Writing,Reading, and Listening Differentially Overload Working Memory Performance Across the Serial Position Curve

Previous research has assumed that writing is a cognitively complex task, but has not determined if writing overloads Working Memory more than reading and listening. To investigate this, participants completed three recall tasks. These were reading lists of words before recalling them, hearing lists of words before recalling them, and hearing lists of words and writing them as they heard them, then recalling them. The experiment involved serial recall of lists of 6 words. The hypothesis that fewer words would be recalled overall when writing was supported. Post-hoc analysis revealed the same pattern of results at individual serial positions (1 to 3). However, there was no difference between the three conditions at serial position 4, or between listening and writing at positions 5 and 6 which were both greater than recall in the reading condition. This suggests writing overloads working memory more than reading and listening, particularly in the early serial positions. The results show that writing interferes with working memory processes and so is not recommended when the goal is to immediately recall information.     

Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition

The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and the accompanying conscious feeling of will (Libet et al., 1983; pg. 640). Here, we demonstrate that volitional movement can occur without an accompanying feeling of will. We additionally show that the neural processes indexed by RPs are insufficient to cause the experience of conscious willing. Specifically, RPs still occur when subjects make self-timed, endogenously-initiated movements due to a post-hypnotic suggestion, without a conscious feeling of having willed those movements.     

Influencing choice without awareness

Forcing occurs when a magician influences the audience’s decisions without their awareness. To investigate the mechanisms behind this effect, we examined several stimulus and personality predictors. In Study 1, a magician flipped through a deck of playing cards while participants were asked to choose one. Although the magician could influence the choice almost every time (98%), relatively few (9%) noticed this influence. In Study 2, participants observed rapid series of cards on a computer, with one target card shown longer than the rest. We expected people would tend to choose this card without noticing that it was shown longest. Both stimulus and personality factors predicted the choice of card, depending on whether the influence was noticed. These results show that combining real-world and laboratory research can be a powerful way to study magic and can provide new methods to study the feeling of free will.     

Unconscious manipulation of free choice by novel primes

The extent to which non-conscious perception can influence behaviour has been a topic of considerable controversy in psychology for decades. Although a challenging task, convincing empirical demonstrations have emerged suggesting that non-consciously perceived ‘prime’ stimuli can influence motor responses to subsequent targets. Interestingly, recent studies have shown that the influence of masked primes is not restricted to target-elicited responses, but can also bias free-choices between alternative behaviours. The present experiment extends these findings by showing that free-choices could also be biased by novel primes that never appeared as targets and therefore could not trigger acquired stimulus–response (S–R) mappings. This new evidence suggests that free-choice behaviour can be influenced by non-consciously triggered semantic representations. Furthermore, the results reported here support accounts of masked priming that posit an automatic semantic categorisation of non-consciously perceived visual stimuli.     

Semantic false memories in the form of derived relational intrusions following training

Contemporary behavior analytic research is making headway in characterizing memory phenomena that typically have been characterized by cognitive models, and the current study extends this development by producing "false memories" in the form of functional equivalence responding. A match-to-sample training procedure was administered in order to encourage participants to treat groups of unrelated English words as being interchangeable. Following training, participants were presented with a list of words from within one of the groups for a free recall test and a recognition test. Results showed that participants were more likely to falsely recall and recognize words that had been assigned to the same group as the list words during prior training, relative to words not assigned to the same group and relative to words that co-occurred with list words. These results indicate that semantic relatedness can be experimentally manipulated in order to produce specific false memories.     

Revisiting the rise and fall of false recall: Presentation rate effects depend on retention interval

Leading theories of false memory predict that veridical and false recall of lists of semantically associated words can be dissociated by varying the presentation speed during study. Specifically, as presentation rate increases from milliseconds to seconds, veridical recall is predicted to increase monotonically while false recall is predicted to show a rapid rise and then a slow decrease—a pattern shown by McDermott and Watson (2001) in a study using immediate recall tests. In three experiments we tested the generality of the effects of rapid presentation rates on veridical and false memory. In Experiments 1 and 2 participants exhibited high levels of false recall on a delayed recall test, even for very fast stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA)—contrary to predictions from leading theories of false memory. When we switched to an immediate recall test in Experiment 3 we replicated the pattern predicted by the theories and observed by McDermott and Watson. Follow-up analyses further showed that the relative output position of false recalls is not affected by presentation rate, contrary to predictions from fuzzy trace theory. Implications for theories of false memory, including activation monitoring theory and fuzzy trace theory, are discussed.     

Effects of language dominance on item and order memory in free recall,serial recall and order reconstruction

Spanish–English bilinguals (N = 144) performed free recall, serial recall and order reconstruction tasks in both English and Spanish. Long-term memory for both item and order information was worse in the less fluent language (L2) than in the more fluent language (L1). Item scores exhibited a stronger disadvantage for the L2 in serial recall than in free recall. Relative order scores were lower in the L2 for all three tasks, but adjusted scores for free and serial recall were equivalent across languages. Performance of English-speaking monolinguals (N = 72) was comparable to bilingual performance in the L1, except that monolinguals had higher adjusted order scores in free recall. Bilingual performance patterns in the L2 were consistent with the established effects of concurrent task performance on these memory tests, suggesting that the cognitive resources required for processing words in the L2 encroach on resources needed to commit item and order information to memory. These findings are also consistent with a model in which item memory is connected to the language system, order information is processed by separate mechanisms and attention can be allocated differentially to these two systems.     

Do Undergraduate Student Research Participants Read Psychological Research Consent Forms? Examining Memory Effects,Condition Effects,and Individual Differences

Although research has examined factors influencing understanding of informed consent in biomedical and forensic research, less is known about participants' attention to details in consent documents in psychological survey research. The present study used a randomized experimental design and found the majority of participants were unable to recall information from the consent form in both in-person and online formats. Participants were also relatively poor at recognizing important aspects of the consent form including risks to participants and confidentiality procedures. Memory effects and individual difference characteristics also appeared to influence recall and recognition of consent form information.     

Limitations of the Mnemonic-Keyword Method

The effectiveness of the mnemonic-keyword method was investigated in 4 experiments in which participants were required to learn the lst-language (L₁, Spanish) equivalents of a list of 30 2nd-language words (L₂, Latin). Experiments 1 (adolescents) and 2 (adults) were designed to assess whether the keyword method was more effective than the rote method; the researcher supplied the keyword, and the participants were allowed to pace themselves through the list. Experiments 3 (adolescents) and 4 (adults) were similar to Experiments 1 and 2 except that the participants were also supplied with a drawing that illustrated the relationship between the keyword and the L₁ target word. All the experiments were performed with groups of participants in their classrooms (i.e., not in a laboratory context). In all experiments, the rote method was significantly more effective than was the keyword method.     

A Cerebral Hyperventilation Index for Electroencephalography

This study was an attempt to determine the effect of drive on probability learning. Each of two groups of Ss was divided into high- and low-drive groups on the basis of MAS scores. Each S was given 200 trials on a probability learning task, with 70 per cent reinforcement on one side and 30 per cent reinforcement on the other. At the .05 level, there was no difference between groups in probability choices, and neither group differed from the objective probability scores. The results are discussed in terms of the number of trials involved, the introduction of emotional arousal, and Hullian theory. On the basis of a comparison with the results of previous studies, it was suggested that investigators be cautious in generalizing probability learning results from one species to another.