The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality

We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.

群体水平IRT模型及其应用——兼与IRT的比较

传统上,群体评估都是以个体的评估结果的平均值为基础进行的。而群体水平IRT理论则可以避开对个体的评估,直接实现对群体的评估,它具有许多传统方法难以企及的优点。本文将群体水平IRT模型应用于2007年某省高考英语阅读理解的410所学校的能力评估,评估结果发现：410所学校的英语阅读理解能力几乎都在[-1,1]区间内,没有能力极高或极低的学校。对这些学校而言,测验中所有项目的难度较易,区分度适中。所有的评估结果与IRT模型的评估结果在 的水平上相关显著,表明GIRT模型在实践中是可以选择的一种群体评估方法。     

Having a voice and getting a hearing: An educational perspective on free speech in a plural society

This paper examines Ronald Dworkin's claim that the right to free speech does not include a right to circumstances that encourage citizens to speak nor a right to competent and sympathetic understanding on the part of listeners. Drawing on familiar arguments for the existence of other human rights, the paper challenges Dworkin's claim. Even if, however, the challenge fails and it is not possible to show that there is such a right, that is not the end of the story. It is argued that democratic societies should try to foster conditions in which citizens are encouraged to speak and are listened to sympathetically in the interests of the well-being and flourishing of the polity. The important role education has to play in this is explored.     

Optimum examinee samples for item parameter estimation in item response theory: A multi-objective programming approach

This paper proposes a multi-objective programming method for determining samples of examinees needed for estimating the parameters of a group of items. In the numerical experiments, optimum samples are compared to uniformly and normally distributed samples. The results show that the samples usually recommended in the literature are well suited for estimating the difficulty parameters. Furthermore, they are also adequate for estimating the discrimination parameters in the three-parameter model, butnot for the guessing parameters.     

Specifying optimum examinees for item parameter estimation in item response theory

Information functions are used to find the optimum ability levels and maximum contributions to information for estimating item parameters in three commonly used logistic item response models. For the three and two parameter logistic models, examinees who contribute maximally to the estimation of item difficulty contribute little to the estimation of item discrimination. This suggests that in applications that depend heavily upon the veracity of individual item parameter estimates (e.g. adaptive testing or text construction), better item calibration results may be obtained (for fixed sample sizes) from examinee calibration samples in which ability is widely dispersed.This work was supported by Contract No. N00014-83-C-0457, project designation NR 150-520, from Cognitive Science Program, Cognitive and Neural Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research and Educational Testing Service through the Program Research Planning Council. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Maxine B. Kingston in carrying out this study, and to thank Charles Lewis for his many insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Effects of visual-field and matching instruction on event-related potentials and reaction time

Vertical letter pairs were presented randomly in the left and right visual hemifields in a physical identity match and name identity match condition. The reaction times showed a right visual field superiority for name matches, and a left visual field superiority for physical matches. Event-related potentials to letter pairs showed a sequence of three waves: a negative wave (N2, around 270 msec), a positive wave (P3, around 500 msec), and a broad positive slow wave (SW, around 600-700 msec), respectively. P3 and SW amplitudes were consistently larger at the left hemisphere than at the right hemisphere, regardless of the field of stimulation. At both hemispheres, N2 waves were always larger to stimuli presented in the visual field contralateral to a hemisphere than stimuli presented in the visual field ipsilateral to a hemisphere. The positive waves (P3, SW) showed the opposite pattern: smaller amplitudes to stimuli that were presented contralaterally than stimuli that were presented ipsilaterally to a given hemisphere. These results were attributed to a shift in sustained negativity on the directly stimulated hemisphere, relative to the indirectly stimulated hemisphere, reflecting either sensory at attentional processes in the posterior cerebral hemispheres.     

A psycho-ethical approach to personality disorders: The role of volitionality

The rupture between psychology and ethics has led to an oversimplification of the study of personality disorders (PD). We claim that an integrated view could enrich and widen the study of PD. This article is an attempt to reconceptualize PD from a psycho-ethical perspective, which includes the dimension of volitionality, to clarify how moral decisions can undermine psychological capacities and contribute, to a greater or lesser degree, to a progressive depersonalization. It is proposed that behaviors with a strong similarity with types of classical vicious character can be categorized into different typical PDs. Using the contributions of theorists who have described types of cognitive biases, in light of virtue epistemology and the underling motivation, we present an understanding of how vicious cognition develops, which is a step in the crystallization of vicious character. This approach, also, offers a distinction between disharmonic and fragmented personality that allows establishing different levels of severity from the psychological and ethical perspective.     

What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice?

Our concept of choice is integral to the way we understand others and ourselves, especially when considering ourselves as free and responsible agents. Despite the importance of this concept, there has been little empirical work on it. In this paper we report four experiments that provide evidence for two concepts of choice—namely, a concept of choice that is operative in the phrase having a choice and another that is operative in the phrase making a choice. The experiments indicate that the two concepts of choice can be differentiated from each other on the basis of the kind of alternatives to which each is sensitive. The results indicate that the folk concept of choice is more nuanced than has been assumed. This new, empirically informed understanding of the folk concept of choice has important implications for debates concerning free will, responsibility, and other debates spanning psychology and philosophy.     

Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation,Free Will,and Moral Responsibility

If someone brings about an outcome without intending to, is she causally and morally responsible for it? What if she acts intentionally, but as the result of manipulation by another agent? Previous research has shown that an agent's mental states can affect attributions of causal and moral responsibility to that agent , but little is known about what effect one agent's mental states can have on attributions to another agent. In Experiment 1, we replicate findings that manipulation lowers attributions of responsibility to manipulated agents. Experiments 2–7 isolate which features of manipulation drive this effect, a crucial issue for both philosophical debates about free will and attributions of responsibility in situations involving social influence more generally. Our results suggest that “bypassing” a manipulated agent's mental states generates the greatest reduction in responsibility, and we explain our results in terms of the effects that one agent's mental states can have on the counterfactual relations between another agent and an outcome.