Paired comparisons with individual differences

A model of Bradley-Terry type for paired comparisons is considered. In addition to the usual parameters, the model allows for individual parameters and corresponding parameters for the choice-alternatives. The model is applied to a set of data from a Danish investigation of the attitude of blue collar workers towards alternative social gains. The proposed model is finally compared to a model recently suggested by Schönemann and Wang.     

Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet’s clock

Is consciousness—the subjective awareness of the sensations, perceptions, beliefs, desires, and intentions of mental life—a genuine cause of human action or a mere impotent epiphenomenon accompanying the brain’s physical activity but utterly incapable of making anything actually happen? This article will review the history and current status of experiments and commentary related to Libet’s influential paper (Brain 106:623–664, 1983) whose conclusion “that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act …can and usually does begin unconsciously” has had a huge effect on debate about the efficacy of conscious intentions. Early (up to 2008) and more recent (2008 on) experiments replicating and criticizing Libet’s conclusions and especially his methods will be discussed, focusing especially on recent observations that the readiness potential (RP) may only be an “artifact of averaging” and that, when intention is measured using “tone probes,” the onset of intention is found much earlier and often before the onset of the RP. Based on these findings, Libet’s methodology was flawed and his results are no longer valid reasons for rejecting Fodor’s “good old commonsense belief/desire psychology” that “my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching.”.     

Do 5% changes around maximal lactate steady state lead to swimming biophysical modifications?

Our purpose was to examine the swimming biophysical responses at velocities (v) of 97.5, 100 and 102.5% of the maximal lactate steady state (MLSS). Ten elite female swimmers performed three-to-five 30-min constant tests at imposed paces to determine 97.5, 100 and 102.5%MLSS v. Gas exchange, blood lactate concentration ([La-]), stroke rate (SR) and v were determined during each test. The v values at 97.5, 100 and 102.5%MLSS were 1.21 ± 0.07, 1.24 ± 0.07 and 1.27 ± 0.07 m.s⁻¹, respectively. Oxygen uptake (V̇O₂) and Pulmonary ventilation (V̇E) increased as function of v. SR and stroke length (v/SR = SL) increased as a function of v. All measured variables were constant as a function of time at 97.5%MLSS and 100%MLSS. At 102.5%MLSS SR increased (3.5%) and stroke length (SL) decreased (3.5%) as a function of time. While V̇O₂ was constant at 102.5%MLSS, [La-] and V̇E increased as a function of time, suggesting hyperventilation, at v’s of 97.5%MLSS and 100%MLSS swimmers completed the 30 min swim in spite of decreased SL and increased SR. However, the decrease in SL and increased SF were accompanied by increased [La-] and V̇E and resulted in the inability of most swimmers to complete the 30 min swim presumably due to fatigue at 102.5%MLSS.     

What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?

Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features (e.g., requiring reasoning). We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were possible in a deterministic universe. Experiments 1 and 2 found that people's judgments about whether a behavior was compatible with determinism were not predicted by their judgments about whether that behavior relies on physical processes in the brain and body, is uniquely human, is unpredictable, or involves reasoning. Experiment 3, however, found that a distinction between what we call “active” and “passive” behaviors can explain people's judgments. Experiment 4 extended these findings, showing that we can measure this distinction in several ways and that it is robustly predicted by two different cues. Taken together, these results suggest that people carve up mentally guided behavior into two distinct types—understanding one type to be compatible with determinism, but another type to be fundamentally incompatible with determinism.     

Subjective correlates and consequences of belief in free will

Four studies measured or manipulated beliefs in free will to illuminate how such beliefs are linked to other aspects of personality. Study 1 showed that stronger belief in free will was correlated with more gratitude, greater life satisfaction, lower levels of perceived life stress, a greater sense of self-efficacy, greater perceived meaning in life, higher commitment in relationships, and more willingness to forgive relationship partners. Study 2 showed that the belief in free will was a stronger predictor of life satisfaction, meaning in life, gratitude, and self-efficacy than either locus of control or implicit person theory. Study 3 showed that experimentally manipulating disbelief in free will caused a reduction in the perceived meaningfulness of life. Study 4 found that inducing a stronger belief in free will caused people to set more meaningful goals for themselves. The possible concern that believers in free will simply claim all manner of positive traits was contradicted by predicted null findings with regard to sense of humor, empathy, and self-rated attractiveness. Taken together, the present studies show that the belief in free will is a strong predictor of several positive traits and outcomes.     

Compatibilism,Evil, and the Free-Will Defense

It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad possible worlds that are populated only by compatibilist free creatures. The primary thesis of this essay is that none of these propositions is true. This thesis is defended by appealing to a recently proposed novel, acausal, composite, unified theory of free action – the Theory of Middle Freedom – that evades the central problems plaguing traditional theories of metaphysical compatibilism.

Free Will in the Block Universe

Carl Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental determiner of other time slices. He concludes from this that our actions are free, insofar as they are pieces of time slices we may legitimately regard as fundamental determiners. However, I argue that Hoefer does not adequately deal with certain remaining problems. For one, there remain pervasive asymmetries in causation and the macroscopic efficacy of our actions. I suggest that what Hoefer may have shown us is that causation, not determinism, was the threat to free will all along. Additionally, Hoefer might avoid the problem of the asymmetry of macroscopic efficacy by noting we have a very small region of space-time completely determined by our choices. However, this move implies our freedom to act is freedom to do very little, given that the region is trivial. I suggest that Hoefer should instead claim that we do have pervasive macroscopic efficacy toward the past, though I am unsure of how well this thesis works. Regardless, there remains a problem that the inside-out perspective requires us to see our choices as brute facts or random occurrences. Attempts to resolve this problem seem to require either a theory of agent causation or a traditional compatibilist argument, making Hoefer’s thesis extraneous, unless he can show us that these require the inside-out perspective. However, Hoefer has not yet shown us this, so there is work to be done.

Who Deserves Faulty Products? How Blaming the Victim Prevents Consumer Punitive Action

A core requirement of a functioning free‐market system is that consumers hold companies accountable for selling faulty products. Following a harmful product failure, any blame that is incorrectly directed toward the victim may threaten consumer well‐being. Four experiments—in contexts of both fictitious and actual high‐profile product failures—show that this may in fact occur. The findings show that for a victim possessing immoral character: (a) consumers exaggerate blame because, (b) the victim is seen as deserving of suffering in general and, as a result, (c) consumers are less likely to take punitive action against the company (e.g., petition signing, negative word of mouth, and supporting financial justice). One field experiment and three online experiments converge to show that morality's effects are unique from other traits (e.g., sociability), but may be attenuated based on severity of harm to the victim and consumers’ own beliefs about justice. In sum, the current research furthers understanding of how and why victims are blamed, how doing so may threaten consumer and societal well‐being, and how it might be prevented.     

Social and individual factors modulate parent-infant interactions: Lessons from free play sessions in an Argentine sample

In this study, we aimed to explore the associations between socioeconomic status (SES) (i.e., parents’ education and occupation, quality of the home and overcrowding), temperament styles (i.e., surgency, negative emotionality and regulatory capacity) and early dyadic and triadic nonverbal communication behaviors. We recruited 60 mother-infant dyads (mean age: 10.89 months, range: 9–13 months) low-to-mid SES, and assessed the duration of their communication behaviors using the Bakeman and Adamson (1984); SES was measured using INDEC Scale (2001), and temperament was assessed using the Infant Behavior Questionnaire-Revised Very Short Form (IBQ-R VSF, Putnam et al., 2014). Results showed that SES and their subdimensions were positively associated with passive, coordinated joint engagement (coordinated attention to person and object) and surgency, and negative with infant passive observation. Also, there were positive correlations between negative emotionality and unengaged attention behavior. We conclude that SES contributed to parent-infant interactions and temperament style from early months of life. We interpret these findings in relation to early intervention approaches aimed at promoting cognitive and social development.     

“Escape from Freedom”: Authoritarianism-related traits,political ideology,personality, and belief in free will/determinism

Philosophers have long speculated that authoritarianism and belief in determinism are functionally related. To evaluate this hypothesis, we assessed whether authoritarianism and allied personality and political variables predict varieties of belief in determinism in three community samples (N₁ = 566 to 20,010; N₂ = 500; N₃ = 419). Authoritarianism and allied variables manifested moderate to large positive correlations with both fatalistic and genetic determinism beliefs. Controlling for political conservatism did not meaningfully attenuate these relations. Further, openness was negatively related to fatalistic determinism beliefs and agreeableness was negatively related to genetic determinism beliefs. Taken together, our findings clarify the nature of relations between authoritarianism and general personality, on the one hand, and free will/determinism beliefs, on the other, and suggest intriguing intersections between worldviews and personality traits.