The structure of workplace adaptive skill in a career inexperienced group

Adaptive skill is a central concept to understanding vocational behavior. In this study, a theory of behavioral functionality is proposed that describes the underlying structure of workplace adaptive skill. The propositions of the theory are formalized in a facet theory mapping sentence, then 12 adaptive skills are assessed on a group of career inexperienced individuals using a structured interview methodology. Smallest space analysis applied to the interview ratings reveals a three-dimensional structure of behavioral functionality. After refinements are made to the theoretical framework, we explore the implications of our findings for understanding the development of adaptive skills in the workplace and for contributing knowledge to the field of vocational behavior.     

CAN WE STILL TALK ABOUT “TRUTH” AND “PROGRESS” IN INTERDISCIPLINARY THINKING TODAY?

On a cultural level, and for Christian theology as part of a long tradition in the evolution of religion, evolutionary epistemology “sets the stage,” as it were, for understanding the deep evolutionary impact of our ancestral history on the evolution of culture, and eventually on the evolution of disciplinary and interdisciplinary reflection. In the process of the evolution of human knowledge, our interpreted experiences and expectations of the world (and of the ultimate questions we humans typically pose to the world) have a central role to play. What evolutionary epistemology also shows us is that we humans can indeed take on cognitive goals and ideals that cannot be explained or justified in terms of survival‐promotion or reproductive advantage only. Therefore, once the capacities for rational knowledge, moral sensibility, aesthetic appreciation of beauty, and the propensity for religious belief have emerged in our biological history, they cannot be explained only in biological/evolutionary terms. Finally, in this way a door is opened for seeing problem solving as a central activity of our research traditions. As philosophers of science have argued, one of the most important shared rational resources between even widely divergent disciplines is problem solving as the most central and defining activity of all research traditions. As will become clear, the very diverse reasoning strategies of theology and the sciences clearly overlap in their shared quests for intelligible problem solving, including problem solving on an empirical, experiential, and conceptual level.     

The levels of perceptual processing and the neural correlates of increasing subjective visibility

According to the levels-of-processing hypothesis, transitions from unconscious to conscious perception may depend on stimulus processing level, with more gradual changes for low-level stimuli and more dichotomous changes for high-level stimuli. In an event-related fMRI study we explored this hypothesis using a visual backward masking procedure. Task requirements manipulated level of processing. Participants reported the magnitude of the target digit in the high-level task, its color in the low-level task, and rated subjective visibility of stimuli using the Perceptual Awareness Scale. Intermediate stimulus visibility was reported more frequently in the low-level task, confirming prior behavioral results. Visible targets recruited insulo-fronto-parietal regions in both tasks. Task effects were observed in visual areas, with higher activity in the low-level task across all visibility levels. Thus, the influence of level of processing on conscious perception may be mediated by attentional modulation of activity in regions representing features of consciously experienced stimuli.     

Inter-individual neural differences in movement imagery abilities

ObjectivesBuilding on mounting evidence distinguishing the neurological basis of different movement imagery abilities (visual versus kinesthetic), this study compared brain activity (i.e., blood flow changes) through functional magnetic resonance imaging elicited by movement imagery in participants self-reporting good and poor imagery abilities with the Movement Imagery Questionnaire-3. Participants also completed the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire-2. Method: Thirty-seven females (good imagery ability = 18; poor imagery ability = 19) were randomly presented with four experimental conditions (i.e., Kinesthetic, Internal Perspective, External Perspective and Rest) counterbalanced for condition, during three separate 11-min functional brain scans. Results: Kinesthetic and visual (internal/external) subscale mean differences of the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire-2 favored good imagers and high Movement Imagery Questionnaire-3 inter-scale correlations evidenced convergent validity. As in prior published work, kinesthetic, internal, and external visual imagery elicited distinct patterns of brain activation relative to rest. Overall, the patterns of brain activity in the good and poor imager groups were remarkably similar, indicating that they both generally relied on a similar brain network during movement imagery. Conclusions: Contrary to processing efficiency hypotheses (i.e., neural efficiency hypothesis) we report that during kinesthetic imagery and external visual imagery only, good imagers actually activated a greater number of spatially distinct cortical sites than did poor imagers. Furthermore, research is needed to fully characterize the neural signature of movement imagery in good and poor imagers. Such research is critical to the appropriate creation and proper application of neuroscience-inspired movement imagery-based learning interventions in healthy and clinical populations.     

Understanding the influence of literacy on consumer memory: The role of pictorial elements

This research examines the relationship between literacy and consumer memory. The effects of a variety of stimuli at exposure (i.e., brand names, brand signatures, and products in usage) on memory (i.e., recognition, stem-completion tasks) were examined for a range of literacy. In a series of experiments, we find that the use of pictorial representations of brands (i.e., brand signatures) results in superior brand memory for individuals with lower literacy levels when compared to those at higher literacy levels. This effect is shown to occur not due to pictorial elements per se, but due to pictorial elements with a 1-to-1 correspondence with reality, i.e., which match the form in which they were originally encoded in memory. Moreover, this effect does not persist with stimulus-rich pictures of brands in usage, pointing to boundary conditions with the use of pictorial information.     

Is there an alternative cerebral network associated with enhanced phonological processing in deaf speech-users? An exceptional case

Most people born deaf and exposed to oral language show scant evidence of sensitivity to the phonology of speech when processing written language. In this respect they differ from hearing people. However, occasionally, a prelingually deaf person can achieve good processing of written language in terms of phonological sensitivity and awareness, and in this respect appears exceptional. We report the pattern of event-related fMRI activation in such a deaf reader while performing a rhyme-judgment on written words with similar spelling endings that do not provide rhyme clues. The left inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis and the left inferior parietal lobe showed greater activation for this task than for a letter-string identity matching task. This participant was special in this regard, showing significantly greater activation in these regions than a group of hearing participants with a similar level of phonological and reading skill. In addition, SR showed activation in the left mid-fusiform gyrus; a region which did not show task-specific activation in the other respondents. The pattern of activation in this exceptional deaf reader was also unique compared with three deaf readers who showed limited phonological processing. We discuss the possibility that this pattern of activation may be critical in relation to phonological decoding of the written word in good deaf readers whose phonological reading skills are indistinguishable from those of hearing readers.     

The logic of how-questions

Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the logic of questions, Van Fraassen has managed to apply their approach in constructing an account of the logic of why-questions. Comparatively little, by contrast, has been written on the logic of how-questions despite the apparent centrality of questions such as How is it possible for us to be both free and determined? to philosophical enterprise.¹ In what follows I develop a logic for how-questions of various sorts including how-questions of cognitive resolution, how-questions of manner, how-questions of method, of means, and of mechanism.     

Are errors differentiable from deceptive responses when feigning memory impairment? An fMRI study

Previous neuroimaging studies have suggested that the neural activity associated with truthful recall, with false memory, and with feigned memory impairment are different from one another. Here, we report a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that addressed an important but yet unanswered question: Is the neural activity associated with intentional faked responses and with errors differentiable? Using a word list learning recognition paradigm, the findings of this mixed event-related fMRI study clearly indicated that the brain activity associated with intentional faked responses was different to the activity associated with errors committed unintentionally. For intentional faked responses, significant activation was found in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate region, and the precuneus. However, no significant activation was observed for unintentional errors. The results suggest that deception, in terms of feigning memory impairment, is not only more cognitively demanding than making unintentional errors but also utilizes different cognitive processes.