年幼儿童的尺寸匹配误差现象

近十年来,尺寸匹配误差作为年幼儿童生活中的一种常见的尺寸误用现象逐渐受到了一些研究者的关注。现有研究主要集中在尺寸匹配误差的特点、出现频率和产生原因等方面。抑制控制的失败、神经通路的协调失败、“计划-控制”模型和“感觉-行动”模型、功能性推理偏好以及身体意识发展的不成熟等观点能够对某些类型的尺寸匹配误差现象做出解释。未来的研究应从进一步深入探讨尺寸匹配误差与假装的区别、完善研究方法以及跨文化研究的开展几方面进行。     

The scientific use of ‘representation’ and ‘function’: avoiding explanatory vacuity

Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity. Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection fatal to that theory. My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’ by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion of function. However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’ must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task.     

Nature and facts about natural and artifactual categories: Sex differences in the semantic priming paradigm

There is abundant evidence from behavioral and neurophysiological experiments for the distinction of natural versus artifactual categories and a gender-specific difference: women’s performances in cognitive tasks increase when natural categories are used, whereas men’s performances increase with artifactual categories. Here, we used the semantic priming paradigm to study retrieval processes by presenting category labels as primes and exemplars as targets. Overall, in two experiments we found larger priming effects for natural than for artifactual categories. In addition, females showed positive priming effects for natural but negative effects for artifactual categories, whereas males showed positive priming effects for both categories. This pattern matches with that from other tasks and can be interpreted as evidence that the findings from these other tasks are, at least partially, indeed due to different representations or processing modes for males and females and not (exclusively) due to—for example—different familiarity with a category. In a further experiment, we showed that the found pattern for females can be manipulated by focusing on perceptual vs. functional features. The results can be interpreted as first evidence that there are (eventually in addition to different “crystallized” semantic structures) specific default processing modes that differ for males and females.     

Comparative Evaluations

My response to Engelmann (2008) will be based on several questions that will allow both its author and the general reader to determine whether the assumptions I make as an interpreter of this complex paper are congruent or incongruent with their own interpretations of the text. The interpretations by the writer, by any commentator, and the diverse interpretations of a general audience together with my own interpretations will, I hope, facilitate some fruitful ‘comparative evaluations.’ I articulate my inferences of the most dense part of the paper, namely the ‘concrete immediate Consciousness and the developing absent outside.’ My hope is to address Engelmann’s question: “Am I in a better disposition to judge modern theories of consciousness?” The last section of my response spells out more personal comments to my all too brief and single encounter with Arno Engelmann. It is there that Arno Engelmann’s fascinating statement “I am a citizen of the world” is addressed through its counterparts in my life.     

Implicit theories of intelligence and IQ test performance in adolescents with Generalized Anxiety Disorder

During the past decade, several studies have reported positive effects of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) in the treatment of children and adolescents with mental disorders. One of the most important CBT interventions is to teach children and adolescents to challenge negative thoughts that lead to maladjusted behaviors. Based on the implicit theories of intelligence framework, the main purpose of this study was to test whether an incremental theory manipulation could be used to affect IQ test performance in adolescents with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD). Results showed that patients demonstrated enhanced IQ performance and experienced less state anxiety when they were exposed to an incremental theory of intelligence manipulation. Our findings suggest that incremental theory manipulation provides a useful cognitive strategy for addressing school-related anxiety in adolescents with mental disorders such as GAD.     

Subjective education in analytic training: drawing on values from the art academy

Abstract: Kernberg and others have observed that psychoanalytic education has tended to promote the acquisition of theoretical knowledge and clinical technique within an atmosphere of indoctrination rather than of exploration. As a corrective, he proposed four models that correspond to values in psychoanalytic education: the art academy, the technical trade school, the religious seminary and the university. He commended models of the university and art academy to our collective attention because of their combined effectiveness in providing for the objective and subjective education of candidates: the university model for its capacity to provide a critical sense of a wide range of theories in an atmosphere tolerating debate and difference, and the art academy model for its capacity to facilitate the expression of individual creativity. In this paper, I will explore the art academy model for correspondences between artistic and analytic trainings that can enhance the development of the creative subjectivity of psychoanalytic candidates. I will draw additional correspondences between analytic and artistic learning that can enhance psychoanalytic education.     

Verbal and nonverbal behaviour as a basis for credibility attribution: The impact of task involvement and cognitive capacity

Three experiments were able to demonstrate the usefulness of dual-process models for the understanding of the process of credibility attribution. According to the assumptions of dual-process models, only high task involvement and high cognitive capacity leads to intensive processing of verbal and nonverbal information when making credibility judgments. Under low task involvement and/or low cognitive capacity, people predominantly use nonverbal information for their credibility attribution. In Experiment 1, participants under low or high task involvement saw a film in which the nonverbal behaviour (fidgety vs. calm) and the verbal information (low versus high credibility) of a source were manipulated. As predicted, when task involvement was low, only the nonverbal behaviour influenced participants’ credibility attribution. Participants with high task involvement also used the verbal information. In Experiment 2 and 3, the cognitive capacity of the participants was manipulated. Participants with high cognitive capacity, in contrast to those of low cognitive capacity, used the verbal information for their credibility attribution.     

In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Maxwell’s Master Argument and Aberrant Theories

Over the past years, in books and journals (this journal included), N. Maxwell launched a ferocious attack on B. C. van Fraassen’s view of science called Constructive Empiricism (CE). This attack has been totally ignored. Must we conclude from this silence that no defence is possible and that a fortiori Maxwell has buried CE once and for all? Or is the attack too obviously flawed as not to merit exposure? A careful dissection of Maxwell’s reasoning will make it clear that neither is the case. This dissection includes an analysis of Maxwell’s ‘aberrance–argument’ (omnipresent in his many writings) for the claim that science implicitly and permanently accepts a substantial, metaphysical thesis about the universe, which then paves the way for his own metaphysical-realist hierarchy-view of science. This aberrance-claim, which Maxwell directs against a widely shared and harmful ideology of science called ‘Standard Empiricism’, generally has been ignored too, for more than a quarter of a century. Our conclusions will be that (i) Maxwell’s attacks on CE can be beaten off, and (ii) his ‘aberrance–arguments’ do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish, but (iii) we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertarian nature of CE.