Revisionism about free will: a statement &; defense

This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility.

The smart gut: Tracking affective associative learning with measures of “liking”, facial electromyography, and preferential looking

We demonstrate here that initially neutral items can acquire specific value based on their associated outcomes, and that responses of physiological systems to such previously meaningless stimuli can rapidly reflect this associative history. Each participant participated in an associative learning task in which four neutral abstract pictures were each repeatedly paired with one of four foods that varied in valence and magnitude. Over the course of learning, participants’ “liking” ratings of and preferences for each picture came to reflect the value of the food with which it was paired. The abstract pictures also elicited physiological responses characteristic of the foods with which they were paired, including changes in facial electromyography (EMG) and preferential looking. A logistic modeling procedure showed that learning parameters, such as the rate at which participants learned the values associated with the pictures, were similar across food outcomes of different value.     

A psychologically based taxonomy of Magicians’ forcing Techniques: How magicians influence our choices,and how to use this to study psychological mechanisms

Magicians have developed a wide range of techniques to influence and control spectators’ choices of such things as card, word, or number. These techniques are what is called forcing. The present paper develops a psychologically-based taxonomy of forcing techniques with two goals in mind. Firstly, it should help uncover the different psychological mechanisms that underlie forcing techniques. Secondly, it should facilitate knowledge transfer between magicians and psychologists. The main division present two basic categories that can be used as a way of focussing separately on (1) decision-making processes and external influences on choices, and (2) links between sense of agency over action and outcome as well as the illusion of control over this outcome. This taxonomy allows us to clearly differentiate between forces in which there is or is not a free choice, and whether this choice has an impact on the following events.¹     

Review for Cognitive Systems Research of the book The Brain and AI,by authors Karl Schlagenhauf and Fanji Gu

The human brain is often considered the most complex system known. It has a fantastic capacity to learn and remember, to recognize patterns in space and time, solve problems of all kinds, innovate tools and machines, create beautiful art and science. Is it reasonable to believe that we, in a foreseeable future, will be able to understand all the wonders of our own brain, enough to be able to mimic it and build artificial brains and minds that correspond to or even surpass the capacity of the human origin? Can we seriously believe that we (soon, or ever) will be able to build robots that know of and can reflect upon their own existence?This review of the book, The Brain and AI, deals with such issues, but in a very special way. It is written as a fascinating dialogue between the two authors, Chinese scientist Fanji Gu and German engineer Karl Schlagenhauf, where they discuss the development of neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI) with a critical examination of given “truths” in these fields. The Brain and AI is indeed worth reading for many reasons, regardless if you are a student or researcher in any of the many fields of science discussed here (e.g. physics, computer science, neuroscience, cognitive science psychology, social science), or if you are just interested in the current and future development of brain research and artificial intelligence. The book is both educating and entertaining and can be strongly recommended.     

Making punishment palatable: Belief in free will alleviates punitive distress

Punishing wrongdoers is beneficial for group functioning, but can harm individual well-being. Building on research demonstrating that punitive motives underlie free will beliefs, we propose that free will beliefs help justify punitive impulses, thus alleviating the associated distress. In Study 1, trait-level punitiveness predicted heightened levels of anxiety only for free will skeptics. Study 2 found that higher state-level incarceration rates predicted higher mental health issue rates, only in states with citizens relatively skeptical about free will. In Study 3, participants who punished an unfair partner experienced greater distress than non-punishers, only when their partner did not have free choice. Studies 4 and 5 confirmed experimentally that punitive desires led to greater anxiety only when free will beliefs were undermined by an anti-free will argument. These results suggest that believing in free will permits holding immoral actors morally responsible, thus justifying punishment with diminished negative psychological consequences for punishers.     

The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility

In this paper, we present the results of the construction and validation of a new psychometric tool for measuring beliefs about free will and related concepts: The Free Will Inventory (FWI). In its final form, FWI is a 29-item instrument with two parts. Part 1 consists of three 5-item subscales designed to measure strength of belief in free will, determinism, and dualism. Part 2 consists of a series of fourteen statements designed to further explore the complex network of people’s associated beliefs and attitudes about free will, determinism, choice, the soul, predictability, responsibility, and punishment. Having presented the construction and validation of FWI, we discuss several ways that it could be used in future research, highlight some as yet unanswered questions that are ripe for interdisciplinary investigation, and encourage researchers to join us in our efforts to answer these questions.     

Probing folk-psychology: Do Libet-style experiments reflect folk intuitions about free action?

There is an ongoing debate in philosophy and psychology about when one should consider an action to be free. Several aspects are frequently suggested as relevant: (a) a prior intention, (b) a conscious action-related thought, (c) prior deliberation, (d) a meaningful choice, (e) different consequences of the action, and (f) the duration between intention and action. Here we investigated which criteria laypeople adopt and thus probed their intuitions about free actions in three surveys based on daily life scenarios. First, our results indicate that laypeople consider a conscious intention important for an action to be free. Second, laypeople consider spontaneous actions without consequences to be freer than actions with prior deliberation. Third, laypeople consider proximal rather than distal intentions relevant when it comes to judging actions as free. Taken together, these results suggest that simple laboratory experiments on action choices reflect laypeople’s intuitions of free actions to a considerable degree.     

Risk Orientation,Risk Exposure,and Policy Opinions: The Case of Free Trade

This research offers a general framework for thinking about how individual disposition towards risk influences public policy opinions. Affinity for or aversion to risk is, in part, a stable personality characteristic that interacts with risk and reward messages in complex policy debates. We examine the implications of this for public opinions about free trade with extensions to immigration policy. We argue and find that opinions about policy depend jointly upon one's exposure to potential gains or losses and one's risk orientation. The findings have implications for crafting and framing public policies because they highlight how individual characteristics are likely to shape the public response to policy proposals. Our findings suggest that there may be limits, in the aggregate, to the degree to which elites can alter the level of support for policies through framing or through offering risk‐mitigating policy provisions.     

Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions

Five experiments suggested that everyday free will and moral responsibility judgments about some hypothetical thought examples differed from free will and moral responsibility judgments about the actual world. Experiment 1 (N = 106) showed that free will intuitions about the actual world measured by the FAD-Plus poorly predicted free will intuitions about a hypothetical person performing a determined action (r = .13). Experiments 2–5 replicated this result and found the relations between actual free will judgments and free will judgments about hypothetical determined or fated actions (rs = .22–.35) were much smaller than the differences between them (η_p² = .2–.55). These results put some pressure on theoretical accounts of everyday intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility.     

结构方程模型统计检验力分析：原理与方法

结构方程模型是心理学、管理学、社会学等学科中重要的统计工具之一。然而, 大量使用结构方程模型的研究忽视了对该方法的统计检验力进行必要的分析和报告, 在一定程度上降低了这些研究的结果的证明效力。结构方程模型的统计检验力分析方法主要有Satorra-Saris法、MacCallum法与Monte Carlo法三类。其中Satorra-Saris法适用于备择模型清晰、检验对象相对简单、检验方法基于χ²分布的情形; MacCallum法适用于基于χ²分布的模型拟合检验且备择模型不明的情形; Monte Carlo法适用于检验对象相对复杂、采用模拟或重抽样方法进行检验的情形。在实际应用中, 研究者应当首先判断检验的目的、方法以及是否有明确的备择模型, 并根据这些信息选择具体的分析方法。