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281.
Amie Thomasson has articulated a novel conception of ontological debates, defending an easy approach to ontological questions as part of the articulation of a deflationary metaphysical view (Thomasson, 2015). After raising some concerns to the approach, we sketch a neutralist alternative to her ontological framework, offering an even easier way of conducting ontological debates. 相似文献
282.
Khemlani et al. (2018) mischaracterize logic in the course of seeking to show that mental model theory (MMT) can accommodate a form of inference (, let us label it) they find in a high percentage of their subjects. We reveal their mischaracterization and, in so doing, lay a landscape for future modeling by cognitive scientists who may wonder whether human reasoning is consistent with, or perhaps even capturable by, reasoning in a logic or family thereof. Along the way, we note that the properties touted by Khemlani et al. as innovative aspects of MMT-based modeling (e.g., nonmonotonicity) have for decades been, in logic, acknowledged and rigorously specified by families of (implemented) logics. Khemlani et al. (2018) further declare that is “invalid in any modal logic.” We demonstrate this to be false by our introduction (Appendix A) of a new propositional modal logic (within a family of such logics) in which is provably valid, and by the implementation of this logic. A second appendix, B, partially answers the two-part question, “What is a formal logic, and what is it for one to capture empirical phenomena?” 相似文献
283.
Yogi Hale Hendlin 《Zygon》2023,58(2):315-339
The object-oriented ontology group of philosophies, and certain strands of posthumanism, overlook important ethical and biological differences, which make a difference. These allied intellectual movements, which have at times found broad popular appeal, attempt to weird life as a rebellion to the forced melting of lifeforms through the artefacts of capitalist realism. They truck, however, in a recursive solipsism resulting in ontological flattening, overlooking that things only show up to us according to our attunement to them. Ecology and biology tend to get lost in the celebration of “thingness,” which puts on par artifacts, trash, and living beings. Such abstractions fail to understand the political, ethical, and ontological implications of eliding the animate/nonanimate distinction, which from the opposite direction (of flattening) reproduce the same violences of historical colonialism (hierarchical humanism). I argue that ontological flattening entails epistemological narcissism, fails to take into account plural (interspecies) perspectives, and propose biosemiotics can address these shortcomings through becoming-with nonhuman knowledge. 相似文献