Dogmatism and the distinctiveness of opposite vs. different cognitive systems: Release from proactive inhibition for shifts within- and between-dimensions of meaning

In a series of three experiments, encoding distinctiveness in a release from proactive inhibition paradigm was investigated as a function of dogmatism. Significant differences in release from proactive inhibition between high and low dogmatic individuals were found for shifts within meaning dimensions (from one end of a dimension to the other end) but not for shifts between different dimensions of meaning. The results were discussed in terms of the emphasis on belief vs. disbelief systems in dogmatism, motivational processes in cognition, and recent work on individual differences in social cognition.     

Pentecostals: The Power of the Powerless

Many researchers interpret Pentecostalism in terms of external factors such as European and North American history or economics. In this article Pentecostalism is examined from below, through qualitative interviews with women living in poverty in Santiago, Chile. The analysis shows how Pentecostalism led to a new theology where the believer became the subject of her own life. Social ascent was made through ecstatic experiences of the spirit in a caring community which directed the individual towards “a female ethos.” This subjective change affected social changes in Chile under dictatorship but not in state politics because parts of the Pentecostal hierarchy collaborated with Pinochet.     

拟社会互动在年幼儿童视频学习中的作用

本研究采用表征理解任务和规则学习任务,通过比较真人互动、视频拟互动和视频非互动三种条件下年幼儿童的学习效果,考察拟互动在2-5岁儿童视频学习中的作用。结果表明,2岁儿童的视频学习存在视频缺陷现象,2.5岁到5岁儿童的拟社会互动视频学习效果明显,优于非互动视频学习,与真人互动学习相当。2.5岁至4.5岁是拟互动视频学习的最佳年龄。     

Asymmetry in the detection of shapes from shading in infants1

Abstract: We investigated 3‐ and 4‐month‐old infants’ sensitivity to differences defined by shading using a paired‐comparison familiarity/novelty preference procedure. Infants were familiarized with a pair of displays consisting of homogeneous shaded disks, and then were tested with two displays: the familiar display and a novel one containing shaded disks with reversed polarity (defined as the target). Experiment 1 examined two assumptions on discerning shapes from shading in infants by manipulating the orientations in the shading gradient of stimuli. When the orientation of the shading gradient was vertical, 4‐month‐old infants looked at the novel display for a longer time during the test trial. However, they failed to detect differences when the orientation of shading gradients was horizontal. Three‐month‐old infants did not detect differences in either orientation of the shading gradient. Experiment 2 examined asymmetry in the detection of convex versus concave shapes. Four‐month‐old infants failed to detect the target when the orientation of the shading grating was vertical and the target was convex. Taken with the results of Experiment 1, concave shapes were much easier to detect than convex shapes for 4‐month‐olds. This asymmetry suggests that 4‐month‐old infants process shading information in the same manner as adults.     

The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist

We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest another approach for meta-methodology based on a conglomeration of tools and strategies (from statistical modeling, experimental design, and related fields) that affords forward looking procedures for learning from error and for controlling error. The resulting “error statistical” appraisal is empirical—methods are appraised by examining their capacities to control error. At the same time, this account is normative, in that the strategies that pass muster are claims about how actually to proceed in given contexts to reach reliable inferences from limited data.     

Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean “is-ought” dictum

Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be.     

Learning from Tolstoy: Forgetfulness and Recognition in Literary Edification

Philosophers have often applied a distinctively epistemic framework to the question of how moral knowledge can be derived from fictional literature, by considering how true propositions, or their argumentative support, can be the cognitive fruits of reading works of fiction. I offer an alternative approach. I focus not on whether readers fail to assent to the truth of a proposition or fail to provide it rational support. Instead, I focus on how readers fail to accord a truth (which they already accept) adequate importance in their web of beliefs about living a good human life. This is a form of ignorance, but in the form of neglect, or failure to pay proper regard – which is one sense of the term ‘forgetfulness’. I argue that works of fictional literature may, at times, stimulate audience members to overcome their own particular forms of forgetfulness in this respect. And I use Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich as a case in point.

Fischer’s Way: The Next Level

I present an analogy between analytic philosophy and a particular sort of computer game, and analyze some aspects of John Martin Fischer's My Way in the light of this analogy. I set out the different levels of the free will question, and explore how well Fischer does on them. On the compatibility level, he succeeds, in my view, in confronting the "metaphysical challenge" and the "manipulation challenge", but does less well with the "moral arbitrariness challenge". The compatibilist perspective captures only part of the moral and personal truth on the compatibility issue, and is shown to be inherently shallow. On the next levels we see that Fischer confronts particular dangers: the very virtues that make his minimalist position so resilient on the second (compatibility) level, render it too impoverished when it comes to the third, which asks about the very importance of taking moral responsibility seriously. Connecting to other positions (such as P.F. Strawson's version of naturalism) may be an imperative, but would also be risky. Likewise, on the fourth level, where we confront the difficulty of deciding how to deal with the previous conclusions, it is doubtful how well Fischer can do, given his previous philosophical commitments.

Free Choice

In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.     

教师课堂教学中的自我表露对学生评价的影响

采用2×3的被试间设计研究课堂教学中教师的自我表露对学生评价的影响.被试分别以视频(录音)形式观看(收听)无表露、表露个人成长经历、表露工作的讲座片断,并对讲座中教师进行评价.结果表明:(1)表露个人经历在视频组和录音组都表现出评价上的优势.(2)热情——冷淡维度,表露工作情况视频比录音评价更高;稳重-轻浮维度,无表露情况视频比录音评价更高.(3)录音组中,高年级对表露和无表露组的评价差距与低年级无显著差异.