Well‐Hidden Regularities: Abstract Uses of in and on Retain an Aspect of Their Spatial Meaning

Prepositions name spatial relationships (e.g., book on a table). But they are also used to convey abstract, non‐spatial relationships (e.g., Adrian is on a roll)—raising the question of how the abstract uses relate to the concrete spatial uses. Despite considerable success in delineating these relationships, no general account exists for the two most frequently extended prepositions: in and on. We test the proposal that what is preserved in abstract uses of these prepositions is the relative degree of control between the located object (the figure) and the reference object (the ground). Across four experiments, we find a continuum of greater figure control for on (e.g., Jordan is on a roll) and greater ground control for in (e.g., Casey is in a depression). These findings bear on accounts of semantic structure and language change, as well as on second language instruction.     

Understanding intentions from actions: Direct perception,inference, and the roles of mirror and mentalizing systems

This review asks whether observers can obtain information about others’ intentions from observation of their actions; and if so, whether this process is performed using direct perceptual or inferential processes (prominent examples of each being the intention understanding theory of mirror neuron function, and mentalizing accounts of intention understanding, respectively). I propose four conditions that should be fulfilled in order to support a direct perception account, and suggest that only two of these conditions are supported by the existing data. I then propose and review three further sources of evidence which have the potential to inform this debate, concluding that the data do not support the direct perception account. In particular, mirror neurons may be involved in lower-level processes of action perception, but there is no evidence to support their involvement in the type of higher-level intention understanding that is proposed by the direct perception account.     

Did she mean to do it? Acquiring a folk theory of intentionality

The ability to both identify and explain others’ intentional acts is fundamental for successful social interaction. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigated 3- to 9-year-olds’ (n = 148) understanding of the folk concept of intentionality, using three types of intentionality measures. The relationship between this type of reasoning and false belief and interpretive mind understanding was also examined. Judgment of the appropriateness of an explanation was based on adult responses (n = 20). Overall, the results indicated that the ability to both identify and appropriately explain a range of intentional acts does not fully emerge until 7 years of age or later. The pattern of explanations revealed the gradual development of a folk concept of intentionality. Preschool- and early school-age children focused on the protagonists’ desires and actions, whereas 8- and 9-year-olds and adults were more likely to reference the protagonists’ awareness and skills.     

Coding of stimuli by animals: Retrospection, prospection, episodic memory and future planning

When animals code stimuli for later retrieval they can either code them in terms of the stimulus presented (as a retrospective memory) or in terms of the response or outcome anticipated (as a prospective memory). Although retrospective memory is typically assumed (as in the form of a memory trace), evidence of prospective coding has been found when response intentions and outcomes are particularly salient. At a more abstract level is the question of whether animals are able figuratively to travel back in time to recover memories of past events (episodic memory) and forward in time to predict future events (future planning). Although what would constitute adequate evidence of episodic memory and future planning is controversial, preliminary evidence suggests that animals may be capable of both forms of subjective time travel.     

Applied Roles and the Future of Community Psychology

The roles for community psychologists have changed over the past several decades. These changes have implications for training, traditional academic roles, and the capacity of the field to maintain its integrity and further development. Changes in the scope of community psychology as a field as well as the roles of community psychologists are described with consideration of how they may affect participation in the field, retention of membership in SCRA, and potential directions for training.     

Psychiatry: The Importance of Understanding Persons While Treating Diagnoses

Modern psychiatry emphasizes chemical, genetic, psychosocial, and similar theoretical biological sciences. While these sciences can explain mental disorders they fail to generate a full understanding of the patient as a person. I argue that psychiatry, to not stereotype persons, must integrate both the important advances in molecular and social sciences needed to diagnose and treat mental illnesses and provide an encounter with the person who is the patient. Standardized forms of diagnostic interviewing now dominate in the psychiatrist–patient relationship. Individualizing forms of inquiry, by contrast, elicit a personal understanding of the patient and her problems and the information necessary to diagnose and treat the patient's mental disorders.

This understanding attitude towards individuals is essential so that psychiatrists avoid falling into over-simplified stereotyping explanations of the persons who are their patients. If psychiatry allows its diagnoses of disordered processes that occur within persons to function as labels for persons, then psychiatry appears scientifically to condone the uses of stereotypes. With an understanding attitude towards patients, psychiatry can better treat mental disorders, while also respecting human diversity.     

Puzzles of Discourse in Being and Time: Minding Gaps in Understanding

Abstract

This paper takes issue with Heidegger’s claim that discourse and understanding are equally basic in the constitution of our making sense of the world. I argue that Heidegger cannot consistently establish this claim, and that discourse can be thought of as being more basic than understanding. The proposed line of thinking has the advantage of shedding light on both the finitude and the normativity of our making sense of the world. Thus, by setting up an exchange with the later Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule‐following makes it possible to develop an approach to the normativity of meaning which was not readily available on Heidegger’s account. Further, the paper offers an inquiry into a certain aspect of our finite sense of the world which, in spite of Heidegger’s marked attention to finitude, was obscured by his approach to discourse. The implications of the argument might be far‐reaching. The view of a basic role of discourse can put into question Heidegger’s guiding vision according to which time alone is ultimately the fundamental constituent of our sense of what there is. The engagement with Wittgenstein indicates, in conjunction with other themes of the paper, that there are certain perspectives and issues in phenomenology which are much closer to aspects of the analytic tradition than is usually granted.     

Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences

Two samples, one gifted, the other “normal,” of 30 children each (11 to 13 years of age) were matched on age, sex, race, and father's occupation. A parent of each child completed the Children's Behavioral Classification Project instrument, and a profile of 30 scaled scores was obtained for each protocol. A discriminant analysis on the basis of the profiles classified 50 of the 60 Ss correctly into their respective sample category, either gifted or normal. Though the results of a multivariate analysis of variance showed no significant differences between the groups when the 30 profile factors were viewed as a whole, univariate analyses on the separate factors yielded significant group differences on several related factors. These were interpreted with caution. Additional factors displayed significant sex differences and one demonstrated a group-by-sex interaction effect.

Coefficients of pattern similarity (the r_p ) were computed among all pairs of the 60 Ss. An unweighted average linkage cluster analysis grouped 34 of the 60 Ss into six clusters which accounted for 26 of 30 possible gifted children.

After an item analysis was performed on the original data, a 42 item subscale of the CBCP questionnaire was constructed which correctly classified 31 of 40 individuals in a cross-validation sample.     

The relationship between emotional-state language and emotion understanding: A study with school-age children

We carried out an investigation with primary-school children on the relationship between both use and comprehension of emotional-state language and emotion understanding. Participants were 100 students between 7 and 10 years old (mean age=8 years and 10 months; SD=15.3 months), equally divided by gender. They completed four tests evaluating their language ability, use of emotional-state language, comprehension of emotional-state language and emotion understanding (EU) respectively. Significant correlations were found between both use and comprehension of emotional-state talk and children's EU. In addition, regression analyses showed that comprehension of emotional-state language, rather than its use, plays a significant role in explaining children's emotion understanding.