论尼采对启蒙话语的挪用

尼采的很多言词都容易被误解,尤其他笔下的创造、自由、上帝死了这些启蒙话语;其实,这些话语在尼采的思想整体中有特殊含义。尼采对这些话语的使用,是一种挪用;通过将其作为自己的修辞面具,尼采一方面隐微地表达了自己的思想,同时也表达了对现代启蒙知识人的特定态度。     

Ratiovitalistic hermeneutics and sport in the perspective of Ortega y Gasset

This work aims to show, in the first place, that the ratiovitalism of Jose Ortega y Gasset is one of the possible lines of the hermeneutic transformation process of contemporary thinking. Nietzsche’s hermeneutical mark on the development of Ortega’s thinking is clear in some very relevant aspects, such as the importance of the body and the innovative notion of life, both of which are decisive issues to understand sport. Secondly, an attempt is made to tap into the rich reflections of Ortega y Gasset on sport, which have a considerable impact on the entire human life, based on the claim of a notion of living body (Leib) and of a new notion of life. Sport forms part of a vital horizon that is not reduced by the narrow utilitarian perspective, but which announces the superior form of human existence, opening up to a festival and creative meaning of life. This requires a discipline that is not merely satisfied with correctly complying with some standards, but which encourages indefinite improvement. The attribute of sport is creative vitality, a new way of understanding life. Because, based on this new vital perspective, homo oeconomicus can no longer be used as a model, but rather, the vital phenomenon understood in a sporting manner is festival, joyful, creative, agonal and Olympic, freely vigorous, a meaningful source of energy. Life is, in principle, creation, a creative experiment, as in the Nietzschean conception.     

PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE TODAY

This essay discusses the possibility, relevance, and pertinence of a reactivation of philosophy as a way of life today on the basis of Pierre Hadot’s account and recent scholarly approaches to the topic. In the wake of John Sellars, it regards philosophy as a way of life as a metaphilosophical option that can still be applied today. The essay starts by addressing John Cooper’s criticism of philosophy as a way of life in the contemporary philosophical landscape and shows that, against the background of the model defined by Hadot, Cooper’s objections do not apply. It then illustrates the clear expression of the model in contemporary philosophy through the particular case of Nietzsche. It concludes by outlining some of the considerations that, in the wake of Hadot, Sellars, Michael Chase, and others, might persuade researchers, teachers, and academics to embrace philosophy as a way of life in their work and lives.     

Zu Einem Methodologischen Interpretationskonstruktionismus

Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, there is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level.     

Creativity and genius as epistemic virtues: Kant and early post-Kantians on the teachability of epistemic virtue

There is a classical paradox in education that also affects the epistemic virtues: the paradox inherent in the demand to develop general strategies for training persons to be free and creative individuals. This problem becomes particularly salient with respect to the epistemic virtue of creativity, the more so if we consider a radical form of creativity, namely, genius. This paper explores a historical constellation in which rigorous claims about the standards for knowledge and morality were developed, along with a highly influential notion of genius: the philosophy of Kant and of immediate post-Kantian philosophers. The paper shows how in this historical moment came together a new notion of “science,” a theory of “genius” and of virtues, and an analysis of the promises and difficulties inherent in educating a virtuous or creative individual. In this constellation of ideas, there also emerges a potentially fruitful account of how to teach intellectual creativity.     

Discarding the Barthian Spectacles: Part I, Recent Scholarship on the History of Early 20th Century German Protestant Theology

Abstract :  This essay introduces "the veritable renaissance" of scholarly attention devoted to the theologies of the early twentieth century. This "renaissance" challenges us to discard the "Barthian spectacles" through which we have been reading the theological history of this time and to examine more closely the complex context—social, political, churchly, cultural—in which theology was done.     

DOWN TO EARTH WITH NIETZSCHE: The ethical effects of attitudes toward time and body

This paper is about the effects on people's lives of their attitudes towards time and their own embodiment. People commonly see time as biform; there is the time of bodily life and the eternal time which transcends mortal life. This division is deeply implicated in the dualistic values that pervade western thought. So, when Nietzsche substitutes a monist notion of time, he profoundly unsettles our cherished values (which, of course, are gendered). Nietzsche's major thrust, I argue, is to elucidate and advocate the more appropriate values that emerge when human existence is understood as entirely earthborn.I use two contrasting literary characters to show concretely how people's lives and relationships are affected negatively or positively according to the temporal perspectives they adopt (and thus the significance they give to their corporeality). I explain how acceptance of human finitude enables a fruitful and rewarding life, while its refusal is life-diminishing. This also makes conceivable a realm beyond gender.     

Nietzsche on morality as a “sign language of the affects”

Abstract

This article argues that Nietzsche’s meta-ethics is basically a form of sentimentalism (as opposed to cognitivism), but a form of sentimentalism that includes cognitive components in the sentiments that are involved. The article also ascribes to Nietzsche the more original position that the moral sentiments in question vary dramatically between historical periods, cultures, and even individuals, sometimes indeed to the point of becoming inverted between one case and another. Finally, the article also attributes to Nietzsche a hermeneutic insight into certain problems that this situation causes for the accurate interpretation of other people’s (moral) viewpoints. Along the way, the article in addition argues that Nietzsche’s positions on all these issues were molded not only by such well-known influences as Paul Rée and Hume, but also, and indeed more strongly, by Herder (and Hegel), and it develops some grounds for thinking that the positions in question are highly plausible ones.