Profiting from poverty

We consider whether and under what conditions it is morally illicit to profit from poverty. We argue that when profit counterfactually depends on poverty, the agent making the profit is morally obliged to relinquish it. Finally, we argue that the people to whom the profit should be redirected are those on whom it counterfactually depends.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

How intention to retrieve a memory and expectation that a memory will come to mind influence the retrieval of autobiographical memories

While involuntary memories are retrieved with no intention and are usually unexpected (when one is not waiting for a memory to arise), voluntary memories are intended and expected (when one is searching and waiting for a memory to arise). The present study aimed to investigate the effects of retrieval intentionality (i.e. wanting to retrieve a memory) and monitoring processes (i.e. waiting for a memory to appear) during autobiographical memory retrieval. In addition, we introduced two novel laboratory conditions that have not been used in previous research on voluntary memories: in the first, participants were asked to report anything they could think of in response to each cue word; in the second, they could skip a word if nothing came to mind. These novel manipulations allowed us to differentiate between voluntary memories retrieved in response to experimenter-generated cues (when participants were forced to provide a memory or a thought for each cue) and self-selected cues (when participants were free to not answer a cue if they found it too difficult). We found that highly accessible memories were mostly experienced when retrieval was involuntary and unexpected, while memories with low accessibility were accessed through intentional retrieval and monitoring processes. Response times for memories recalled in the experimenter-generated cue conditions were longer compared to the self-selected cue conditions. This novel finding shows that experimenter-generated recall favours memories with low accessibility; it further supports the idea that, in a substantial number of trials, voluntary memories are directly rather than effortfully retrieved. The idea that the driving force behind differences between involuntary and voluntary memories is not the intention per se is further discussed.     

物质主义者自我概念的特点和相关理论

物质主义的经典研究分别从人格、价值观、目标和需要的角度界定和理解物质主义的相关现象。自我概念一直是贯穿物质主义研究的线索, 但直到最近研究者才试图以它为理论基点统摄与整合已有研究。相关研究表明, 物质主义者对自我的评价较低, 表现为低自尊、权变性自尊; 对自我的认识具有不一致性, 表现为自我概念不清晰、外显-内隐自尊分离、以及自我差距(理想自我与现实自我的差距)。最近出现的两个综合理论——物质主义的自我逃离理论与物质主义的认同目标追求理论提出, 物质主义是个体将物质拥有作为逃避自我的方式或满足自我认同动机的手段。这两个理论弥补了现有物质主义研究缺乏整合性理论的不足。未来研究可以通过借鉴有关自我概念的理论, 超越单纯的物质主义者自我匮乏的思路, 从而做出更大的理论贡献。     

Shock and awe: Distinct effects of taboo words on lexical decision and free recall

Taboo stimuli are highly arousing, but it has been suggested that they also have inherent taboo-specific properties such as tabooness, offensiveness, or shock value. Prior studies have shown that taboo words have slower response times in lexical decision and higher recall probabilities in free recall; however, taboo words often differ from other words on more than just arousal and taboo properties. Here, we replicated both of these findings and conducted detailed item analyses to determine which word properties drive these behavioural effects. We found that lexical-decision performance was best explained by measures of lexical accessibility (e.g., word frequency) and tabooness, rather than arousal, valence, or offensiveness. However, free-recall performance was primarily driven by emotional word properties, and tabooness was the most important emotional word property for model fit. Our results suggest that the processing of taboo words is influenced by distinct sets of factors and by an intrinsic taboo-specific property.     

How to Release Oneself from an Obligation: Good News for Duties to Oneself

In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.     

Disagreements Over Analogies

This essay presents a dialogical framework for treating philosophical disagreements as persuasion dialogues with analogical argumentation, with the aim of recasting philosophical disputes as disagreements over analogies. This has two benefits: (1) it allows us to temporarily bypass conflicting metaphysical intuitions by focusing on paradigmatic examples, (dis)similarities, and the plausibility of conclusions for or against a given point of view; and (2) it can reveal new avenues of argumentation regarding a given issue. This approach to philosophical disagreements is illustrated by studying the role of argumentation by analogy in disputes over Lockean justifications of intellectual property rights, and disagreements over whether artificial agents should be treated as moral agents. Finally, a nonexhaustive list of possible global and local points of contention over analogical arguments is identified in order to highlight potential avenues of argumentation in disagreements over analogies.     

The Influence of Time Estimation and Time‐Saving Preferences on Learning to Make Temporally Dependent Decisions from Experience

In this paper, we merge research related to experiential learning, temporal perception, and the value of time and money by examining decisions where the timing of action (response) determines the outcome received. We predicted that time‐saving preferences and impatience would decrease maximization (i.e., taking action when it returned the largest reward), and that the constraints of temporal perception would compound their effects. Across three studies, participants undershot on average (i.e., responded earlier than the period of time during which a response would return the maximal reward) showed a preference for shorter‐delay options and often did not find the maximal reward. In addition, participants' reliance on temporal perception increased undershooting, increased preferences for shorter‐delay options, and reduced maximization. Nevertheless, participants who found the maximal reward continued to maximize at a high rate rather than opting for shorter delays and smaller rewards. Thus, while most participants appeared to have a preference for saving time, most behaved as reward maximizers rather than temporal discounters. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of circular motion on judgment of rotation direction and depth order in visual motion

Abstract:  The rotation direction and depth order of a rotating sphere consisting of random dots often reverses while it is viewed under orthographic projection. However, if a short viewing distance is simulated under perspective projection, the correct rotation direction can be perceived. There are two motion cues for the rotation direction and depth order. One is the speed cue; points with higher velocities are closer to the observer. The other is the vertical motion cue; vertical motion is induced when the dots recede from or approach the observer. It was examined whether circular motion, which does not have any depth information but induces vertical velocities, masks the vertical motion cue. In Experiment 1, the effects of circular motion on the judgment of the rotation direction of a rotating sphere were examined. The magnitude of the two cues (the speed cue and the vertical velocity cue) as well as the angular speed of circular motion was varied. It was found that the performance improved as the vertical velocity increased and that the speed cue had slight effects on the judgment of the rotation direction. It was also found that the performance worsened as the angular speed of the circular motion was increased. In Experiment 2, the effects of circular motion on depth judgment of a rotating half sphere were investigated. The performance worsened as the angular speed of the circular motion increased, as in Experiment 1. These results suggest that the visual system cannot compensate perfectly for circular motion for the judgment of the rotation direction and depth order.