Incorrect estimates and false reports: How framing modifies truth

Nearly all framing studies to date presuppose unbiased estimates. If an expert says that “programme A will save 200 people”, it is tacitly assumed that this prediction is correct. In real life this is rarely the case. In the present study people were asked to evaluate such claims that eventually turned out to be incorrect. Participants in five experiments were asked to rate how correct, and how true, are predictions and reports that either overstate or understate the facts. Overall, understatements were considered more accurate than overstatements, and pessimistic statements were better than overly optimistic ones. Thus predictions of an outcome that turns out better than expected should preferably have been presented in a positive frame (e.g., money saved), whereas outcomes that turn out worse than expected will appear less “wrong” if predictions were presented in a negative frame (e.g., money lost). Parallel studies were performed with wrong predictions and incorrect factual claims (lies). In all studies, correctness ratings were affected by the way the statements were framed.     

Individual differences in a within-subjects risky-choice framing study

A within-subjects study investigated several different risky-choice framing problems patterned after Kahneman and Tversky’s classic economic game, the Asian Disease problem, but included variations to increase generality. Risk-style and thinking-style were utilized to predict individual differences in response to the framing problems. Significant framing effects were found at both the item and composite level. Individual difference effects were rare when framing was strictly defined as a preference reversal. When a more encompassing preference shift defined framing, risk-averse individuals (measured by the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire) and those scoring high on experiential (heuristic) thinking were more likely to show a framing effect. Discussion focuses on the meaning of these results in terms of individual susceptibility to framing.     

Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist extraction,truncation, and conversion

In the first section of this paper, we analyze classic framing effects according to principles of fuzzy-trace theory. The key principle of the theory is that reasoning prefers to operate on simple gist, as opposed to exact details. Then, we introduce new data in three experiments designed to test this fuzzy-processing assumption. In the first experiment, framing effects were conserved when numerical information was omitted from standard problems, arguing against a critical role for numerical processing. In the second experiment, evidence is presented that some subjects simplified framing problems by mentally truncating linguistically redundant complements in gambles. Experimentally deleting parts of gambles mimiced such effects, and choices varied depending on the information that remained explicit. In the third experiment, truncation effects were also demonstrated for mixed-frame problems, in which one option is positive and the other is negative. The data disconfirmed a ‘halo’ hypothesis that subjects merely selected the positive option over the negative one. Instead, choices were accounted for by conversion, that is, transforming problems into uniformly positive representations to avoid the complexity of negation. In all three experiments, choices could be explained as a consequence of radically simplifying decision information.     

Predicting the intensity of losses vs. non-gains and non-losses vs. gains in judging fairness and value: A test of the loss aversion explanation

Three studies examined the predictions that in the context of evaluation of fairness and concessions in negotiations, losses would be perceived as more intensely negative than non-gains, and that non-losses would be perceived as more positive than gains. Extant studies tested only the first of these predictions. These predictions derive from the principle of loss aversion (LA), according to which losses are experienced more intensely than gains of similar objective magnitude. In this view, losses and non-losses are measured against the steep loss part of the value curve, whereas gains and non-gains are measured against the shallow part of the value curve. Our studies replicated extant studies in confirming the first prediction but failed to confirm the second prediction. Specifically, opposite to the prediction of LA, gains were perceived as more intensely positive than non-losses. It seems, therefore, that LA is not a sufficient explanation of why losses are perceived as more averse than gains. Feature positive and regulatory focus effects are discussed as additional potential contributors to the phenomenon.     

Appraising the unusual: Framing effects and moderators of uniqueness-seeking and social projection

In this paper, we examine people’s appraisals of unusual objects and their intuitions about whether others will like those objects. Prior work suggests uniqueness motives (e.g., Need for Uniqueness) affect appraisals, but the effect of these motives on projection of appraisals to others is unclear. Contrary to some prior work, we argue that uniqueness motives do not govern projection of appraisals but rather that individual differences in perceived similarity to a target group do. We also show that perceptions of uniqueness are partly constructed and susceptible to framing, holding all other object properties constant. In two studies, we confirm our predictions about the effects on uniqueness motives and perceived similarity on appraisals and social projection of those appraisals.     

Sad, thus true: Negativity bias in judgments of truth

An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments, manipulating information valence through framing - and assessing judgments of truth - the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Potential explanations and implications for further research are discussed.     

Threat perception after the Boston Marathon bombings: The effects of personal relevance and conceptual framing

We examined how the Boston Marathon bombings affected threat perception in the Boston community. In a threat perception task, participants attempted to “shoot” armed targets and avoid shooting unarmed targets. Participants viewing images of the bombings accompanied by affectively negative music and text (e.g., “Terror Strikes Boston”) made more false alarms (i.e., more errors “shooting” unarmed targets) compared to participants viewing the same images accompanied by affectively positive music and text (e.g., “Boston Strong”) and participants who did not view bombing images. This difference appears to be driven by decreased sensitivity (i.e., decreased ability to distinguish guns from non-guns) as opposed to a more liberal bias (i.e., favouring the “shoot” response). Additionally, the more strongly affected the participant was by the bombings, the more their sensitivity was reduced in the negatively framed condition, suggesting that this framing was particularly detrimental to the most vulnerable individuals in the affected community.     

Do framing effects make moral intuitions unreliable?

I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then re-examine the evidence which is supposed to support this claim. In doing so, I provide a novel suggestion for how to analyze the reliability of intuitions in empirical studies. Analysis of the evidence suggests that moral intuitions subject to framing effects are in fact much more reliable than perhaps was thought, and that Sinnott-Armstrong has not succeeded in showing that noninferential justification has been defeated.