为了更好地工作：工作恢复的内涵及实现机制

工作恢复是保障员工持续有效应对工作要求,支撑员工“更好地工作”的资源补充机制,也是近年来职业健康心理学研究中的一个热点主题。本文在澄清工作恢复概念的界定和梳理工作恢复影响因素的基础上,着重围绕工作恢复的实现机制进行了分析和探讨。最后,围绕工作恢复相关研究的现状及未来方向进行了总结和展望。     

Is Modernism Really Modern? Uncovering a Fallacy in Postmodernism

Some postmodernists criticize the view that the logics of Western thought can be employed universally. In doing so, they assume without adequate proof that different human societies have greatly different rationalities and employ completely different logics. This essay argues that, on the contrary, widely different cultures often share noteworthy similarities in rationality.     

“自杀”：一个重要的伦理问题

自杀现已成为人类死亡十大原因之一 ,而且呈现出低龄化的趋势 ,越来越引起社会的关注。因而 ,从政治、经济、社会、疾病、文化等多视角来寻找自杀的外部原因 ,对探究这个重要的伦理问题是有益的。     

贝叶斯推理中的“自击中率参照抑制”

本文旨在研究贝叶斯推理中基础比率、击中率起作用的机制。通过设置肝炎情境、中彩情境的贝叶斯推理问题,同时操作基础比率和击中率的水平,考察449名大学生被试的概率估计情况。结果表明,总体上,贝叶斯推理中的基础比率和击中率均起作用,表现为后验概率估计值随基础比率水平的提高而增加,随击中率水平的提高而增加。然而,在低基础比率的中彩情境中,后验概率估计值先随击中率的增加而增加;之后却随击中率水平的继续提高而显著降低,出现自击中率参照抑制。这似乎说明,击中率在贝叶斯推理中并非一致地起作用,而可能与推理者的知识经验对击中率加工的调节有关。     

吉备真备与唐代易学东传

吉备真备是日本奈良时期(中国唐代)著名的学者、政治家、军事家,是中日文化交流史上的重要人物。他在唐留学19年,将中国的许多重要典籍带回日本,促进了日本政治制度的建设与完善。同时,有史料证明他也是将易学传入日本的重要人物之一。本文通过日本史料解读唐代易学东传中吉备真备的作用及其对易学中占卜内容的态度等问题。     

儿童虐待与戒毒动机：自我概念的中介效应

本文旨在探讨戒毒人群儿童虐待情况,以及儿童虐待、自我概念和戒毒动机之间的关系。采用儿童虐待问卷、田纳西自我概念量表和戒毒动机问卷对771名（男520,女251）正在戒毒的人员进行调查。结果发现：（1）强制戒毒人群的儿童虐待现象比较普遍（56.7%）,特别是躯体忽视和情感忽视;（2）儿童虐待与自我概念、戒毒动机呈显著负相关,自我概念与戒毒动机呈显著正相关;（3）自我概念在儿童虐待与戒毒动机间起部分中介作用。结论：治疗戒毒人群的心理成瘾,应评估其儿童虐待情况,针对有儿童虐待经历者,可通过构建积极自我概念的方式改善戒毒动机,进而提高戒毒成功率。     

团体宽恕干预在恋爱受挫群体中的运用及其对大学生心理健康教育的启示

为探讨团体宽恕干预在大学生恋爱受挫群体中的应用效果,本研究以31名在恋爱中受到过伤害的女大学生为对象进行6次团体宽恕干预,并设立一般干预组和控制组进行比较。研究结果显示：（1）前测中,三个组在恋爱宽恕问卷的四个维度、抑郁量表、焦虑量表和幸福感量表上均不存在显著差异;（2）后测中,在恋爱宽恕问卷的四个维度上,宽恕干预组均优于控制组,而一般干预组和控制组没有显著差异;在抑郁、焦虑和幸福感三个量表上,宽恕干预组和一般干预组都要优于控制组,但两个干预组之间差异并不显著;（3）前后测比较显示,宽恕干预组在各个指标上均有了显著变化;一般干预组在抑郁、焦虑和幸福感量表的得分上有了显著变化,但在恋爱宽恕的各个维度上（除报复维度）变化不显著;控制组则在各个指标上都没有显著变化。研究表明,面对恋爱受挫群体,宽恕干预的针对性更强,并对大学生的心理健康教育具有一定的启示作用。     

Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure

New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are inconsistent or that total failure and naked tryings are metaphysically impossible. Rather, my aim is be to build a case against the possibility of naked, independently existing tryings, by questioning how well we understand the scenarios invoked in their favour. Thus, rather than attempting to present a definitive metaphysical refutation of New Volitionalism, I attempt to diminish or demolish its underlying motivation.

From universal laws of cognition to specific cognitive models

The remarkable successes of the physical sciences have been built on highly general quantitative laws, which serve as the basis for understanding an enormous variety of specific physical systems. How far is it possible to construct universal principles in the cognitive sciences, in terms of which specific aspects of perception, memory, or decision making might be modelled? Following Shepard (e.g., 1987 ), it is argued that some universal principles may be attainable in cognitive science. Here, 2 examples are proposed: the simplicity principle (which states that the cognitive system prefers patterns that provide simpler explanations of available data); and the scale‐invariance principle, which states that many cognitive phenomena are independent of the scale of relevant underlying physical variables, such as time, space, luminance, or sound pressure. This article illustrates how principles may be combined to explain specific cognitive processes by using these principles to derive SIMPLE, a formal model of memory for serial order ( Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007 ), and briefly mentions some extensions to models of identification and categorization. This article also considers the scope and limitations of universal laws in cognitive science.     

Free Choice

In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can, however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice. Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism.