Does functional neuroimaging solve the questions of neurolinguistics?

Neurolinguistic research has been engaged in evaluating models of language using measures from brain structure and function, and/or in investigating brain structure and function with respect to language representation using proposed models of language. While the aphasiological strategy, which classifies aphasias based on performance modality and a few linguistic variables, has been the most stable, cognitive neurolinguistics has had less success in reliably associating more elaborately proposed levels and units of language models with brain structure. Functional imaging emerged at this stage of neurolinguistic research. In this review article, it is proposed that the often-inconsistent superfluity of outcomes arising from functional imaging studies of language awaits adjustment at both "ends" of the process: model and data. Assumptions that our current language models consistently and reliably represent implicit knowledge within human cerebral processing are in line for major revision; and the promise of functional brain imaging to reveal any such knowledge structures must incorporate stable correlates of the imaging signal as dependent variable.     

Generative models, brain function and neuroimaging

The representational capacity and inherent function of any neuron, neuronal population or cortical area in the brain is dynamic and context-sensitive. Functional integration, or interactions among brain systems, that employ driving (bottom up) and backward (top-down) connections, mediate this adaptive and contextual specialisation. A critical consequence is that neuronal responses, in any given cortical area, can represent different things at different times. This can have fundamental implications for the design of brain imaging experiments and the interpretation of their results. Our arguments are developed under generative models of brain function, where higher-level systems provide a prediction of the inputs to lower-level regions. Conflict between the two is resolved by changes in the higher-level representations, which are driven by the ensuing error in lower regions, until the mismatch is "cancelled". From this perspective the specialisation of any region is determined both by bottom-up driving inputs and by top-down predictions. Specialisation is therefore not an intrinsic property of any region but depends on both forward and backward connections with other areas. Because the latter have access to the context in which the inputs are generated they are in a position to modulate the selectivity or specialisation of lower areas. The implications for classical models (e.g., classical receptive fields in electrophysiology, classical specialisation in neuroimaging and connectionism in cognitive models) are severe and suggest these models may provide incomplete accounts of real brain architectures. Here we focus on the implications for cognitive neuroscience in the context of neuroimaging.     

Functional integration and the mind

Different cognitive functions recruit a number of different, often overlapping, areas of the brain. Theories in cognitive and computational neuroscience are beginning to take this kind of functional integration into account. The contributions to this special issue consider what functional integration tells us about various aspects of the mind such as perception, language, volition, agency, and reward. Here, I consider how and why functional integration may matter for the mind; I discuss a general theoretical framework, based on generative models, that may unify many of the debates surrounding functional integration and the mind; and I briefly introduce each of the contributions.     

Hemispheric asymmetries in visual word-form processing: progress, conflict, and evaluating theories

The ubiquitous left-hemisphere advantage in visual word processing can be accounted for in different ways. Competing theories have been tested recently using cAsE-aLtErNaTiNg words to investigate boundary conditions for the typical effect. We briefly summarize this research and examine the disagreements and commonalities across the theoretical perspectives. This work may provide a good example why a multi-level, multi-method, and multi-paradigm approach holds the greatest promise for rapid theoretical progress.     

Aggression and school social dynamics: The good, the bad, and the ordinary

A social dynamics perspective of aggression in school is presented. This framework focuses on the role of natural social processes in the establishment and maintenance of aggressive behavior in the school context. The five articles in this special issue are briefly reviewed and a synthesis of their contributions for understanding the social dynamics of aggression in school is underscored. Future research and intervention implications are also discussed. The need for examining the role of school social dynamics in conducting social skills interventions, functional behavioral assessments, and the development of positive behavioral support plans is emphasized.     

Self‐Disclosure Characteristics and Motivations in Social Media: Extending the Functional Model to Multiple Social Network Sites

The purpose of this study was to examine differences in self‐disclosure goals, privacy concerns, and self‐disclosure characteristics between Facebook and Twitter. These sites were compared in terms of audience representations, based on structural cues that suggest potential audiences for a user. We conceptualized audience representations in 2 ways: based on privacy boundaries that imply bounded versus unbounded audiences, and on network characteristics such as size and diversity for audiences within the boundary. Results revealed that self‐disclosure goals, privacy concerns, and self‐disclosure intimacy were different depending on the privacy boundary. Network characteristics were also important, but effects were moderated by the privacy boundary type, suggesting a complex interplay between the 2 types of audience representations in shaping self‐disclosure in social media.     

Responsiveness and functional connectivity of the scene-sensitive retrosplenial complex in 7–11-year-old children

Brain imaging studies have identified two cortical areas, the parahippocampal place area (PPA) and the retrosplenial complex (RSC), that respond preferentially to the viewing of scenes. Contrary to the PPA, little is known about the functional maturation and cognitive control of the RSC. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and tasks that required attention to scene (or face) images and suppression of face (or scene) images, respectively, to investigate task-dependent modulation of activity in the RSC and whole-brain functional connectivity (FC) of this area in 7–11-year-old children and young adults. We compared responsiveness of the RSC with that of the PPA. The RSC was selectively activated by scene images in both groups, albeit less than the PPA. Children modulated activity between the tasks similarly in the RSC and PPA, and to the same extent as adults in PPA, whereas adults modulated activity in the RSC less than in PPA. In children, the whole brain FC of the RSC was stronger in the Sf than Fs task between the left RSC and right fusiform gyrus. The between groups comparison suggested stronger FC in children than adults in the Sf task between the right RSC and the left inferior parietal lobule and intraparietal sulcus. Together the results suggest that the function of the RSC and the related networks undergo dynamic changes over the development from 7–11-year-old children to adulthood.     

Functions and Health at the Interface of Biology and Technology

Synthetic biology promises to eliminate the distinction between biology and engineering by delivering a philosophically interesting new kind of entity: a biological organism that is wholly designed and constructed by humans. The possibility of such organisms raises interesting questions in three domains: the analysis of (1) biological functions, (2) engineering functions, and (3) health and disease. This paper identifies and systematically answers these questions. This does not only establish how we should think about functions and health and disease in synthetic biological organisms, but it also reveals insights that are of broader relevance: (1) aetiological accounts of biological function need to omit or reinterpret reference to natural selection. This results in complete continuity between aetiological analyses of function in engineering and philosophy; (2) considering synthetic biology prompts interesting further questions about heritability, ancestry, and biological individuals; and (3) accounts of disease as biological dysfunction do not straightforwardly map onto our intuitive health and disease judgments regarding non-human animals. In response to the latter point I examine three possible avenues, and tentatively defend one on behalf of the ‘disease as dysfunction’ theorist.     

Sense of body ownership in patients affected by functional motor symptoms (conversion disorder)

Background and aimPatients with functional neurological symptoms are commonly seen in neurological practice. Nevertheless their aetiopathology remains unclear. We have recently shown that patients affected by functional motor symptoms (FMS) present lower interoceptive awareness and higher alexithymia levels than healthy controls. Nevertheless sense of body ownership has never been studied in FMS patients.The aim of the present study was to systematically investigate the sense of body ownership, with the rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm, in patients with FMS and healthy controls.Materials and methodsWe included in the study 16 patients with FMS and 18 healthy controls (HC). Patients and HC were asked to complete the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) and the self-consciousness scale (self-objectification questionnaire). All participants underwent the RHI paradigm: illusionary experience was measured by self-report and by proprioceptive alteration.ResultsA Mann–Whitney U test performed revealed that FMS (median = 2.11) participants embodied the rubber hand to the same extent than HC participants (median = 2.0, Z = −0.86, p > 0.05, r = −0.15). The same test revealed no significant difference in the Proprioceptive Drift experience between FMS (median = 0.0) and HC participants (median = −0.5, Z = −0.96, p > 0.05, r = −0.16).ConclusionsOur study revealed that sense of body ownership is not impaired in patients affected by FMS. This, together with the results from our previous experiment (studying the interoceptive awareness), supports the hypothesis that interoceptive awareness and sense of body ownership may be dissociated in patients with FMS.