Learning in reverse: Eight-month-old infants track backward transitional probabilities

Numerous recent studies suggest that human learners, including both infants and adults, readily track sequential statistics computed between adjacent elements. One such statistic, transitional probability, is typically calculated as the likelihood that one element predicts another. However, little is known about whether listeners are sensitive to the directionality of this computation. To address this issue, we tested 8-month-old infants in a word segmentation task, using fluent speech drawn from an unfamiliar natural language. Critically, test items were distinguished solely by their backward transitional probabilities. The results provide the first evidence that infants track backward statistics in fluent speech.     

How strong is the comparison‐to‐the‐strongest heuristic?: An empirical test of the comparison‐ to‐the‐strongest heuristic in probability judgment1,2

Abstract: Windschitl and Wells (1998 ) proposed that the pairwise comparison between the focal and strongest alternative outcomes plays an important role in probability judgment. However, their studies did not control the effects of alternative outcomes other than the strongest one. This article tested whether only the strongest alternative outcome would affect probability judgment, using a variable selection method in a multiple regression analysis. Study 1 reanalyzed the results of Windschitl and Young (2001 ) and showed that only the strongest alternative outcome affects probability judgment. In Study 2, a new experiment was conducted to modify the methodological problems in Study 1. The results of Study 2 were identical to those of Study 1. All these results consistently supported the comparison hypothesis.     

Delay, Probability, and Social Discounting in A Public Goods Game

A human social discount function measures the value to a person of a reward to another person at a given social distance. Just as delay discounting is a hyperbolic function of delay, and probability discounting is a hyperbolic function of odds-against, social discounting is a hyperbolic function of social distance. Experiment 1 obtained individual social, delay, and probability discount functions for a hypothetical $75 reward; participants also indicated how much of an initial $100 endowment they would contribute to a common investment in a public good. Steepness of discounting correlated, across participants, among all three discount dimensions. However, only social and probability discounting were correlated with the public-good contribution; high public-good contributors were more altruistic and also less risk averse than low contributors. Experiment 2 obtained social discount functions with hypothetical $75 rewards and delay discount functions with hypothetical $1,000 rewards, as well as public-good contributions. The results replicated those of Experiment 1; steepness of the two forms of discounting correlated with each other across participants but only social discounting correlated with the public-good contribution. Most participants in Experiment 2 predicted that the average contribution would be lower than their own contribution.     

BIS/BAS responses to emotional cues: Self report, autonomic measure and alpha band modulation

The study explored the effect of the subjective evaluation and of BIS/BAS (Behavioral Inhibition and Activation System) differences on psychophysiological and brain oscillation measures, in response to pleasant/unpleasant and high/low arousing stimuli. Skin conductance response, heart rate, and electromyography, and alpha frequency band, were registered, during viewing IAPS figures. Both BIS and BAS measures were significant in modulating behavioral, autonomic and brain responses, with a clear dichotomy BAS-appetitive/positive BIS-withdrawal/negative sensitivity. Withdrawal (BIS) and appetitive (BAS) behavior showed opposite patterns of responses by the subjects within the frontal cortical site more than other sites. In addition, a specific frontal lateralization effect was found as a function of BIS (more right-side activation for negative cues) and BAS (more left-side activation for positive cues). Moreover, autonomic variables and frequency band were found to be effected by arousal rating per se, with an increased response to high arousal in comparison with low arousal and neutral stimuli. The effects of subjective evaluation and individual differences were discussed in the light of the coping activity of emotion comprehension.     

Linda问题:"齐当别"抉择模型的解释

大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理.Tversky和Kahneman(1983)使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因.然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清.该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li(1994,2004)提出的不确定情形下决策理论--"齐当别"抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释.     

四卡问题解决中的内容与逻辑分析效应

选取条件概率(P(Q|P))由低到高的四个命题作为四卡问题中的检验规则,探讨了大学生被试对四张卡片的逻辑证明作用的推断能力及其对解决四卡问题的影响。结果发现:(1)不同条件概率的命题之间正确选择P-Q的人数百分比不存在显著差异,命题的条件概率因素对四卡问题的正确解决没有影响。(2)逻辑分析过程对四卡问题的正确解决产生了一定的抑制作用,这可能是因为被试不能从整体上思考四张卡片在命题检验中的逻辑作用的缘故。(3)一些被试即使在逻辑分析过程中表现出知道-Q卡片的证伪作用,仍然倾向于选择卡片Q而非-Q,这一现象再次证实了人类思维的非形式逻辑的一面。     

动机的概率意义——概率归并定理与Monty Hall问题的非贝叶斯解

本文探讨Monty Hall问题认知困惑的形成因素。通过对该问题数学结构的分析,导出一个与该问题的解密切相关的定理——概率归并定理;并依据该定理给出了Monty Hall问题的一种更直观的数学解。     

时间贴现的性质与脑机制

时间贴现是指个人对事件的价值量估计随着时间的流逝而下降的心理现象,它是行为选择理论的一个重要组成部分。着重介绍了时间贴现的数学模型（指数模型、双曲线模型族、非双曲线模型）、时间贴现现象和概率贴现现象的联系、延迟兑现与提前兑现时间贴现不对称现象及其理论解释,还讨论了时间贴现现象的神经机制研究。提出了时间贴现未来研究的几个主要问题     

假言推理中的概率效应

近来Oaksford等人的研究表明,概率信息对假言推理的认知过程有着显著的影响,在一定程度上可以用它来解释和预测个体在推理中的行为反应。该文针对这种新的观点,就假言推理中所涉及的前后件概率信息、条件概率信息、连接概率信息、因果概率信息以及额外前提条件等对假言推理的影响分别做了简要的阐述,并介绍了一些相关的实验研究,最后作了总结和展望。     

Preferred Difficulty and Subjective Probability in Different Action Phases

Drawing on Gollwitzer's deliberative–implemental mindset distinction (P. M. Gollwitzer, 1990), it was predicted that people who are deliberating on different actions or goals would be more cautious or more realistic in their expectation of success in subsequent tasks than people who are going to implement a chosen action or goal. Participants were given a choice between different test-materials. They were interrupted before (deliberative) or immediately after decision-making (implemental). They then either had to choose between various levels of difficulty within one type of task (Experiment 1) or they had to predict their own future performance (Experiment 2). The results showed that deliberative participants preferred less difficult tasks and overestimated their probability of success less than implemental participants. In addition, deliberative participants referred more than implemental participants to their past performance when selecting levels of difficulty or predicting future performance; however, the two groups did not differ in actual performance. Taken together, the findings suggest that people are more realistic in a deliberative than in an implemental state of mind. The present studies extend prior research because for the first time they document mindset effects on peoples' estimates concerning their future performance in the achievement domain.