QUANTUM PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD: INSIGHTS FROM WOLFGANG PAULI

Abstract. Nobel Laureate in physics Wolfgang Pauli studied philosophy and the history of ideas intensively, especially in his later years, to form an accurate ontology vis-à-vis quantum theory. Pauli's close contacts with the Swiss psychiatrist C.G. Jung gave him special qualifications for also understanding the basic problems of empirical knowledge. After Pauli's sudden death in 1958, this work was maintained mainly in his posthumously published correspondence, which so far extends only to 1939. Because Pauli's view differs essentially from the direction physics research took after the deaths of the founding fathers of quantum theory, this article attempts to describe the main features in Pauli's revolutionary thought, which is based on nature's "epistemological lesson" as revealed by Pauli's atomic research. Pauli's conclusions have important implications for various issues in Western culture, not least with the limits of science and the relation of science to religion.     

Molar versus local reinforcement probability as determinants of stimulus value.

During one component of a multiple schedule, pigeons were trained on a discrete-trial concurrent variable-interval variable-interval schedule in which one alternative had a high scheduled rate of reinforcement and the other a low scheduled rate of reinforcement. When the choice proportion between the alternatives matched their respective relative reinforcement frequencies, the obtained probabilities of reinforcement (reinforcer per peck) were approximately equal. In alternate components of the multiple schedule, a single response alternative was presented with an intermediate scheduled rate of reinforcement. During probe trials, each alternative of the concurrent schedule was paired with the constant alternative. The stimulus correlated with the high reinforcement rate was preferred over that with the intermediate rate, whereas the stimulus correlated with the intermediate rate of reinforcement was preferred over that correlated with the low rate of reinforcement. Preference on probe tests was thus determined by the scheduled rate of reinforcement. Other subjects were presented all three alternatives individually, but with a distribution of trial frequency and reinforcement probability similar to that produced by the choice patterns of the original subjects. Here, preferences on probe tests were determined by the obtained probabilities of reinforcement. Comparison of the two sets of results indicates that the availability of a choice alternative, even when not responded to, affects the preference for that alternative. The results imply that models of choice that invoke only obtained probability of reinforcement as the controlling variable (e.g., melioration) are inadequate.     

Evaluation of human consciousness level by means of “automated fluctuation analysis” of high frequency electroencephalogram fitted by double Lorentzians

Since Berger’s discovery of the electroencephalogram (EEG), its analysis has been generally restricted to the visual range (upmost 100Hz) and has ignored higher frequency components. One reason should be that there are no reliable methods to distinguish the brain potentials from muscle activity. We have introduced fluctuation analysis, which is popular method especially in the field of basic physiology to clinical electrophysiology. In our previous study, it was declared that power spectral density (PSD) of human high frequency EEG was composed of double Lorentzians and vanished into white level within 1kHz. Then the purpose of this study is to elucidate the “Automated Fluctuation Analysis,” which enables us to evaluate these higher frequency components and its physiological meaning especially focused on conscious level from wakefulness to sleep stage 1. Seventy-four scalp recording EEGs in twenty normal subjects were studied. In short, “Automated Fluctuation Analysis” is made of three steps: amplification of EEG signal, A/D conversion and Fast Fourier Transform by signal processor and extraction of Lorentzian parameters. PSD of high frequency EEG was displayed on log-log graph and the algorithm fit to the following Lorentzian formula were mathematically based on Brown & Dennis. S(f)=S1/ [1+(f/fc₁)²] + S2/ [1+(f/fc₂)²], where S(f) is PSD (μ V²/Hz) at each frequency (f;Hz), S1 and S2 are the plateau level or zero-frequency power of the initial and second Lorentz, and fc₁ and fc₂ are the corner or half-power frequency of the initial and second Lorentz, respectively. As results, during wakefulness the PSD of high frequency EEG activity was composed of double Lorentzian fluctuations and the power distribution of S1 value in topographical display was frontal dominant. This pattern of S1 value disappeared and S2 value became lower during sleepiness and the second Lorentz disappeared during sleep.     

Danger and usefulness are detected early in auditory lexical processing: evidence from electroencephalography

Visual emotionally charged stimuli have been shown to elicit early electrophysiological responses (e.g., [Ihssen et al., 2007], [Schupp et al., 2003] and [Stolarova et al., 2006]). We presented isolated words to listeners, and observed, using generalized additive modeling, oscillations in the upper part of the delta range, the theta range (Bastiaansen & Hagoort, 2003), and the lower part of the alpha range related to degree of (rated) danger and usefulness (Wurm, 2007) starting around 150 ms and continuing to 350 ms post stimulus onset. A negative deflection in the oscillations tied to danger around 250-300 ms fits well with a similar negativity observed in the same time interval for visual emotion processing. Frequency and competitor effects emerged or reached maximal amplitude later, around or following the uniqueness point. The early effect of danger, long before the words’ uniqueness points, is interpreted as evidence for the dual pathway theory of LeDoux (1996).     

Protecting Against Low‐Probability Disasters: The Role of Worry

We carry out a large monetary stakes insurance experiment with very small probabilities of losses and ambiguous as well as exact probabilities. Many individuals do not want to pay anything for insurance whether the probabilities are given exactly or are ambiguous. Many others, however, are willing to pay surprisingly large amounts. With ambiguity, the percentage of those paying nothing is smaller and the willingness to pay (WTP) of the other individuals larger than with exact probabilities. Comparing elasticities with ambiguity, we find that worry is much more important than subjective probability in determining WTP for insurance. Furthermore, when the ambiguous loss probability is increased by a factor of 1000, it has almost no effect on WTP. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making

Although the law assumes a close relation between the probability that a defendant committed the act in question and the ensuing verdict of the jurors, prior research has shown this assumption to be often violated. We present five experiments designed to show that factors that influence probability also influence verdict, but other factors are capable of directly producing changes in verdict without affecting probability. In Experiment 1, we replicated the Wells Effect; scenarios generating the same probability that the Blue Bus Company was to blame for the same accident, nevertheless, generated significantly different likelihoods of finding the defendant liable. In Experiment 2, we showed that equally diagnostic affirmative and negative evidence had differential effects on mock jurors' probability estimates and verdicts. In Experiment 3, we showed that a completely nondiagnostic witness, who either implicates the same bus company or a different bus company as did a diagnostic witness, significantly influenced mock jurors' verdicts. However, the nondiagnostic witness did not change the probability that the Blue Bus Company was responsible for the accident. In Experiment 4, we demonstrated that base rate and witness reliability information resulted in very similar probability estimates but radically different verdicts. In Experiment 5, we showed that a change in the diagnosticity of the evidence influenced both probability and verdict with the former mediating differences in the later. Because probability is only one of the several determinants of the verdict, the two dependent variables are not as closely related as the law presumes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Instance‐based Learning: A General Model of Repeated Binary Choice

A common practice in cognitive modeling is to develop new models specific to each particular task. We question this approach and draw on an existing theory, instance‐based learning theory (IBLT), to explain learning behavior in three different choice tasks. The same instance‐based learning model generalizes accurately to choices in a repeated binary choice task, in a probability learning task, and in a repeated binary choice task within a changing environment. We assert that, although the three tasks are different, the source of learning is equivalent and therefore, the cognitive process elicited should be captured by one single model. This evidence supports previous findings that instance‐based learning is a robust learning process that is triggered in a wide range of tasks from the simple repeated choice tasks to the most dynamic decision making tasks. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How fast can you (possibly) do it,or how long will it (certainly) take? Communicating uncertain estimates of performance time

Recent research on verbal probability statements has revealed that some expressions (e.g., possible) are especially appropriate for describing outcomes in the high end of a distribution, whereas other expressions (e.g., certain) are more appropriate for describing low-end values. However, some dimensions appear to be reversible, with higher achievements sometimes associated with high and sometimes with low values, depending on frame. We report three experiments where this “reframing effect” is studied in communications of estimated performance time, both from a speaker's and from a listener's perspective. We hypothesize that statements describing tasks as “taking time” suggest a duration frame, and find accordingly that statements about how many hours that possibly will be spent on a task, or the time a task possibly takes, lead to high time estimates. Statements focusing on the actor's role suggest, in contrast, a speed frame, thus statements about what the actor can possibly do lead to low time estimates. Estimates of the time a task certainly takes or when it is certainly done follow the opposite pattern. The results are in line with approaches that see production and comprehension of language as a dynamical and context-driven process.