Fostering innovation in functionally diverse teams: The two faces of transformational leadership

Empirical research on the effects of functional diversity on team innovation has yielded largely inconsistent results, showing positive, negative, as well as nonsignificant effects. For capitalizing on the positive potential inherent in functionally diverse teams, opening the black box between cross-functionality and team innovation by analysing mediating and moderating processes thus seems to be highly relevant. In this article, task and relationship conflicts are introduced as mediators of functional diversity and team innovation. Within this framework, transformational leadership is discussed as a moderator. It will become apparent that the role of transformational leadership in fostering the innovativeness of cross-functional teams is rather ambiguous. The discussed mediators and the moderator transformational leadership are integrated into a comprehensive framework and propositions for future research are derived.     

The coordination of shoulder girdle muscles during repetitive arm movements at either slow or fast pace among women with or without neck-shoulder pain

Purpose: The aim of this study was to evaluate the coordination of the shoulder girdle muscles among subjects with or without neck-shoulder pain performing repetitive arm movement at either a slow or fast pace. Methods: Thirty female adults were allocated to one of two groups—healthy controls or cases with neck-shoulder pain. Surface electromyography (sEMG) signals from the clavicular, acromial, middle and lower trapezius portions and the serratus anterior muscles were recorded during a task performed for 20 min at a slow pace and 20 min at a fast pace. The root mean square (RMS), relative rest time (RRT) and normalised mutual information (NMI, an index of functional connectivity between two muscles in a pair) were computed. Results: No significant differences on RMS, RRT and NMI were found between groups. For both groups, the fast movement pace resulted in increased levels of RMS, lower degrees of RRT and higher NMI compared to the slow pace. No interaction between group and movement pace was found. Conclusions: This study highlights the change in sEMG activity of muscles to meet the demands of performing a task at fast movement pace. The fast pace imposed a higher muscle demand evidenced by increased sEMG amplitude, low degree of muscle rest and increased functional connectivity for subjects in both the case and control groups. No indication of impaired sEMG activity was found in individuals with neck-shoulder pain.     

Dynamical structure of center-of-pressure trajectories with and without functional taping in children with cerebral palsy level I and II of GMFCS

Postural control during quiet standing was examined in typical children (TD) and children with cerebral palsy (CP) level I and II of GMFCS. The immediate effect on postural control of functional taping on the thighs was analyzed. We evaluated 43 TD, 17 CP children level I, and 10 CP children level II. Participants were evaluated in two conditions (with and without taping). The trajectories of the center of pressure (COP) were analyzed by means of conventional posturography (sway amplitude, sway-path-length) and dynamic posturography (degree of twisting-and-turning, sway regularity). Both CP groups showed larger sway amplitude than the TD while only the CP level II showed more regular COP trajectories with less twisting-and-turning. Functional taping didn’t affect sway amplitude or sway-path-length. TD children exhibited more twisting-and-turning with functional taping, whereas no effects on postural sway dynamics were observed in CP children. Functional taping doesn’t result in immediate changes in quiet stance in CP children, whereas in TD it resulted in faster sway corrections. Children level II invest more attention in postural control than level I, and TD. While quiet standing was more automatized in children level I than in level II, both CP groups showed a less stable balance than TD.     

EEG and fMRI agree: Mental arithmetic is the easiest form of imagery to detect

fMRI and EEG during mental imagery provide alternative methods of detecting awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) without reliance on behaviour. Because using fMRI in patients with DOC is difficult, studies increasingly employ EEG. However, there has been no verification that these modalities provide converging information at the individual subject level. The present study examined simultaneous EEG and fMRI in healthy volunteers during six mental imagery tasks to determine whether one mental imagery task generates more robust activation across subjects; whether activation can be predicted from familiarity with the imagined activity; and whether EEG and fMRI converge upon the same conclusions about individual imagery performance. Mental arithmetic generated the most robust activation in the majority of subjects for both EEG and fMRI, and level of activation could not be predicted from familiarity, with either modality. We conclude that overall, EEG and fMRI agree regarding individual mental imagery performance.     

A generalization of Piéron's law to include background intensity and latency distribution

Piéron's law, which formulates the effect of the signal intensity i on the mean or the median reaction time (MRT) as a power function, MRT=R+i^-βC, in which R, β and C are positive parameters, is of much interest in the simple reaction time literature. In particular, consistent estimates of β are obtained. However, this law offers no information regarding the effect of the signal intensity on other aspects of the reaction time distribution. In addition, the background intensity, which also has some impact on the detectability of the signal, is not considered in Piéron's law. In this paper, we generalize Piéron's law based on the above comments. That is, we assume that both β and C are functions of the background intensity and of the percentile rank. We then investigate from a theoretical viewpoint some possible functional forms of β and C, with a special emphasis on the dependency of β on the background intensity. It is shown that the so-called “Fechner-Thurstone-type representation” forces β and C to be “separable.” If we further assume a near-miss to Weber's law-type representation, then the functional form of β can be determined.     

The scientific use of ‘representation’ and ‘function’: avoiding explanatory vacuity

Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity. Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection fatal to that theory. My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’ by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion of function. However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’ must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task.     

Nature and facts about natural and artifactual categories: Sex differences in the semantic priming paradigm

There is abundant evidence from behavioral and neurophysiological experiments for the distinction of natural versus artifactual categories and a gender-specific difference: women’s performances in cognitive tasks increase when natural categories are used, whereas men’s performances increase with artifactual categories. Here, we used the semantic priming paradigm to study retrieval processes by presenting category labels as primes and exemplars as targets. Overall, in two experiments we found larger priming effects for natural than for artifactual categories. In addition, females showed positive priming effects for natural but negative effects for artifactual categories, whereas males showed positive priming effects for both categories. This pattern matches with that from other tasks and can be interpreted as evidence that the findings from these other tasks are, at least partially, indeed due to different representations or processing modes for males and females and not (exclusively) due to—for example—different familiarity with a category. In a further experiment, we showed that the found pattern for females can be manipulated by focusing on perceptual vs. functional features. The results can be interpreted as first evidence that there are (eventually in addition to different “crystallized” semantic structures) specific default processing modes that differ for males and females.     

Comparative Evaluations

My response to Engelmann (2008) will be based on several questions that will allow both its author and the general reader to determine whether the assumptions I make as an interpreter of this complex paper are congruent or incongruent with their own interpretations of the text. The interpretations by the writer, by any commentator, and the diverse interpretations of a general audience together with my own interpretations will, I hope, facilitate some fruitful ‘comparative evaluations.’ I articulate my inferences of the most dense part of the paper, namely the ‘concrete immediate Consciousness and the developing absent outside.’ My hope is to address Engelmann’s question: “Am I in a better disposition to judge modern theories of consciousness?” The last section of my response spells out more personal comments to my all too brief and single encounter with Arno Engelmann. It is there that Arno Engelmann’s fascinating statement “I am a citizen of the world” is addressed through its counterparts in my life.