Karl Schmitz-Moormann: Our Intellectual Legacy From a Great Mind

Karl Schmitz-Moormann's thought as expressed in his last book exemplifies Catholic theology based on realism, flow, evolution, and free will. Categories of creation are reviewed: from nothing, continuous, called forth, informed, and free.     

《周易正义》的刑罚适用原则探源

在严格区别《周易》、王弼《周易注》及《周易正义》三者不同思想的基础上,厘清《周易正义》所蕴含的法律思想是《周易正义》法律视角研究的当务之急。作为《周易正义》法律思想的表征体系,《周易正义》中的刑罚适用原则可简述为:区分故意与过失原则、轻刑原则、重刑原则。这些原则的形成有其特定的哲学基础。     

Knowledge despite falsehood

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.     

Prayer as a cause of recovery from illness

This research aimed to examine the developmental trajectory of the beliefs about the power of prayer to aide recovery from illness. One hundred and sixty children and young adults divided in four age groups participated in the study. Participants were interviewed with vignettes presenting two sick individuals who differed in terms of prayers that they received from their friends in order to recover from their illness. The results showed that children and pre-adolescents strongly believe in the power of prayer to recover from illness while only about half of the university students share this belief. Thus, contrary to the framework theory approach, children, adolescents, and young adults did not replace these beliefs (as naive explanations), with the scientific explanations. Instead, they continue to hold these beliefs in parallel to their scientific explanations.     

Observed Variability and Values Matter: Toward a Better Understanding of Information Search and Decisions from Experience

The search for different options before making a consequential choice is a central aspect of many important decisions, such as mate selection or purchasing a house. Despite its importance, surprisingly little is known about how search and choice are affected by the observed and objective properties of the decision problem. Here, we analyze the effects of two key properties in a binary choice task: the options' observed and objective values, and the variability of payoffs. First, in a large public data set of a binary choice task, we investigate how the observed value and variability relate to decision‐makers' efforts and preferences during search. Furthermore, we test how these properties influence the chance of correctly identifying the objectively maximizing option, and how they affect choice. Second, we designed a novel experiment to systematically analyze the role of the objective difference between the options. We find that a larger objective difference between options increases the chance for correctly identifying the maximizing option, but it does not affect behavior during search and choice. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Extreme Outcomes Sway Risky Decisions from Experience

Whether buying stocks or playing the slots, people making real‐world risky decisions often rely on their experiences with the risks and rewards. These decisions, however, do not occur in isolation but are embedded in a rich context of other decisions, outcomes, and experiences. In this paper, we systematically evaluate how the local context of other rewarding outcomes alters risk preferences. Through a series of four experiments on decisions from experience, we provide evidence for an extreme‐outcome rule, whereby people overweight the most extreme outcomes (highest and lowest) in a given context. As a result, people should be more risk seeking for gains than losses, even with equally likely outcomes. Across the experiments, the decision context was varied so that the same outcomes served as the high extreme, low extreme, or neither. As predicted, people were more risk seeking for relative gains, but only when the risky option potentially led to the high‐extreme outcome. Similarly, people were more risk averse for relative losses, but only when the risky option potentially led to the low‐extreme outcome. We conclude that in risky decisions from experience, the biggest wins and the biggest losses seem to matter more than they should. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the Decision to Explore New Alternatives: The Coexistence of Under‐ and Over‐exploration

The decision whether to explore new alternatives or to choose from familiar ones is implicit in many of our daily activities. How is this decision made? When will deviation from optimal exploration be observed? The current paper examines exploration decisions in the context of a multi‐alternative “decisions from experience” task. In each trial, participants could choose a familiar option (the status quo) or a new alternative (risky exploration). The observed exploration rates were more sensitive to the frequent outcome from choosing new alternatives than to the average outcome. That is, the implicit decision whether to explore a new alternative reflects underweighting of rare events: Over‐exploration was documented in “Rare Disasters” environments, and insufficient exploration was evident in “Rare Treasures” environments. In addition, the results reveal a decrease in exploration of new alternatives over time even when it is always optimal and some exploration even when it is never reinforcing. These results can be captured with models that share a distinction between “data collection” and “outcome‐driven” decision modes. Under the data collection mode, the decision maker collects information about the environment, to be used in future choices. Under the outcome‐driven mode, the decision maker relies on small samples of previous experiences with familiar versus unfamiliar alternatives, before the selection of a specific alternative. The predictive value of a two‐parameter “explorative sampler” quantification of these assumptions is demonstrated. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why neither diachronic universalism nor the Argument from Vagueness establishes perdurantism

One of the most influential arguments in favour of perdurantism is the Argument from Vagueness. The argument proceeds in three stages: The first aims to establish atemporal universalism. The second presents a parallel argument in favour of universalism in the context of temporalized parthood (‘diachronic universalism’). The third argues that diachronic universalism entails perdurantism. I offer a novel objection to the argument. I show that on the correct way of formulating diachronic universalism the principle does not entail perdurantism. On the other hand, if diachronic universalism is formulated as Sider (incorrectly) proposes, the argument fails to establish his principle, and thus perdurantism.     

Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition

The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and the accompanying conscious feeling of will (Libet et al., 1983; pg. 640). Here, we demonstrate that volitional movement can occur without an accompanying feeling of will. We additionally show that the neural processes indexed by RPs are insufficient to cause the experience of conscious willing. Specifically, RPs still occur when subjects make self-timed, endogenously-initiated movements due to a post-hypnotic suggestion, without a conscious feeling of having willed those movements.