Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness

It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third‐party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third‐party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive.     

Religiosity Reduces Sexual Aggression and Coercion in a Longitudinal Cohort of College Men: Mediating Roles of Peer Norms,Promiscuity, and Pornography

Extensive literature suggests that religiosity is a protective factor in reducing a number of deviant behaviors, including sexual aggression (SA). Whereas previous research focused on the role of risky alcohol consumption in mediating the relationship between religiosity and SA, this study explores the hypothesized meditational paths from religiosity to SA and technology‐based coercive behavior (TBC) through peer norms, pornography consumption, and promiscuity. Findings from a four‐year longitudinal study of male college students suggest that peer norms and promiscuity mediate the relationship between religiosity and both outcome measures, while pornography consumption mediates the relationship between religiosity and TBC. These findings may inform ongoing practice and future research into possible mechanisms by which problematic sexual behaviors may be influenced.     

Just between us: Exclusive communications in online social networks

Social media websites such as Facebook are used for relationship development and maintenance often through self-disclosure and sharing of personal information. However, not all forms of social media communication may be equally suitable for this task. This paper explores users’ norms about the appropriateness of using private vs. public Facebook messages to communicate different kinds of personal information, and the effectiveness of these types of communication in building relationships. Study 1, a survey, revealed that users endorse conflicting expectations about preferences for receiving information publicly or privately. Study 2, a field experiment testing the effects of private versus public Facebook communications on actual relationship development using participants’ own Facebook pages, suggested that private messages lead to greater closeness.     

Setting the bar: divergent sociocultural norms for women's and men's ideal appearance in real-world contexts

Research suggests that exposure to sociocultural norms for idealized appearance can reduce both women's and men's body satisfaction. Despite comparable effects for both genders in the lab, in the “real-world” women's body satisfaction is chronically lower than men's. Real-world gender differences may arise from discrepancies in men's and women's everyday exposure to norms. Across eight studies using a variety of content analysis, survey, and experimental methods, we examine differences in sociocultural norms for ideal appearance pertaining to women and men in “daily life” contexts. We demonstrate that appearance norms encountered by women in daily life are more rigid, homogenous and pervasive than those for men, and that more messages implying the attainability of the ideal appearance are directed at women. Finally, experimental results show that homogeneous, rigid norms (like those typically encountered by women) are more harmful to body image than heterogeneous, flexible norms (like those typically encountered by men).     

New perspectives in assessing deception: The evolution of the truth machine

In recent years a growing interest has arisen in the development of tools for the detection of deception. Since William M. Marston's first publication (1917) on the use of the polygraph as a lie detector, the application of this tool, commonly known as the truth machine, has evolved. Modern technologies are now trying to push the issue further, investigating brain activity during deception using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The aim of this paper is to summarise the evolution of research from the original use of the polygraph to the use of new technologies in detecting deception, in order to provide an overview of the recent developments on the use of measurements of deception, and promote new research in this highly important domain of applied cognitive psychology.     

Cognitive neuroimaging: cognitive science out of the armchair

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuroimaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory.     

Nondirectiveness and Its Lay Interpretations: The Effect of Counseling Style, Ethnicity and Culture on Attitudes Towards Genetic Counseling Among Jewish and Bedouin Respondents in Israel

To evaluate the effects of ethnicity, culture, and counseling style on the interpretation of nondirectiveness in genetic counseling, a questionnaire containing premarital and prenatal case vignettes in two versions (pessimistic/optimistic) was administered to 281 Jewish and 133 Bedouin respondents. The first study population was comprised of Jewish students enrolled in a university and a community college in the Negev (southern part of Israel). The second study population was comprised of Muslim-Bedouin college students from the same area. The majority of Jewish respondents interpreted the nondirective message as intended by counselors, while the majority of Bedouin respondents did not. Counseling style was found to have a statistically significant effect on the interpretation of the general role of counseling. Gender and susceptibility were not found to have a significant effect on interpretation. Group differences are analyzed through a cultural lens in which different interpretive norms can generate expectations for either nondirectiveness or directiveness.     

Plugging the Leaks in Neurath's Ship: A Defense of Naturalistic Epistemology

This paper examines the question whether foundational epistemology (“FE”) can be replaced by naturalized epistemology (“NE”). First, it argues that Quine's defense of NE is inadequate since it is only based on arguments showing the impossibility of the logical empiricist version of FE rather than on arguments for the impossibility of FE as such. Second, it proposes that a more promising argument for the impossibility of FE can be found in the Münchhausen-trilemma which aims at showing that ultimate foundations (and, hence, FE) are unattainable. However, Karl-Otto Apel has shown that this trilemma is unconclusive since it uncritically presupposes the premise that all argumentation is deductive in nature. Apel's argument implies that FE is possible if and only if it is possible to devise a non-deductive foundation (“NDF”). It is argued, however, that the possibility of NDF cannot be demonstrated. This leads to a situation called the Multatuli-dilemma: we cannot prove the possibility of ultimate foundations nor can we prove the impossibility of ultimate foundations. This dilemma shows that the discussion about the possibility of FE is pointless. Thus, it suggests that it is legitimate to replace FE by NE. Barry Stroud and Henri Lauener, however, argue that this replacement is not feasible since NE is not capable of refuting scepticism (Stroud) or justifying methodological rules (Lauener). But these objections are shown to be mistaken: First, epistemological scepticism is practically impossible and, hence, does not pose a serious threat to NE. Second, NE is capable of justifying methodological norms if and only if it makes use of so-called internal justifications. Thus, the final conclusion of this paper is that FE can be replaced by NE. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-based Externalist Ethics

The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props to moral teaching and thus to the general institution of moral discourse. However, they are not implied by any particular moral judgment (or speaker), so that amoralism comes out as possible. The response that defines the distinctively moral notion of wrong on this account is the second-level (social) response of forbidding some behavior; but this is ultimately to be understood in terms of (variable) individual reactions. Natural human emotion tendencies thereby constrain the content of ethics, while allowing for some degree of social variation in moral codes.