Weigh(t)ing for Awareness

We wished to learn if weight perception can be extinguished by studying two patients with right hemisphere brain damage. When lifting weights simultaneously, a patient with right frontal damage was not biased in her judgments of which weight was heavier. By contrast, a patient with right parietal damage reported left-sided weights as being lighter than those on the right. Psychophysical power functions revealed that her awareness of increasing weights on the left was dampened compared to the right when lifting weights individually on each side. Strikingly, her awareness of weight changes on the left was completely abolished when she lifted weights in both hands simultaneously. She demonstrated an unusual split in awareness, being motorically aware of and actively engaged with left-sided weights while being unaware of their incremental changes.     

Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems—these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness.     

The unity of consciousness in pre-psychotic states. A phenomenological analysis / La unidad de la conciencia en estados pre-psicóticos. Un análisis fenomenológico

This paper explores the way in which the phenomenon called delusional moods — an alteration of consciousness that characterizes the moment that precedes the adoption of delusional beliefs — would challenge the claim that consciousness is necessarily deployed as an experiential unity. After exploring three basic characterizations of the unity of consciousness, it is concluded that during delusional moods only some of them are completely altered. Finally, after complementing the analysis with the examination of some psychotic states, it is concluded that, from the three dimensions of the unity of consciousness that are explored, only one seems to be fundamental.     

Nietzsche's Pluralism about Consciousness

In this paper I argue that Nietzsche's view on consciousness is best captured by distinguishing different notions of consciousness. In other words, I propose that Nietzsche should be read as endorsing pluralism about consciousness. First, I consider the notion that is preeminent in his work and argue that the only kind of consciousness which may fit the characterization Nietzsche provides of this dominant notion is self-consciousness (^Sconsciousness). Second, I argue that in light of Nietzsche's treatment of perceptions and sensations we should conclude that he takes each of such state types to involve a specific kind of consciousness which differs from ^Sconsciousness. I label these two additional kinds of consciousness perceptual consciousness (^Pconsciousness) and qualitative consciousness (^Qconsciousness), respectively. I conclude the paper with some remarks on how, in Nietzsche's picture, these three different kinds of consciousness might relate.     

大学生人格特质对道德认同的影响：法律意识的调节作用

为探讨大学生人格特质与道德认同的关系,及其法律意识在二者关系之间的调节作用,采用法律意识量表、道德认同量表和大五人格量表对1878名大学生进行了调查。结果显示：(1)尽责性、宜人性、开放性和外向性与道德认同、法律意识呈显著的正相关;神经质与道德认同、法律意识呈显著的负相关。(2)人格特质、道德认同、法律意识表现出了显著的性别差异,同时尽责性对道德认同的影响也存在着显著的性别差异。(3)法律意识在尽责性与宜人性对大学生道德认同的影响中起着负向调节作用。本研究结果提示,应该尊重人格特质的个体特异性,在高校进行专业的法制教育和法律意识培养,提高个体的道德认同水平。     

The Concept of Intermediate Existence in the Early Buddhist Theory of rebirth

This article investigates the concept of intermediate existence in the early Buddhist theory of rebirth. The main sources investigated for this article are the Pāli canonical and commentarial literature. My main thesis is that early Buddhist discourses contain instances that suggest a spatial-temporal gap between death and rebirth known as ‘intermediate existence’ (antarābhava), in contrast to the idea of Theravāda Buddhist theory that rebirth takes place immediately without a spatial-temporal gap. In order to prove this, I argue that the ‘one who liberates in interval’ (anarāparinibbāyī) attains Nibbāna in the intermediate existence and the concept of gandhabbā in early Buddhist discourses refers to a being in intermediate existence, not to a dying consciousness (cuti-viññāna), and there are indirect inferences to an spatiotemporal gap between death and rebirth in the early Buddhist discourses.     

Ramseyan humility: the response from revelation and panpsychism

David Lewis argues for Ramseyan humility, the thesis that we can’t identify the fundamental properties that occupy the nomological roles at our world. Lewis, however, remarks that there is a potential exception to this, which involves assuming two views concerning qualia (i) panphenomenalism (contemporary panpsychism): all instantiated fundamental properties are qualia and (ii) the identification thesis (revelation): we can know the identities of our qualia simply by being acquainted with them. This paper aims to provide an exposition, as well as an assessment, of this response to the humility thesis.