arguments largely independent of Moore—for the abandonment of idealism. Leibniz, no less
than Bradley, adhered to an antiquated variety of logic: what Russell refers to as the subject-predicate doctrine of logic.
Uniting this doctrine with a metaphysical principle of independence—that a substance is prior to and distinct from its properties—Russell
is able to demonstrate that neither a substance pluralism nor a substance monism can be consistently maintained. As a result,
Russell alleges that the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bradley has been undermined as ultimately incoherent. Russell’s remedy
for this incoherence is the postulation of a bundle theory of substance, such that the category of “substance” reduces to
the most basic entities—properties. 相似文献
139.
William Craig 《Synthese》2008,164(3):321-332
A common aim of elimination problems for languages of logic is to express the entire content of a set of formulas of the language,
or a certain part of it, in a way that is more elementary or more informative. We want to bring out that as the languages
for logic grew in expressive power and, at the same time, our knowledge of their expressive limitations also grew, elimination
problems in logic underwent some change. For languages other than that for monadic second-order logic, there remain important
open problems. 相似文献
140.