Regional cerebral blood flow response in a patient with remitted global amnesia

A case of remitted global amnesia, believed to have residual left medial temporal lobe damage, is tested by the same recognition memory paradigm used by Wood, Taylor, et al. in the previous paper. On two different testing occasions, once using an intentional and once an incidental memory procedure, the patient's right occipital flows were inversely correlated with memory accuracy and the values were very close to the regression line for 10 normals relating occipital flow to memory accuracy. The left occipital flows did not fit the regression line, however. The results were interpreted as consistent with the notion that occipital flow is inversely related to medial temporal lobe activation. Another surprising feature of this case is the unexpected persistence of amnesia for a period from about 5 to 10 years before her episode to about 2 weeks after the episode, with recovery of memory functioning for the period since that time.     

Regional cerebral blood flow response during rest and memory activation in a patient with global amnesia

A college professor with a classical amnesic syndrome is described. He has a WAIS IQ of 130, but dramatic memory loss for episodes ranging from a few seconds ago all the way back to portions of his childhood. The amnesia was of sudden onset, 2 years prior to the current memory tests and regional cerebral blood flow measurements. The etiology is believed, though not conclusively proven, to be medial thalamic infarction. rCBF measurements were taken on six separate occasions, four resting baseline, one memory activation, using the previous procedure of Wood, Taylor, et al., and one carbon dioxide activation. The resting baseline showed extremely low flows throughout the cortex, with some hyperfrontal response on the first baseline. With CO₂ activation, however, there was brisk, uniform reactivity, with all sites showing increased flow. This suggested that there were no prominent areas of impaired vasomotor control or probable ischemic damage in the cortical surface. During memory activation, there was also a generalized increase in flow, especially in the frontal areas. This was in sharp contrast to the pattern for normals, described by Wood, Taylor, et al., which shows a slight overall decrease in flow from baseline to memory activation. The results are interpreted in light of Talland's proposal that the amnesic syndrome reflects an arousal failure, with premature closure and shutdown of memory processing, especially at retrieval. Here the arousal failure is interpreted as an inadequate restriction or focusing of cortical activation, with resulting pathologically diffuse flow increases.     

Frank Ebersole on Wittgenstein and Pictures in Philosophy

How do we get into trouble in philosophy, and what do pictures have to do with it? This article addresses Frank Ebersole's thoughts on (Wittgenstein's remarks on) pictures in philosophy. It identifies the puzzlement generated for Ebersole by what Wittgenstein says and also considers some puzzling aspects of Ebersole's own renderings of pictures. It distinguishes between the philosophical picture and the pictorial form in which it may be crystalized and shows how philosophy's reliance on situationally disembedded grammatical stories (pictorial or not) leads us into trouble. Accordingly, responding to such trouble consists not in recovering the picture, in the sense of a single “object” or image we had before our mind's eye, but in—what is better described as Ebersole's strategy of—supplying a grammatical example (pictorial or otherwise) to go with our thinking, an example that makes what we think and say clear to ourselves.     

Free recall of concrete and abstract words in poor and normal readers

The present study compared poor and normal readers in second and sixth grade on free recall of concrete and abstract words. On the basis of the assumption that memory for abstract words relies more heavily upon linguistic coding ability than does memory for concrete words, it was expected that poor readers would have much greater difficulty on recall of abstract words than would normal readers, but would more closely approximate the normal readers on recall of concrete words. The hypothesis was confirmed at the second-grade level but not at the sixth-grade level, wherein the magnitude of group differences on concrete words was comparable to that on abstract words. Post hoc analyses of intrusion errors suggested that the linguistic coding hypothesis may be a viable explanation of reader group differences on memory tasks only at lower age levels.     

The prevalence of mental retardation: Cross-cultural considerations from Sweden and the United States

Recent reports from Sweden and other European countries have shown a sharp disparity between their incidence and prevalence figures on mild mental retardation and similar figures in the U.S. (Grunewald, 1979; Martin, Blodgett, Edwards, Geer, & Melcher, 1974; Robinson & Robinson, 1976).The purpose of this paper is to provide a model of intellectual performance that might explain such disparities and predict future levels of occurrence of mild mental retardation. Such explanations should have relevance for our views on the development of intellectual ability as well as, on a practical level, planning the allocation of treatment resources. Such planning clearly depends upon the number of children having the condition in question.Over the past few decades we have progressed substantially in our ability to describe mental retardation and to differentiate it from conditions that superficially resemble it; such as, autism, learning disabilities, schizophrenia, etc., (Baroff, 1974; Robinson & Robinson, 1976). Our ability to identify variables that relate to mild mental retardation also has developed substantially, but correlation does not necessarily lead to understanding. One of the large set of variables that often is associated with mild mental retardation in the U.S. is poverty. But “poverty” is too broad a variable to be explanatory. Such a dimension is a surrogate factor standing in the place of other variables, not yet understood, that control, in part, the actual process, by which the child develops the condition of mild mental retardation (Kirk & Gallagher, 1983). A series of papers has been presented by psychologists in Sweden that allow us to address this issue.The ability to observe two cultures, Sweden and the U.S., that have both substantial similarities and differences provides a natural comparison of the prevalence of mental retardation that would be impossible to achieve through experimental manipulation. Prevalence is used here as the total number of cases present in a population group during a specific interval of time (Kramer, 1975).     

Intentional action and the frame-of-mind argument: new experimental challenges to Hindriks

Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [(2003). “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the “frame-of-mind condition”, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [(2008). “Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 630–641; (2014). “Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.” Mind & Language 29: 51–72] has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According to his “Normative Reason account of Intentional Action”, a side-effect counts as intentional only when the agent thought it constituted a normative reason not to act but did not care. In this paper, I put Hindriks’ account to test through two new studies, the results of which suggest that Hindriks’ account should be rejected. However, I argue that the key conceptual insight behind Hindriks’ account can still be saved and integrated in future accounts of Knobe’s results.     

Feind Oder Zeuge Des Glaubens? Nietzsche im Spiegel der Russischen Religiösen Philosophie

Sehr früh machte sich die russischeintellektuelle und literarischeÖffentlichkeit mit den Ideen von Nietzschevertraut, und bald entbrannten – nach gutrussischer Art – heftige Kontroversen, in derenZentrum die russische religiöse Philosophiestand. Mit Ausnahme von Solov'ëv, der eineunwiderlegbare Kritik an Nietzsches Atheismusausübte, aber sich damit begnügte,versuchten Berdjaev, estov und Frank dieinneren Widersprüche und Ambivalenzen desPredigers des ``Übermenschen aufzudecken.'Diese Denker waren geneigt neben dem``Antichrist' auch dem Gottsucher Rechnung zutragen, der, obschon Gott leugnet, dennoch umihn ringt und durch die Aufrichtigkeit undLeidenschaftlichkeit seines Erlebens derGottesfrage zu ihrem besseren und tieferenVerständnis beitragen kann.     

A RELATIVISTIC ESCHATOLOGY: TIME,ETERNITY, AND ESCHATOLOGY IN LIGHT OF THE PHYSICS OF RELATIVITY

Unique epistemological challenges arise whenever one embarks on the critical and self‐critical reflection of the nature of time and the end of time. I attempt to construct my preference for an eschatological distinction between time and eternity from within a middle way, avoiding both the hubris that claims complete comprehension and the resignation that concedes readily to know nothing. Surveying the history of reflection on this multifaceted question of time, with its ephemeral and everlasting dimensions, I argue that the eschatological interplay between the “already” and the “not yet” has much to offer: promise for the religion‐science dialogue as well as hope for humanity, especially for those on society's bleakest edges. But understandings of time, to be authentically theological, must be also informed by cosmology and the physics of relativity. My proposal seeks to respect the theological and scientific interpretations of the nature of time, serving the ongoing, creative interaction of these disciplines. Between physics and theology I identify four formal differences in analyzing eschatology, all grounded in the one fundamental difference between extrapolation and promise. Discussion of what I term deficits in both the scientific and theological approaches leads to further examination of the complex relationship between time and eternity. I distinguish three models of such relationships, which I label the ontological, the quantitative, and the eschatological distinction between time and eternity. Because of the way it embraces a multiplicity of times, especially relating to the culmination and the consummation of creation, I opt for the eschatological model. The eschatological disruption of linear chronology relates well to relativ‐istic physics: This model is open, dynamic, and relational, and it may add a new aspect to the debate over the block universe.